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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The decade since the Maastricht treaty has seen numerous instances of opposition to the 
European Union across its member states.  Despite this, focused and systematic research on 
opposition has been scarce, resulting in an incomplete understanding of this phenomenon.  
This thesis describes, analyses and explains organised opposition, using France and the UK 
between 1985 and 1999 as case studies.  An institutionalist approach is used, relegating 
traditional socio-historical explanations to a secondary position. 
 
The hypotheses state that political events at the European level will drive the formation and 
development of opposition within a country, but interactions with the country's political and 
social structures will produce specific patterns.  In particular, the country's institutional 
structure will have profound effects on this process, especially the relative ease of access and 
carrying capacities of formal political institutions.  These factors are hypothesized to control 
the development of opposition both within and outside formal institutions.   Over time anti-
EU groups (be they parties or non-party groups) will increase in volume and profile, as they 
penetrate the system. 
 
In order to test this model, anti-EU groups are classified on the basis of their form, 
objectives and ideology.  Institutions are shown to play an important role in group structure 
and strategy, while group formation is clearly driven by events at the European level.  
Finally, group volume and media profile have grown over time, although electoral success 
presents a much more ambivalent picture, reflecting the issue's low importance for the 
general public and highlighting the lack of a link between volume and influence. 
 
The thesis provides a testable model that can be used across Europe to explain national 
aggregate patterns of anti-EU opposition.  The first-order nature of opposition also 
highlights the increasing importance of the EU in national polities and publics. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the development of opposition to the European Union in France and 
the UK between 1985 and the end of 1999.  It discusses the reasons for the creation and 
mobilisation of that opposition, while also considering the extent to which the form of 
opposition is shaped by the institutional structures within each country, and the profile that 
such opposition has had.  In so doing, this piece of research provides both a typology of the 
opposition in each country and a means of describing the aggregate pattern of opposition in 
other national systems. 
 
In this introduction, the focus will be on the why, what and how of the thesis.  The case for 
studying opposition in general, and these case studies in particular, will form a first section.  
This will be followed by an examination of the parameters that the study will encompass, in 
particular the definition of what constitutes opposition to the European Union (EU).  A 
discussion of the hypotheses follows, before the methodology used in this study is laid out 
and explained.  A brief overview of the structure of the rest of the thesis concludes this 
introduction. 
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WHY LOOK AT THIS SUBJECT? 
 
The first question that any thesis must address is its raison d’être.  It is essential that both the 
author and the reader are clear from the outset why it is that the given subject has been 
chosen, and what it is that the thesis sets out to do.  These two elements are vital because 
they give direction and meaning to all of the work that follows. 
 
It is an oft noted point that most literature on European integration is conditioned by current 
events.  From the neo-functionalist approach of the 1950s and early 1960s, through the 
intergovernmentalist critiques that developed afterwards, through to the work on multi-level 
governance from the 1980s onwards, all have sprung out of the evolution of an economic 
community into a European Union.1  So too it is with this thesis. 
 
Since the early 1990s, the substantial increases in both the scope and depth of European 
competencies took the European Union into a new stage of its development.2  At the same 
time, a previously isolated phenomenon became both increasingly common and increasingly 
important, namely the creation of opposition towards the integration process, both at elite 
and public levels.  The extended ratification process of the Treaty on European Union 
between 1991 and 1993 is the most widely acclaimed expression of this development.  More 
recently, there have been the failed referenda in Denmark (on membership of the Euro in 
2000) and Ireland (on ratification of the Nice treaty in 2001), as well as increasingly 
prominent politicians who oppose the current process of European integration, such as Jean-
Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider and Pia Kjærsgaard.  After several decades where integration 
appeared to be becoming less, rather than more, contentious, the Union has faced falling 
levels of public support, even in member states that have traditionally been more positive.3 
 
It could be argued that this is nothing new.  There have always been figures such as Charles 
de Gaulle or Margaret Thatcher, who have wanted to shift the direction and goal of 
European integration to very different ends.  Ever since the first enlargement in 1973 to the 
                                                     
1 For a good example of this evolution and academics’ view of it, see Chapter 1 of S. George & I. Bache, 2001, 
Politics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  Standard key titles include E. Haas, 
1958, The uniting of Europe, Stanford, Stanford University Press; S. Hoffmann, 1966, ‘Obstinate or 
obsolete? The fate of the nation state and the case of Western Europe’, in Daedalus, Vol.26, pp.892-908; 
and G. Majone, 1996, Regulating Europe, London, Routledge. 
2 See D. Dinan, 1999, Ever closer union: An introduction to European integration, 2nd ed., Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, or S. Hix, 1999, The political system of the European Union, London, Macmillan, for complete 
overviews of this evolution. 
3 See Eurobarometer 57 (at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm) for 
summary tables of public opinion.  Average support for membership as a “good thing” fell from an historic 
high of 72% in 1991 to 46% 1996: it is currently 54%. 
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UK and Denmark there have been populations that have been much less enthusiastic than 
most about ‘Europe’: indeed, 1972 was the year that Norway first voted against membership. 
 
However, to take this approach would be to miss the fundamental difference between these 
people and events and the current situation.  While there were undoubtedly elements 
opposed to the integration process before the 1990s, they were isolated within specific 
countries and to specific issues.4  By contrast, one of the major features of the current wave 
of opposition to European integration is its presence in almost every country, both those that 
are already members and those that are negotiating their membership.  It is found at both the 
elite and the popular level and it has resulted in the formation of hundreds of anti-EU groups 
and organisations.  In short, it is pandemic as a phenomenon in present-day Europe. 
 
This increasing visibility of opposition to the European Union represents the first main 
reason for studying the subject.  It has an intrinsic value as the focus of this thesis.  This 
value derives from the substantial volume that the opposition movement has developed 
during the 1990s, drawing in increasing numbers of individuals and groups and resulting in 
new and novel forms of organisation and activity.  This thesis focuses on this opposition, 
trying to understand where it has come from and how it manifests itself.  Through 
addressing these questions, the thesis also starts to explore the question of what impact 
opposition has had and will have in the future. 
 
This last point leads into the second set of reasons for studying opposition.  As opposition 
has raised its profile over the past decade, so it has potential effects on the process to which 
it is opposed.  In the years since the Single European Act, the European Union has become a 
much more developed and integral part of political life in Europe, whether one looks at its 
growing membership, its involvement in almost every public policy field or its public 
profile.  Thus opposition to the EU is an increasingly visible element of an increasingly 
visible whole, i.e. the EU itself.  And this is set to continue being the case, as the Union of 
the new millennium is confronted with new challenges: the introduction of Euro notes and 
coins in January 2002, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, and an Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) in 2004 that will be the culmination of a debate on the nature of the Union 
and its possible constitutionalisation.  Each one of these has the potential to bring with it 
new tensions to the existing system and to make the EU – and by extension opposition – 
even more of an important issue. 
                                                     
4 Not that this should be read as taking events such as the Luxembourg Compromise or the British budget rebate 
as unimportant in the European Union’s development. 
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Seen as such, and given the increasing profile and potential importance of anti-EU 
opposition, this study will provide a useful addition to the study of the EU as a whole.  The 
development of dedicated anti-EU groups and falling public support arguably changes the 
set of possible paths that are open to the European Union.  The Danish ‘No’ vote on the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 demonstrates the point, having consequences not only for the 
Danish government, but also for ratifications in France and the UK, as well as the 
development of transparency and information strategies at the European level.  Put the other 
way around, in order to have a full understanding of the European Union, it is necessary to 
have an understanding of the role of opposition.  This is true whether the subject is being 
approached from the academic’s or the practitioner’s viewpoint: the former needs to 
integrate opposition into models of integration, while the latter needs to understand the 
causes and objectives of opposition in order to build a strategy that can manage this new 
phenomenon. 
 
Creating models of opposition formation and development offers two main means of 
discussing European integration more generally.  The first has already been mentioned, 
namely a consideration of the impact of opposition on the Union’s development.  However, 
this requires an initial analysis of what opposition groups have achieved and are aiming 
towards, in terms of objectives.  As a result, any comment on impact is somewhat 
speculative and will be limited to some observations made in the conclusions.  More 
directly, the second point of interface between opposition and the European Union is 
opposition formation: what drives the formation of opposition groups?  Whether it is found 
that groups are formed as a direct result of European events or as a consequence of national 
debates, the findings will add to the understanding of how the EU interfaces with the general 
public.  Is opposition to the EU simply another example of Europe as a second-order issue, 
or does it possess characteristics that mark it out as a direct link between citizens and the 
Union? 
 
The answer to this last question will involve reflection upon the nature of European 
integration in its present state.  With the Convention on the Future of the EU currently 
debating possible alternative models for the next IGC in 2004, this thesis could offer some 
useful and timely insights into how the Union is received by individuals, what issues 
mobilise public opposition and future potential points of friction. 
 
If the reasoning for the thesis has concentrated so far on the specific case of opposition to the 
EU, then this should not obscure the importance of considering opposition in a more general 
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sense.  Robert Dahl described the development of legalised opposition to the government as 
one of the “great milestones in the development of democratic institutions”, while Karlheinz 
Neunreither calls it a “new qualitative dimension to the [political] system”.5  Yet despite 
such strong words, the study of opposition remains at best patchy at any level of 
government, let alone the European Union.  While there has been a wave of new writing 
over the past few years, it is still far from comprehensive.6 
 
In Hegelian terms, opposition can be seen as the antithesis to government’s thesis, the 
necessary counterpart needed to produce an advance in the form of a synthesis.  Opposition 
is of necessity a relative phenomenon, since there has to be something to oppose and to react 
against.  Moreover, the form of opposition reflects the form of that which it opposes.  Thus 
in studying it, the object of that opposition is also under study, resulting in a better 
understanding of that object.  This is the case whether considering this research topic as a 
matter of specific case studies, as opposition in the EU more generally, or as an abstract 
question of opposition in political systems. 
 
At the same time, it should be recognised that this is a novel form of this phenomenon.  The 
novelty stems from the two level nature of the European Union and the way in which 
opposition has reacted to that fact.  This is the result of the Union being neither a 
replacement (i.e. a ‘super-state’) nor a reinforcement (i.e. a glorified international 
organisation) for the member states, but instead a transformation of them.  As Laffan notes, 
the EU has changed the traditional national triptych of territory, identity and function both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, and the same is necessarily true for opposition to this new 
system.7  This makes this study all the more relevant, given the increasing importance of 
transnational governance structures across the Union.  
 
Three main arguments have been used to justify the importance of this thesis.  Firstly, the 
development of opposition to the EU during the 1990s presents a subject of considerable 
size and pervasiveness that warrants further study in of itself.  Secondly, this opposition 
movement impacts upon the EU and its development, which requires an understanding of 
                                                     
5 R. Dahl, 1966, Political oppositions in Western democracies, New Haven, Yale University Press, p.xi; K. 
Neunreither, 1998, ‘Governance without opposition: The case of the EU’, in Government & Opposition, 
Vol.33-4, pp.419-441, p.436. 
6 For example, the Opposing Europe Research Network was created in 2000 by Paul Taggart and Alexs 
Szczerbiak at Sussex University’s European Institute.  Members of this Network, including this author, 
have produced pieces on party-based opposition across Europe.  A full list is available at: 
http://www.susx.ac.uk/Units/SEI/areas/OpposingEurope.html  
7 See B. Laffan, R. O’Donnell & M. Smith, 2000, Europe’s experimental Union: Rethinking integration, London, 
Routledge, and B. Laffan, 1998, ‘The European Union: a distinctive model of internationalization’, in 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.5-2, pp.235-253, for a detailed explanation of this thesis. 
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how opposition interacts with the European integration process, both as an effect and as a 
cause.  Thirdly, the study of opposition as a phenomenon of modern systems of governance 
remains under-researched, especially in the novel case of the EU.  Taken together, these 
three elements form a strong and coherent case for researching and analysing opposition to 
the EU. 
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WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE THESIS? 
 
Opposition, for all of its importance, is not an easily defined subject.  Even Dahl did not 
provide an all-encompassing definition, concentrating instead on a rather specific case: 
 
“Suppose that A determines the conduct of some aspect of the government of a 
particular political system during some interval… Suppose that during this 
interval B cannot determine the conduct of the government; and that B is 
opposed to the conduct of government by A.  Then B is what we mean by an 
“an opposition.”  Note that during some different interval, B might determine 
the conduct of the government, and A might be “in opposition”.  Thus it is the 
role of opposition that we are interested in…”8 
 
Dahl’s statement avoids a simple, one-line definition, but does contain three basic elements.  
Firstly, there is a connotation of power and control: the group in government not only has 
the desire and means to make policy, but also the position to deny those means to those 
groups outside of government, should it so choose.  Secondly, there is a more normative 
implication that the different groups have different ideas about what policy should be, and 
that the other groups are wrong in their beliefs.  Finally, there is the implicit acceptance of 
the framework – neither group attempts to overturn the system so that they can have 
perpetual control. 
 
However, this basic definition is only a starting point.  Apart from the comment that Dahl 
himself makes straight away, that such a definition is vague and highly abstract, the point 
made in the previous section must be remembered, namely that the EU presents a novel 
situation.9  To this end, it is necessary to consider how the European Union is structured and 
how it creates a particular dilemma for opposition. 
 
Karlheinz Neunreither, in possibly the only piece to explicitly discuss the question, describes 
the EU as ‘governance without opposition’.10  National systems create opportunities at 
various levels for different voices to be raised and accommodated.  These range from an 
overarching ‘unity of the system’ (through a constitution), through Dahl’s government and 
                                                     
8 Dahl, 1966, p.xvi, emphasis in original. 
9 Dahl, 1966, pp.xvi-xvii.  Flood has an interesting discussion on the definition of opposition in the EU: C. Flood, 
2002, ‘Euroscepticism: A problematic concept (illustrated with particular reference to France)’, Paper 
presented at the 32nd annual UACES conference, Belfast, 2-4 September, 2002. 
 17 
 Introduction 
 
opposition, down to a public sphere of debate.  Neunreither not only argues that opposition 
is contained and integrated at each of these levels, but also that a qualitatively new 
community develops, transcending the traditional one-way relationship of rulers and ruled.11 
 
By contrast, the EU lacks all of these mechanisms for containing and integrating opposition.  
Even though there are treaties that lay out various provisions, there is still no formal 
constitution, nor even a popular sense that what already exists can form a proxy for such a 
text.  Furthermore, the institutional framework of the Union does not take the same form as 
in a national context.  Traditionally, national institutions have been divided on a principle of 
divided powers (i.e. executive, legislative and judiciary).  However, the EU’s institutions 
have rather followed a principle of divided interests, with the Council representing the 
member states, the European Parliament the peoples of the Union, the Commission the 
‘European’ interest, and the Court of Justice the law.  Whatever the reasoning behind the 
decision, it has resulted in a system that shares competencies, blurs responsibilities and 
engenders a consensual approach.12  Hence, even in the institution that would most 
obviously represent opposing voices, the Parliament, the dominance of the centre-right 
European People’s Party and the centre-left Party of European Socialists has tended to 
drown out that opposition.  One might also look towards the lack of clear political 
alternations within institutions, the continued importance of unanimity voting in the Council 
and the treaty requirement of impartiality on the part of Commissioners as further examples 
of this consensual system.  As a result, in Neunreither’s opinion, there is a lack of a 
European public sphere and thus a diversion of EU political issues back into national 
frameworks.13  While national systems can deal with opposition at the point of origin, 
usually on matters of government policy, the European system is “very fragile: even minor, 
issue-orientated grievances turn themselves against the system itself.”14 
 
This analysis not only highlights the particularity of the European Union as a governance 
structure, but also contains the basis for a more exact definition of opposition in the context 
of this thesis.  Essentially this contains two elements: intensity and field of operation. 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 Neunreither, 1998.  The only other article dealing with the subject that this author is aware of is the now rather 
dated G. Zellentin, 1971, 'Form and function of the opposition in the European Communities', in R. Barker 
(ed.), Studies in Opposition, Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp.302-322. 
11 Neunreither, 1998, p.436.  This view echoes the work of Karl Deutsch during the 1960s, on the importance of 
communication in building national (and transnational) communities: see K. Deutsch, 1966, Nationalism 
and social communication: An inquiry into the foundation of nationality, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
12 Moravcsik’s critique of this idea – that the structure results from the technical nature of the EU’s work – does 
not sit easily with the role to which the Union’s pretends: A. Moravcsik, 2002, ‘In defence of the 
‘democratic deficit’: Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol.40-4, pp.603-624. 
13 Neunreither, 1998, pp.437-8. 
14 Neunreither, 1998, p.439. 
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At its broadest, opposition might be extended to include anyone who has any sort of feeling 
that either integration as a whole, or the European Union as a particular expression of that 
integration, is anything less than perfect.  Of course, this would effectively rob the word of 
any true meaning, since it would cast the net so wide as to cover almost the entire population 
of Europe and beyond. Hence it is necessary to bring the term down to a more overt 
conception of disagreement with the integration project.  At the broader level, this means a 
rejection of any sort of integration between countries, either via the EU or any other 
organisation.  Such an extreme position is not often found beyond far-right wing and fascist 
bodies of thought, but it should still be considered, inasmuch as it impinges on the narrower 
debate on the EU. 
 
More common is opposition to the EU specifically, as the chosen means of achieving 
integration in Europe.  This prevalence of opposition to the EU is due to the predominance 
of that organisation in the post-war period: no other organisation plays the same role, either 
in terms of scope (especially when one considers the various Central and East European 
Countries lining up to join) and, more particularly, in terms of depth.  The EU is, put simply, 
in a different class from the European Free Trade Association, the Organisation for 
Cooperation and Security in Europe or even NATO. 
 
EU-specific opposition can be subdivided into those who oppose the EU as the particular 
form of integration on grounds of principle, and those who oppose on grounds of practice.  
The former usually seek one of three routes to resolving their opposition: fundamental 
systemic change, withdrawal of their country from the EU or, less commonly, the 
withdrawal of all countries, leading to the EU’s collapse.  The relative lack of interest in the 
third option highlights the preoccupation with ‘regaining control’ of national decision-
making in a particular country: what other countries chose to do is their affair. 
 
Those who oppose on grounds of practice tend to be milder in their opposition, given that 
practice does not of necessity require a systemic change.  Having said this, there are those 
who chose to dress up principled opposition as practical opposition, especially when those 
principles are not widely held (again, this is often the case with far-right groups). 
 
For many, opposition to the EU is based on opposition to certain parts of the project in 
particular (e.g. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), etc.), but is deflected into systemic opposition by the EU’s very structure, as already 
discussed.  Even those elements of opposition that do exist tend to become socialised into 
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the system as they adopt the system’s norms and values.  The normative aspect of whether 
this is a good or a bad thing is not of concern.  More important is that it underlines the wider 
process of consensus building that has taken place as the EU has expanded: at each stage of 
expansion the Union has developed to include particular groups (at the cost of functional 
efficiency and global effectiveness) inside the project. 
 
However, it is not the aim of this research to focus so much on those who have been 
socialised into the Union, but instead to consider those who work actively against the EU 
and its development.  Such a definition has several dimensions.  Firstly, it is broad enough to 
include those who are less than fanatical in their opposition (i.e. the majority), yet tight 
enough to exclude more overtly opportunistic elements, those for whom scepticism is little 
more than a sideshow to their primary goals.  Secondly, it allows for some degree of 
differentiation between those who reject the EU as a whole and those who have continued to 
limit themselves to particular (policy) goals.  Finally, it is not level dependent. 
 
This last point is worth developing, since it is the second part of the definition of opposition.  
If the depth of opposition is highly variable, then so too is its level of operation.  There are 
three key levels to be considered; public opinion, party politics, and an intermediate level 
that will be termed non-party politics. 
 
At the most diffuse level it is possible to take public opinion towards the EU as an 
expression of opposition, be it in terms of opinion polls, elections or referenda.  Such feeling 
can be seen at a national or a European level and provides a useful backdrop for more 
focused opposition.  In the chapter on France and the UK’s relationship with the EU the 
factors that affect such opinion will be discussed in more depth.15 
 
                                                     
15 The literature on public opinion is not specifically focused on opposition, but usually on various measures of 
support instead.  The most useful pieces include: Hix, 1999, especially chapter 5; M. Gabel, 1998, ‘Public 
support for European integration: An empirical test of five theories’, in The Journal of Politics, Vol.60-2, 
pp.333-354; C. Anderson & K. Kaltenhalter, 1996, ‘The dynamics of public opinion toward European 
integration, 1973-93', in European Journal of International Relations, Vol.2-2, pp.175-199; M. Franklin, 
M. Marsh & L. McLaren, 1994, ‘Uncorking the bottle: Popular opposition to European unification in the 
wake of Maastricht’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.32-4, pp.455-472.  There is also a 
literature on individual countries: For France see J. Evans, 2000, 'Contrasting attitudinal bases to 
euroscepticism amongst the French electorate', in Electoral Studies, Vol.19-4, pp.539-561, or B. Cautrés & 
B. Denni, 2000, ‘Les attitudes des français à l’égard de l’union européenne: Les logiques du refus’, in P. 
Bréchon, A. Laurent & P. Perrineau (eds.), Les cultures politiques des français, Paris, Presses de Sciences 
Po, pp.323-354; For the UK see H. Berrington & R. Hague, 2001, ‘The further off from England: British 
public opinion and Europe’, in A. Menon & V. Wright (eds.), From the nation state to Europe? Essays in 
honour of Jack Hayward, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.66-94, or G. Evans, 1998, 'How Britain 
views the EU', in R. Jowell, J. Curtice, A. Park, L. Brook, K. Thomson & C. Bryson (eds.), British and 
European social attitudes: The 15th report: How Britain differs, Aldershot, Ashgate, Social & Community 
Planning Research, pp.173-189. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible to concentrate on party political actions, given 
their key role in the functioning of European democracies and in the political life of the 
Union and its component members.  This has the advantage of a relatively well-structured 
set of arenas in which actions take place and of a relatively well-defined set of actors within 
those arenas, as well as being the subject of most of the literature on opposition to the EU.16  
Certainly, any clear understanding of the phenomenon of opposition requires a grasp of the 
impact of both party politics and general public opinion if it is to make sense.   
 
Having said this, it is essential to consider also those non-party groups and individuals on an 
intermediate level who make up such a substantial proportion of organised opposition.  This 
intermediate level represents a much richer variety of opinions and actions than the other 
levels, by definition, and yet it is this level that has been largely ignored by academic 
research.17  This includes those groups, organisations and movements that bring together 
elements of political parties and the general public in the sphere of civil society.  Free from 
the constraints of seeking electoral success, these groups can adopt whatever structure and 
positions they feel best represent their interests and priorities, since that is their primary 
purpose. 
 
If the levels of party politics and public opinion are essential in understanding opposition, 
then the intermediate level is no less important in that process of understanding.  Any 
                                                     
16 The key text on comparative party-based opposition towards European integration is still P. Taggart, 1998, 'A 
touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems', in European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol.33-3, pp.363-388, while S. Hix & C. Lord, 1997, Political parties in the 
EU, London, Macmillan, also provides a useful account.  In contrast to public opinion literature, the focus 
has been, as might be expected, on national cases. For the UK, from a very large literature, see S. George, 
1998, An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press; 
H. Young, 1998, This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, Woodstock, Overlook 
Press; or M. Sowemimo, 1996, ‘The Conservative party and European integration 1988-95', in Party 
Politics, Vol.2-1, pp.77-97.  For France, see B. Benoit, 1997, Social-Nationalism: an anatomy of French 
euroscepticism, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing; C. Bidégaray & C. Emeri, 1996, ‘Enjeux européens et 
système des parties politiques français’, in F. d’Arcy & L. Roubon (eds.), De la Ve République à l’Europe: 
Hommage á Jean-Louis Quermonne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, pp.61-76; and A. Guyomarch, 1995, 
‘The European dynamics of evolving party competition in France', in Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.48-1, 
pp.100-123. 
17 Consideration of non-party groups is usually confined to a few brief paragraphs in larger works, and there has 
been no attempt to produce a comparative overview.  Both S. George, 2000, ‘Britain: Anatomy of a 
eurosceptic state’, in Journal of European Integration, Vol.22-1, pp.15-34, and Young, 1998, have slightly 
more discussion on the UK, while S. Milner, 2000, ‘Euroscepticism in France and changing state-society 
relations’, in European Journal of European Integration, Vol.22-1, pp.35-58 is a starting point for France.  
Also see C. Flood, 1997, ‘Euroscepticism in the ideology of the British and French right: A comparison’, 
Paper presented at the 1997 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 
August 28-31, 1997, for a comparative approach.  The recent development of large-scale demonstrations 
has attracted some interest: see P. Bursens & D. Sinardet, 2002, ‘The anti-globalisation movement and the 
EU: Horizontal coherence of the Laeken protesters’, Paper presented at 1st Pan-European Conference on 
European Union Politics, European Consortium for Political Research, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, 
Bordeaux, 26-28 September, 2002.  Non-academic literature is slightly more useful, with helpful directories 
from the federalist European Movement (2000, An A-Z of anti-EU and anti-EMU organisations in Britain, 
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analysis, therefore, needs to consider all three elements together if it hopes to produce 
meaningful results.  In the following section, a research structure will be proposed that 
allows for the integration of the three elements into a single framework.  The use of an 
institutionalist approach to the subject places non-party political activity within the context 
of both public opinion and party activity.  In turn this highlights the linkages between the 
different elements and their relative importance. 
 
Rather than looking at individuals working against the EU, the thesis is concerned instead 
with organised groups, for several reasons.  First and foremost, it is assumed that groups 
have a greater impact on political life than individuals, an assumption that is explored at the 
start of the chapter on group formation.  Groups are more efficient in their work and can 
claim to speak for a larger constituency, elements that result in effectiveness gains greater 
than the sum of their constituent members.  Furthermore, groups also have the advantage of 
being more readily identifiable, since their objectives, structures and activities are relatively 
explicit.  Individuals, on the other hand, do not need to externalise their decision-making 
processes or objectives in quite the same way, a fact that makes objective third-party 
observation very difficult.  Finally, in the context of anti-EU activity, it is rare for 
individuals not to be involved in some kind of group activity: hence, the study of groups 
covers much individual activity.  This last point is dealt with at the end of the chapter on 
group formation, which discusses the relationship between individuals and groups. 
 
As well as not focusing on individual activity against the Union, this thesis also does not 
deal very closely with the discourse that accompanies opposition.  While clearly an 
important part of understanding the objectives and the critique of integration made by those 
opposed to the EU, to engage in a (necessarily) lengthy discussion of the numerous critiques 
that exist would distract from the primary aim of the work, namely the understanding of the 
forces that shape opposition in the first place.  Certainly, discourse does have to be taken 
into some consideration, particularly when looking at ideological motivations for group 
mobilisation and formation, but that has to be balanced with the need for a parsimonious 
project of work.  The discourse that a particular group chooses is dependent first and 
foremost upon the interests of its members, which are in turn what European integration 
impacts on.  Discourse is thus a consequence of integration and opposition, rather than a 
cause.  As a result, it is only where there is a direct need to take account of discursive 
elements that the issue is dealt with directly.  However, this is not to deny that in a broader 
                                                                                                                                                      
London, European Movement, October 2000) and the anti-EU Bruges Group (C. Tame, 1997, The Euro-
sceptical directory, Bruges Group Occasional Paper No. 29, London, Bruges Group). 
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approach to the subject, some awareness of discourse within opposition movements is 
necessary. 
 
To summarise, this section has provided a more precise definition of what opposition to the 
EU entails.  Starting from the observation that the intensity of opposition can vary, this 
thesis will look at those elements that work actively against the EU and its development.  
This then allows for the application of the definition to the three levels that exist within 
national political systems, namely the party political, the non-party political and public 
opinion.  With this, there is now a clear reference point upon which to base the research.  
More pertinently, in the following section, the hypotheses of the thesis will be discussed in 
detail, as well as the methodology; both points that require an understanding of what 
opposition encompasses. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 
Before discussing the methodological approach of the thesis, it is necessary to lay out and 
discuss the central hypotheses.  The hypotheses form a set of three interlinked statements.  
The first concerns the cause of opposition mobilisation and formation, the second the form 
and development of that opposition, and the third its future development.  They are as 
follows: 
 
1. Political events at the European level drive the formation and development 
of groups opposed to the EU within a country, but these events have 
unique interactions with individual countries’ political and social 
structures, producing country-specific effects. 
 
2. This pattern of group formation and development is profoundly affected 
by the country’s institutional structure. 
 
3. Over time these groups will increase in volume and profile, as their scope 
for action and their depth of penetration into formal institutional spaces 
increase. 
 
The first hypothesis argues that it is developments at the European level, rather than at the 
national, which are at the basis of opposition mobilisation and development within a national 
system.  At first glance this might seem a rather obvious statement, but it runs counter to 
much work on the relationship between the two levels.  Literature on European elections, 
referenda and even ‘euroscepticism’ itself has tended to converge on ‘second-order’ 
explanations.18  Such explanations suggest that while the events are ostensibly about 
European issues, their outcomes actually reflect domestic concerns.  By contrast, in this 
thesis the reverse is suggested, namely that while opposition operates within, and makes 
reference to, a national system, it is driven more fundamentally by developments at the 
European level. 
 
Of course, member states do play a role in those European level developments, but for most 
practical purposes that does not matter.  A theorist such as Moravcsik would argue that 
                                                     
18 See M. Marsh, 1998, ‘Testing the second-order election model after 4 European elections’, in British Journal 
of Political Science, Vol.28-4, pp.591-607; M. Franklin, M. Marsh & L. McLaren, 1994; M. Franklin, C. 
Van der Eijk & M. Marsh, 1995, ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for 
Europe in the wake of Maastricht’, in West European Politics, Vol.18-3, pp.101-117; Taggart, 1998. 
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national interests are not obscured by the process of interest aggregation and the complexity 
of decision-making at the European level.19  However, policy outcomes still emanate from 
the European Union itself, and it is this fact that is of primary concern to those opposed to 
the EU, rather than the relative importance of national and supranational elements within the 
system. 
 
At the same time, it is also clear that European developments are conditioned by national 
specificities.  People live in countries, each of which has its own set of political and social 
institutions, with which the EU interacts.  The two-level nature of the system that makes it 
so interesting to study also makes it necessary to consider the relative impact of each level.20  
More concretely, since many of those opposed to the EU would prefer an enhanced role for 
national institutions, there is a keen awareness of how those latter institutions have been 
affected by the integration process.  Thus the modulation of the European by the national is 
both objective and subjective. 
 
The second hypothesis concerns the factors shaping opposition formation and development.  
Here, institutions are accorded a decisive role.  In particular, the concept of ‘institutional 
space’ is introduced, the term that is given to the collection of formal political institutions 
within which opposition can be represented and develop.  Some institutions, such as national 
parliaments, are ideally suited for opposition representation, while others (such as 
presidencies) offer much less scope.  For this reason, for each of the case studies, it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the institution space within that country, in order to 
gauge the likelihood and the location of opposition within that space.  This overview also 
gives an idea of the overall size of the formal institutional space, and so helps in evaluating 
the probability of opposition developing outside it, in the form of non-party political 
groupings. 
 
In basic terms, it will be suggested that the relative difficulty in gaining access to British 
institutions (due to the First Past the Post System) will result in relatively more opposition 
developing in informal spaces, in the form of non-party groups.  At the same time, the 
requirement for cohesive parties will make it difficult for disaffected politicians either to 
start a new party or to fully express their opinion within existing parties, resulting in their 
use of non-party groups to express their disaffection. 
                                                     
19 See A. Moravcsik, 1999, The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht, 
London, UCL Press 
20 R. Putnam, 1988, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', in International 
Organisation, Vol.42-3, pp.427-460, is the starting point for any discussion on this analytical heuristic. 
 25 
 Introduction 
 
 
By contrast, the relative ease of access to French institutions, compounded by the weakness 
of French political parties, will produce a situation in which the locus of opposition will be 
new party formations, since this will be a viable electoral strategy.  Informal opposition will 
be relatively weak and will involve relatively fewer disaffected politicians, who will be able 
to use the party structures to express their opinions. 
 
Formal opposition in both countries other than in the lower house of parliament will be 
limited, either because of a lack of formal institutional spaces (as in the UK) or because of a 
lack of suitability (as in France).  It is only in the case of the European Parliament that there 
exist substantial opportunities for anti-EU elements to gain formal representation. 
 
As has been discussed before, the according of primacy to institutional factors stands in 
contrast to much of the existing literature on the subject of countries’ relationships with the 
EU, which tends towards socio-historical explanations.  In addition to the advantages of 
objectivity and comparability that an institutionalist approach brings, it can also be noted 
that it helps to link the first two hypotheses together.  National institutions play a key role in 
first receiving European developments, so mobilising opposition, before then constraining 
that opposition.  This idea of institutions’ dual action is influenced by the idea of path-
dependency, in as much as there is an evolution over time conditioned by previous states.21  
However, it should be made clear that the focus is at least as much on institutions as 
intervening factors in shaping organisation as it is on the shape of the institutions 
themselves. 
 
The third and final hypothesis, on the increasing volume and profile of opposition, is also 
linked to the first two hypotheses by the institutional approach used, since that profile is in 
part a function of the pattern of opposition that exists.  Within the formal institutional space, 
there will be an optimisation of the institutional possibilities for expressing opposition, while 
outside there will be an optimisation of organisational forms to maximise impact.  At the 
same time, the evolving European system will provide new occasions and new policy issues 
that will drive opposition groups within countries.  Thus opposition group profile is carried 
along by both the actions of opposition groups themselves and the supply of new impetuses 
by the EU. 
 
                                                     
21 See P. Pierson, 2000, ‘Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics’, in American Political 
Science Review, Vol.94-2, pp.251-268, and P. Pierson, 1996, ‘The path to European integration: a historical 
institutionalist analysis’, in Comparative Political Studies, Vol.29-2, pp.123- 163. 
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It should be noted that this hypothesis only claims an increased volume and profile for 
opposition groups, not an increased impact or influence.  This is due to two factors, one 
methodological and one temporal.  The methodological problem arises from the difficulty of 
measuring impact: whether public opinion or political discourse is under consideration, it is 
a relatively subjective matter. The paucity of impartial work in the field makes it very hard 
indeed to make any kind of quantifiable assessment of opposition’s influence.  The temporal 
issue is linked to the relative novelty of opposition to the EU, at least in its present form.  
The current wave of opposition dates from the early 1990s, when the Maastricht treaty began 
a process of major institutional reform.  That process is still under way, and is likely to 
stretch through most of the first decade of the new century, hence the end of the study period 
is at most halfway through a long-term evolution, the outcome of which is uncertain.  Given 
these problems, consideration of opposition’s impact and influence is limited to a discussion 
in the conclusions. 
 
Taken as a whole, these three hypotheses clarify the origin, form and path of opposition to 
the European Union.  Furthermore, they are all falsifiable.  In the event that national factors 
are found to prevail over European developments, or that non-institutional factors are 
essential in explaining patterns of development, or that there is no increase in the volume of 
opposition, then it will be clear that the hypotheses are lacking in some critical respect.  
Moreover, in disproving the hypotheses, at least it will also be apparent why they can be 
disproved, which will follow through to a new and more workable hypothesis. 
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THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The final step after the discussions of the reasons for this research, its parameters and the 
hypotheses is a focus on the means that will be used to conduct it.  The methodology used 
here comprises two discrete parts. Firstly, there is an overarching theoretical framework, 
namely that of institutionalism.  Secondly, there is the use and choice of case studies, 
drawing on comparative politics approaches.  In addition, there is also a limitation in the 
time period covered in the work, for reasons both of historical developments and of viable 
data collection. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONALIST FRAMEWORK 
In most accounts of individual countries’ relationships with the EU, importance is often 
accorded to factors such as historical experience or ‘national particularities’.22  Whether it is 
Britain’s offshore location, France’s fear of a dominant Germany, or German war guilt, such 
factors are seen as critical for an understanding of both that country and its European policy.  
Why then is it not used here? 
 
While such approaches may offer some explanations when considered as part of a much 
more comprehensive study of a country, too often they are used as a means of sidestepping 
contentious points.  It is this tendency to ascribe too much to such explanations that requires 
addressing, not least since a substantial critique can be made of them.  This critique breaks 
down into four key points.  In the first place, there is no agreement as to which elements 
from society or history should be considered important, nor of what order of importance they 
should have, since it is of necessity a subjective process.  Secondly, with such a subjective, 
‘pick and mix’ approach, it is impossible to make comparisons between different political 
systems or countries.  Thirdly, using socio-historical approaches tends to encourage a view 
of countries simply as black boxes, rather than the complex systems that there are.23  Finally, 
                                                     
22 See George, 1998, for the UK and J. Hayward, 1996, ‘La cinquième République et l’intégration 
communautaire’, in F. d’Arcy & L. Roubon (eds.), De la Ve République à l’Europe: Hommage á Jean-
Louis Quermonne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, pp.23-43, for France.  Other examples might include R. 
Haesly, 2001, ‘Euroskeptics, europhiles and instrumental Europeans: European attachment in Scotland and 
Wales’, in European Union Politics, Vol.2-1, pp.81-102; C. Archer, 2000, ‘Euroscepticism in the Nordic 
region’, in Journal of European Integration, Vol.22-1, pp.87-114; H. Larsen, 1999, ‘British and Danish 
European policies in the 1990s: A discourse approach’, in European Journal of International Relations, 
Vol.5-4, pp.451-483; P. Lawler, 1997, ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism and EU’, in Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol.35-4, pp.565-594; T. Swienty (ed.), 1994, Danmark I Europa 1945-93, Copenhagen, 
Munksgaard. A. Forster, 2002, Euroscepticism in contemporary British politics: Opposition to Europe in 
the British Conservative and Labour parties since 1945, London, Routledge, represents a rare exception to 
this. 
23 This was the key argument of Allison and Zelikow, who used the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis to 
emphasis the need to look at organisational outputs and internal actor bargains in order to properly 
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from a more methodological viewpoint, such explanations are suspect because they are not 
falsifiable, since they are chosen precisely because they support the argument and 
alternatives are deemed unimportant: ‘this is a special country’ does not offer much option 
for disagreement. 
 
For all these reasons, socio-historical options have been relegated to a secondary position in 
explaining the creation and development of opposition to the EU within the British and 
French polities.  Instead, attention is focused on the role of institutions.  Every country has a 
set of formal institutions through which political activity is played.  Normally these will be 
national institutions (parliaments, elected heads of state, etc.), but they can also be sub-
national (e.g. regional councils) or even supranational (the European Parliament).  Taking 
each of these institutions and analysing the extent to which it allows the expression of 
dissenting, or opposing, voices, permits the construction of a picture of the ‘institutional 
space’ in which those voices can operate. 
 
This idea of ‘institutional space’ is central to this thesis and is explored at length in the 
following chapter.  However, here it will suffice to note that it offers the possibility of a 
much more objective measure of the forces involved in opposition formation and 
development than does a socio-historical style explanation.  Furthermore, since a 
comparative approach is being used, it allows for the creation of a set of key variables that 
can be transferred between different political systems in a consistent manner. 
 
In all of this, socio-historical explanations are not to be completely ignored.  For a start, it is 
clear that the institutional structures within a national system are the expression of societal 
preferences and historical evolutions.  Here, those structures are taken as givens, without any 
in-depth discussion of why they are shaped the way that they are.  Even so, this is not socio-
historicism by other means: institutions are hypothesised here as powerful agents for shaping 
actors’ preferences in their own right, regardless of their origin.  That they have causal 
factors of their own is not a key concern of this thesis:  institutional change is a medium- to 
long-term process (even in France), whereas opposition to the EU can count its entire 
existence over a much shorter time-span.  Furthermore, as shall be seen in the conclusions, 
socio-historicism can offer some useful elements of explanation when used in conjunction 
with the institutionalist approach used here. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
understand why countries make decisions: G. Allison & P. Zelikow, 1999, Essence of decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed., Harlow, Longman 
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The inspiration for this institutionalist approach comes not only from the perceived 
shortcomings of existing explanations, but also from other sources.  Aspinwall provides the 
best example of an institutionalist approach to understanding the national-European 
relationship with his piece on the UK.24  As will be seen later, this model forms an important 
part of the model used in this thesis.  Dahl places institutional elements at the top of his list 
of explanatory factors in his overview of opposition in Western democracies, noting that 
“[…] to ignore the effects of constitutional and electoral institutions leaves one in serious 
difficulties.”25 
 
On the theoretical level, institutionalism has become an increasingly influential paradigm in 
European studies, albeit in a variety of versions.26  Indeed Aspinwall and Schneider even go 
as far as to say that “almost any Europeanist with a minimal level of self-respect flags 
himself as an ‘institutionalist’ at the moment”!27  While this rather overstates the case, it 
does point to a trend that dates back to the mid-1980s, of looking at actors and norms as the 
basis of understanding the process of integration.  It also allows this thesis to draw on, and 
make comments upon, a body of work that takes a similar approach. 
 
 
CASE STUDIES – THE NECESSITY OF A COMPARATIVE POLITICS APPROACH 
This research will use two case studies, France and the UK, to explore the hypotheses.  It 
might appear strange that a thesis on opposition to the European Union should take two 
national case studies, instead of either the EU itself or a broad comparison of all member 
states.  However, this choice is predicated on the twin pillars of the nature of the European 
system and the space available within a thesis. 
 
As was noted in the discussion of the meaning of opposition, the EU presents very particular 
characteristics.  A national system is structured to allow for the expression, containment and 
absorption of opposing voices, through a series of different mechanisms, such as a 
constitutional framework and a civil society.  By contrast, the EU does not possess such 
mechanisms – or at the very least, is not perceived to possess them – and hence opposition 
                                                     
24 M. Aspinwall, 2000, ‘Structuring Europe: Powersharing institutions and British preferences on European 
integration’, in Political Studies, Vol.48-3, pp.415-442. 
25 Dahl, 1966, p.349.  He also comments that the link between cultural premises and opposition are in large part 
“impressionistic” (p.356). 
26 See M. Aspinwall & G. Schneider, 2000, Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political 
science and the study of European integration', in European Journal of Political Research, Vol.38-1, pp.1-
36, and A. Forster, 1999, ‘The state of the art: Mapping the theoretical landscape of European integration’, 
in Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol.2-1, at 
http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/jird/jird_99foa01.html for discussions of the state of 
theoretical approaches to European integration. 
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on any point of the EU and its functioning is readily turned into something more systemic.28  
Furthermore, and more pertinently here, opposition still cannot be fully expressed at the 
European level, since there are only very limited opportunities for dissenting voices within 
the institutional system, so it has to move back into the existing national systems, where the 
necessary institutional space does exist. 
 
Seen as such, the very structure of the EU pushes opposition down to a national level, 
making the use of national case studies essential.  To this should also be added the 
observation that most critiques of European integration involve the diminution of national 
competencies, and that most alternative plans of European cooperation involve an increased 
role for nation-states (without wishing to attach any particular connotation to that phrase).  
The result of this preference for the national over the transnational is usually manifested in 
the programmes of oppositional groups, which more often than not are more concerned with 
changing their own country’s relationship with the EU than with changing the EU as a 
whole.29  As much as the opportunity structure for opposition is much better at the national 
level than it is at the European, so too the preferences of those in opposition are more 
attuned to national concerns than they are to European ones. 
 
This then is the reasoning behind the use of national case studies.  But why not the use of 
more cases than the two used here?  There are two, interlinked reasons.  As was discussed in 
the use of an institutionalist approach, in rejecting the use of socio-historical explanations for 
the creation and development of opposition, it is necessary to turn to more objective criteria, 
namely institutional spaces.  It then logically requires that for each case used, there is not 
only a discussion of the opposition that is present, but also of the institutional structure in 
that country.  However, within a thesis limited to 100,000 words there has to be balance 
between depth and scope. 
 
Structuring the thesis in this manner clearly makes the choice of the two case study countries 
rather important, in order to avoid confounding explanations.  Furthermore, given the lack of 
literature in the field, any country would be both interesting and useful to study.  Hence the 
choice of France and the UK needs to be justified both on absolute and relative grounds. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
27 Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p.2. 
28 See Neunreither, 1998. 
29 However, it should be noted that transnational and bilateral cooperation between groups has been present since 
the early 1990s.  At the same time, that cooperation has not resulted in any way in coordinated or unified 
programmes of action. 
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Britain’s relationship with the European Union has been the source not only of much 
political discussion, but also of a large academic literature.30  As such, it is particularly 
interesting to evaluate that discussion and literature in light of the institutionalist approach, 
which explicitly rejects the socio-historical frameworks in which much of the debate has 
traditionally been based.  Furthermore, that debate has translated in a very high level of 
organised opposition to the EU; there are probably as many anti-EU groups in the UK as 
there are in all other member states together.31  This means the UK is a rich environment for 
study. 
 
While the sheer volume of organised opposition makes the UK as interesting case study, it is 
not the only reason.  In a European context, the country’s position towards integration has 
been particularly vexed for the entire post-war period.  The initial preferences for classical 
intergovernmental mechanisms eventually led to the UK being excluded from the more 
federalist projects of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic 
Community in the 1950s.  Once finally inside, there were soon considerable tensions, 
resulting in a ‘renegotiation’ of membership with an associated referendum, protracted 
debate over the British contribution to the budget, a lack of willingness to support Economic 
and Monetary Union and little enthusiasm for political integration.  In short, there has been 
an almost continuous set of important issues facing the British polity since the 1950s (at 
least at the elite level), which offers a useful means of examining how the European level 
impacts on the national level, one of the key hypotheses outlined above. 
 
Moreover, the UK offers a very distinctive institutional environment in which to work.  This 
has several dimensions.  Firstly, the dominance of Parliament in the political system has few 
equivalents (the Danish Folketinget is probably the closest example to be found in the EU), 
especially given the lack of counterweights to its power and the principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.  Secondly, the predominant electoral system, First Past the Post, is not only 
unique in Europe, but also a potentially very important factor in the development of 
                                                     
30 Aside from the works on the UK previously mentioned (and particularly Aspinwall, 2000, George, 2000, 
George, 1998, and Young, 1998), the following cover different aspects and periods: D. Baker & D. 
Seawright (eds.), 1998, Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European 
integration, Oxford, Clarendon Press; R. Lofthouse, 1998, ‘Britain, New Labour, Europe and the Euro: 
Current policy and historical perspectives’’, Working Paper, Columbia International Affairs Online, at 
http://wwwc.cc.colmubia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/lor01/lor01.html; H. Wallace, 1997, ‘At Odds with Europe’, 
in Political Studies, Vol.45-4, pp.677-688; I. Loveland, 1996, ‘Parliamentary sovereignty and the European 
Community: The unfinished revolution?’, in Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.49-4, pp.517-535; or P. Stephens, 
1996, Politics and the pound: The Conservative’s struggle with Sterling, London, Macmillan.  This short 
list does not include the large number of pieces produced by opposition groups and individuals, since this 
will be dealt with elsewhere. 
31 This is based on a survey of anti-EU groups’ websites from mid-1999 onwards.  This formed the basis of a 
website with links to each of these groups, available at: http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm. 
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opposition, given its fundamental differences from proportional systems.  Thirdly, and 
related to the previous factor, the British party political system is very consolidated, with 
effectively only two parties capable of holding a parliamentary majority to support a 
government.  This contrasts with most other European countries, where multi-party systems 
and government coalitions predominate.  The essential point behind this is that the specific 
configuration of British political institutions offers a unique model, against which other 
national systems may be compared. 
 
If the choice of the UK is based on the possibilities of making an original contribution to a 
well-known debate, then the choice of France is based as much on its characteristics relative 
to the UK as on its own merits.  Essentially this comes down to their relative similarities in 
socio-historical terms, which will be shown to have only limited explanatory power. 
 
It should be clear that it is not being claimed that France and the UK are identical in terms in 
their histories or their societies, but rather they are relatively similar in comparison to other 
countries.  On the large historical scale, both countries have spanned many centuries, as well 
as both being former imperial powers.  In the more specific context of post-war European 
integration, they were both key players, if for different reasons, in that process and the much 
later date of British entry into the European Economic Community should not hide the 
similarities in the two countries’ European policy.  If the French political class has always 
given the appearance of unreserved enthusiasm for further integration, then it has also 
always aimed to make sure such integration served French interests.32  France was the 
‘awkward partner’, to use George’s phrase, in the Community before 1974, from the failed 
European Defence Community negotiations, through the Treaty of Rome to the Empty Chair 
crisis of 1965-6.  In the period under consideration in this thesis, the British government had 
won its budget rebate and was not much more garrulous than its French counterpart.  The 
former sought opt-outs from the final stage of the single currency and the social protocol, 
finally joined then left the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and briefly attempted an 
empty chair policy over the ban on beef exports.  The latter delayed and diluted reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, resisted liberalisation of various key economic sectors, and 
had the European Parliament’s three seats embodied in Community law.  In short, while the 
bones of contention differ, they exist in both cases. 
 
                                                     
32 Compare this with German attitudes to integration up to the 1990s, based not on power politics but instead on 
reactive support for French projects.  See C.-C. Schweitzer & D. Karsten, 1990, Federal Republic of 
Germany and EC membership evaluated, London, Pinter, for more details, and J. Teschner, 2000, ‘No 
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There are other similarities, all of which come together to make France a closer match to the 
UK than other possibilities.  If it is assumed that those member states that are net 
beneficiaries of EU funds, and especially the Cohesion countries, are likely to have more 
positive attitudes towards the Union (although clearly the recent case of Ireland makes this a 
questionable assumption), then the case studies are not too mismatched.33  France is just 
about a net contributor, receiving large amounts of agricultural support, while the UK’s 
contribution is lessened by the rebate, so it does not reach the levels of Germany or the 
Netherlands. 
 
Even in terms of public support for the EU, there has been a convergence of attitudes in the 
two countries, although the French public is clearly more positive about membership.  While 
French levels of support were uniformly high during the second half of the 1980s, the British 
public became increasingly positive, until both countries experienced a downturn from the 
early 1990s onwards.34  Even if the absolute levels of support continue to differ (by roughly 
10% during the 1990s), then the simultaneous downturn is suggestive of a common cause, a 
point that is reflected in the hypotheses developed in the previous section. 
 
Finally, at a more mundane level, both countries are of roughly equal size.  Small countries 
are often subject to outside forces in ways that larger countries are not: Luxembourg defines 
itself by its membership of the EU in a way that neither the UK nor France do.  Moreover, in 
purely institutional terms, the two countries have equal representation and weight within the 
Union, from the number of votes in the Council to the number of Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). 
 
Institutionally, there is a clear gap between the two.  This point will be discussed at much 
greater length in the following chapter, but it will suffice to mention here that the British 
features of parliamentary primacy, First Past the Post and a consolidated party system 
mentioned above are not found in France.  Instead, there is a division between the President 
and the Assemblée Nationale, a two-round voting system with relatively proportionate 
outcomes and a fractured multi party system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
longer Europe's europhiles? Euroscepticism in Germany in the 1990s’, in Journal of European Integration, 
Vol.22-1, pp.59-86, for more recent developments. 
33 Carrubba suggests that budget transfers can be best explained as side-payments in the integration process (C. 
Carruba, 1997, ‘Net financial transfers in the European Union: Who gets what and why?’, in The Journal of 
Politics, Vol.59-2, pp.469-496). 
34 This is based on Eurobarometer data and is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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In this context, it has been argued that the UK and France possess several similarities.  This 
does not extend to institutional frameworks, since that is the subject of the study, although 
on several points there are certain similarities between them.  But is this really enough to 
stand up to a socio-historical critique that argues that the particularities of both cases make it 
possible to simply line them up against each other?  Certainly, points can be found that are 
peculiar to each country, but such points could be found for any other country. 
 
 
TIMEFRAME AS CONSEQUENCE AND CAUSE 
The final issue to be discussed in this section concerns the choice of dates for the research, 
namely 1985 to the end of 1999.  Why not earlier or later?  The choice effectively reflects 
both the consequences of the hypotheses and the requirements of viable data. 
 
As already mentioned briefly above and discussed at more length in the next section of this 
introduction, opposition is hypothesised to be driven by developments at the European level, 
which in turn interact with national systems.  Thus it would make sense to choose a time 
period that has some meaning at that European level, which 1985-1999 indeed does, 
marking the development of the European Community into the European Union.  1985 
marks the start of negotiations that led to the Single European Act, while 1999 was the year 
that the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, itself the follow up treaty to the Treaty on 
European Union of 1992.  The three treaty cycles of negotiation, signing and ratification are 
further complemented by the programmes to create an internal market and EMU. 
 
At the same time, on a national level, the timeframe encompasses a certain parallel situation 
in the two case studies.  In France, François Mitterrand was President for all but the last four 
years in question, while in the UK the Conservatives held the government through to 1997.  
Admittedly, this is something of an over-simplification, given two French co-habitations and 
the change of Conservative leader in 1990, but it does provide a relative sense of continuity 
to the period.  This stands in contrast to the development of opposition, where the timeframe 
provides a useful ‘before’ and ‘after’ picture.  The bulk of group formation and mobilisation 
took place in the early 1990s in both countries, a fact that will yield a better understanding of 
the forces at work in their creation. 
 
If the timeframe is justifiable on these grounds, then it is also tied to the availability of data.  
For the period before 1985 there are even less available than thereafter, both in terms of 
primary sources and secondary literature, partly because opposition movements were rare 
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and partly they had no appreciable impact.35  Moreover, the data that do exist have only 
limited use, given the qualitative changes in the European system from the Single European 
Act onwards and the subsequently changed relationship between the European and the 
national. 
 
At the other end of the period, it was decided that rather than attempting to provide an 
accurate account up to the last possible moment, it was better to take a definitive end point.  
In the context of Stage 3 of EMU, it is clear that there will be developments for many years 
to come, not least in the UK, where a decision to join still has to be made and put to a 
referendum.  The debate on constitutionalisation is even further from any kind of resolution 
(after the ‘non-treaties’ of Amsterdam and Nice, the Intergovernmental Conference foreseen 
for 2004 is not certain to produce a long-term solution).  More practically, there is also an 
issue of those involved not wishing to divulge information at such a stage; in large part this 
thesis deals with issues that have passed from the public eye. 
 
 
                                                     
35 Zellentin, 1971, has already been mentioned re opposition in the Community.  Apart from D. Butler & U. 
Kitzinger, 1976, The 1975 referendum, London, Macmillan, which is the best account of the No campaign 
in the British referendum, there is nothing more than some public opinion pieces and general accounts of 
the integration process.  An exception that will not be considered here is the small literature on the first 
Norwegian referendum in 1973 (e.g. T. Bjørklund, 1982, Mot strømmen: Kampen mot EF 1961-1972, Oslo, 
Universitetsforlaget). 
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The final section of this introduction looks at the thesis’ structure, in order to help the reader 
to see briefly how it relates to the hypotheses laid out above. 
 
Before entering into the specific matter of opposition to the EU in France and the UK, it is 
first necessary to flesh out the institutional frameworks that exist within the two countries.  
This is necessary because these frameworks form the basis of the rest of the analysis, since 
the European developments that drive opposition are shaped by them, as is the opposition 
itself.  Consequently, the first chapter provides a description of the institutional space within 
each country.  This consists of comparing formal institutions (parliaments, heads of state, 
sub-national bodies, etc.) in order to provide an assessment of locations suitable for 
opposition within that space.  As well as giving a shape to formal opposition, this account 
will also provide an idea of the relative overall sizes of the spaces, and hence the likelihood 
of opposition developing outside it. 
 
Having set out the institutional framework, the second chapter provides the historical 
overview of the two countries’ relationship with the EU from 1985 through to the end of 
1999.  This will include political developments at both national and EU level, changing 
public opinion and the creation and development of opposition groups.  As such, it provides 
the practical material with which to test the hypotheses. 
 
This application covers the next two chapters.  In the first of these, the factors in group 
formation are considered.  By looking at individual groups in both countries, it is possible to 
assess the relative importance of different factors in the formation and development of those 
groups.  This assessment will feed into the evaluations of the first two hypotheses on 
mobilisation and development.  Similarly, the following chapter, which looks at group 
strategies and profile, not only helps with the third hypothesis on impact, but also with the 
second, since the choice of strategies will reflect the institutional constraints that apply to 
those groups. 
 
This then leads into the conclusions, where all of the findings of the research will be brought 
together and compared with the hypotheses.  This will allow for those findings to be placed 
back in the wider literature that exists, in order to see how it fits in.  It will also be the point 
at which a discussion the impact and influence of opposition can be made. 
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1: Institutional Spaces in France and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Introduction, it was suggested that institutional structures played a key role in the 
formation and development of opposition towards the European Union in national systems.  
In order to test this hypothesis, there must be an assessment of what such structures are and 
how they influence opposition formation and development. 
 
The first step is to define what is meant by “institutions” and “institutional structures”.  
While institutionalist theory has tended to construct these very broadly – to cover not only 
bodies such as parliaments and governments, but also rules and practices – the focus in this 
thesis is more upon the former.36  The reason for this stems from the idea that while bodies 
and organisations are indeed constituted by a set of rules and practices, here the main interest 
is the ease of access for opposition elements to those institutions and the extent to which that 
opposition can be carried once inside.  As a result, rules and practices are seen here more as 
a function of institutions proper, than as a category of their own. 
 
The central concept in all of this will be the idea of ‘institutional space’.  As has just been 
noted, the points of particular interest are the ease of access to an institution for an anti-EU 
group or person (hereafter referred to as access), and the subsequent ability of the institution 
to hold and represent anti-EU viewpoints (hereafter, capacity).  This refers both to individual 
institutions and to the sum of those institutions.  While the focus here is on the question of 
anti-EU access and capacity, this concept can be applied to any issue, as long as it is applied 
in a methodical manner. 
 
Working from the second of the main hypotheses – namely that group formation and 
development is deeply affected by institutional structures – a set of sub-hypotheses can be 
developed about how institutions affect development.  Two of these sub-hypotheses apply to 
how institutions have an effect on any sort of interest representation (i.e. of general 
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application), and one applies to how institutions specifically affect anti-EU representation 
(i.e. of specific application).  In this case, the general sub-hypotheses relate to the ease of 
access to institutions and their ability to represent a variety of opinions, while the specific 
sub-hypotheses deal with the relative interests of anti-EU elements towards different 
institutions. 
 
The first of the general sub-hypotheses says that it is easier to gain access to an institution 
that uses a Proportional Representation (PR) system of election, than it is to one that uses 
First-Past-the-Post (FPP).  The reasoning behind this is explained in the next section, but is 
essentially due to the breadth of interests and opinions that each system will typically allow 
through the electoral gateway to representation inside the institution.  Furthermore, both 
electoral systems will allow easier access for any given interest than a system based on 
appointments or, in the most extreme case, heredity.  In these cases, there is no discretion on 
the part of the general public on who will be present in those institutions, nor any guarantee 
that those present will represent any particular opinion. 
 
A second general sub-hypothesis can be made about the capacity of an institution to 
represent opinion.  Here, there is a distinction between institutions that have only one person 
filling them and those that have many people.  In the first category there are presidencies and 
heads of state.  Clearly, in such institutions there is very little scope for the representation of 
a variety of interests, since there is only the one person, so an a priori assumption of a low 
capacity can be made.  At the same time, a multi-member institution such as a parliament or 
council, by its very nature as an assembly of not necessarily convergent opinions, will allow 
for a much wider interest representation.  In general, it might be expected that this capacity 
to represent opinion will rise in a linear fashion, as more members become involved in an 
institution. 
 
Over and above these two general sub-hypotheses, a more specific sub-hypothesis has to be 
added regarding the representation of anti-EU interests.  There are institutions at a variety of 
levels, from the sub-national, via the national, to the supranational.  The sub-hypothesis 
states that anti-EU interests are more likely to be represented in supranational and national 
institutions than they are in sub-national ones.  The reasoning is threefold.  Firstly, 
supranational institutions, and here this essentially means the European Parliament, are 
likely to have anti-EU interests represented inside them because they deal primarily with EU 
matters.  Secondly, anti-EU groups might see their primary goal as being control of national 
                                                                                                                                                      
36 Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, give a good account of the variety of interpretations of ‘institutions’. 
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institutions, given the privileged place these have in controlling EU policy-making and, in 
extremis, in having the power to withdraw from the Union.  Sub-national institutions will 
have much less exposure to the European Union and its workings, since regional and local 
work will dominate the agenda, and so offer little opportunity to anti-EU groups to affect 
policy outcomes.37  Thirdly, those attempting to pursue anti-EU positions will be more 
inclined to seek representation in institutions in which they will be able to have an impact, 
both on policy outcomes (via their votes on legislation) and on public opinion (via the 
profile of the institution).  On both counts, sub-national institutions are less well placed than 
are those at higher levels. 
 
Beyond individual institutions, the overall institutional space must be looked at.  This is for 
two reasons.  Firstly, it permits the evaluation of the relative access and representation 
capacities of matched institutions in the two countries: when the actual formation and 
development of opposition is applied in each case, it will be possible to see how much that 
reflects the opportunity structures available in each case.  Secondly, it allows for the 
estimation of the relative overall size of the institutional space available to opposition.  This 
is important, because it leads into a further assessment of the development of opposition 
outside of formal institutions. 
 
In all of what has been said so far, there has been an implicit assumption that the focus rests 
on institutions such as parliaments, assemblies, councils or presidencies.  However, it is also 
necessary to consider civil society, and the space that exists for political expression outside 
those formal political institutions.  If the overall capacity for opposition in these formal 
institutions is restricted, then it might be expected that opposition would develop in civil 
society, in forms that are not bound by institutional rules and norms in the same way as they 
would be otherwise.  This distinction can be termed as a distinction between formal and 
informal opposition, where the formality is a function of the space in which that opposition 
is expressed.  Formal opposition is thus that which takes place inside formal institutions, 
informal opposition that which takes place outside. 
 
                                                     
37 It should be noted that Hughes et al have argued that in Central and Eastern Europe, the lack of involvement of 
sub-national elites creates a potential space for opposition to the EU to develop (J. Hughes, G. Sasse & C. 
Gordon, 2002, ‘Saying ‘maybe’ to the ‘return to Europe’’, in European Union Politics, Vol.3-3, pp.327-
355).  However, in both France and the UK the extent of public debate on European issues renders this 
relatively unlikely. 
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This division is also a useful indicator of the divide between those opposed to the way a 
system is developing and those opposed to the system per se. 38  In the case of the EU, this is 
particularly important to note, since unlike most national political systems, the EU lacks a 
popular demos, as well as the spaces in which to express and diffuse opposition, so making 
it more likely that what opposition does occur will be of a systemic nature.  If there is no 
possibility of expressing an opinion against one element of the system (such as a particular 
policy), because the system does not allow for that, then there is little alternative but to 
question the entire system, since that is the only level at which opinions can be expressed: 
there is no intermediate point for representing views.  Obviously, the supranational nature of 
the EU also adds the complication of two levels on which opposition can be expressed, with 
the understandable result that most opposition occurs at the national level, in traditional 
spaces, both inside and out of the formal institutional structures. 
 
In order to fill out this idea of institutional space, it is necessary to look at the individual 
formal and informal institutional spaces available in each country.  Once done, some 
comments can then be made about how those spaces interact with each other, what their 
relative overall size is, and what impact this ought to have on opposition formation and 
development. 
 
                                                     
38 In his study of opposition spaces within the European Union, Neunreither, 1998, describes this as a 
systemic/non-systemic distinction. 
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NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND ELECTORAL GATEWAYS 
 
Looking at formal opposition elements, it is necessary to turn first to those bodies expressly 
designed to accommodate the variety of opinion within a polity, namely the elected 
assemblies.  Those elected to represent a constituency in a parliament will reflect the 
opinions of that constituency, either by themselves, or by working in a party that is similarly 
minded.  The extent to which members of the parliament reflect public opinion at large and 
the extent to which parties can coalesce and develop is dependent to a large degree on the 
means by which the former are elected. 
 
As with most levels of government in the UK, the House of Commons uses a simple FPP, 
multi-constituency system.  In France, Assemblée elections have usually been run under a 
two-round system, with FPP in the second round between the two candidates with the largest 
number of votes from the first round, unless one of them receives an absolute majority in 
that first round.  The exception was during the 1986 election, when a d’Hondt PR system in 
each département was introduced on the initiative of the Socialist Party, before being 
withdrawn again before the 1988 election. 
 
The relative merits of FPP and PR in their various forms are not important here.  However, 
the difference does open up the potential for important effects on national political systems.  
Aspinwall structures attitudes towards European integration on a cleavage between a pro-
integration core and an anti-integration fringe, which builds its opposition on a wide variety 
of reasons, drawing from both the left and right of the political spectrum.39  Such a 
modelling of attitudes reflects work by Hix and Lord, as well as Taggart, which have 
stressed the transnational dimension of party positions on European integration, to the 
detriment of voting on national lines: positions on left-right and pro-anti integration spectra 
are dominant within the European Parliament over parties from one country holding the 
same position.40  With this structure of attitudes, Aspinwall then suggests that the electoral 
system acts as the key intervening variable between social preferences and policy outcomes. 
 
Under the First-Past-the-Post system, small parties are penalised and there is a strong 
incentive for prospective candidates to seek membership of one of the main parties if they 
wish to have a reasonable chance of success.  Once in the party, Whip systems work to keep 
the members of the parliamentary party in line with each other.  However, at this point a 
                                                     
39 See Aspinwall, 2000, p.428-30. 
40 Hix & Lord, 1997; Taggart, 1998. 
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tension arises, namely that the party leadership has to accommodate, at least some extent, 
those members with anti-integration opinions.  Hence, “power sharing occurs within the 
ruling party, and on questions of European policy the centre of balance falls between the 
pro-integration centre of the spectrum and the anti-integration end of the spectrum”.41  While 
logically this centre of balance could be hard up against either of these two endpoints, in 
practice neither a hard pro or anti position would be stable.  This is because in a situation 
where there is a spread of positions, there is still a need to give the minority position (be it 
pro or anti) at least some concession in order to avoid on-going tension.  As a result, policy 
positions are likely to be intermediate between the two extreme points. 
 
Aspinwall characterises this tension as “fundamentally anti-centrist”, since it creates a 
tension towards a polarizing of policy between the two parties.42  This echoes Finer’s 
argument that the centrifugal forces within an essentially two-party system create not only a 
divergence from the overall attitude of Parliament but also, and more importantly, an even 
larger divergence from the overall attitude of the electorate as a whole.43  This occurs 
because party preferences will tend to be concentrated around poles either side of the median 
of overall Parliamentary preferences, which in turn are not necessarily representative of 
electoral preferences, due to the distorting effects of FPP.  It stands in sharp contrast to the 
Proportional Representation electoral model, where while it is easier for those on the fringes 
to gain election, it is harder from them to enter into a governing (centrist) coalition.  Thus 
anti-integrationists on both left and right tend to be excluded and marginalised from policy 
making.44   
 
This could have several consequences.  Firstly, in the FPP system, the size of the governing 
coalition/party’s majority is of key importance, since the smaller it becomes, the more power 
individual members gain.  In the particular case of the UK, the relative dominance of the 
Labour and Conservative Parties reduces the ability of party managers to avoid this effect by 
choosing different coalition partners, an option that the more fragmented French system 
permits. 
 
The second impact is the link between representation in elected offices and extra-
parliamentary groups.  It might well be that if EU-opposition elements cannot gain 
representation in elected assemblies then they will take other routes to achieve their goals of 
                                                     
41 Aspinwall, 2000, p.431. 
42 Aspinwall, 2000, p.431. 
43 S. Finer, 1975, ‘Adversary politics and electoral reform’ in S. Finer (ed.), Adversary Politics and Electoral 
Reform, London, Anthony Wigram, pp.3-32, pp.12-15. 
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influence and power.  Thus a country with FPP might be expected to have more extra-
parliamentary groups than a country using PR.  At the same time, given that moderate 
opposition is more likely to have an effective position of influence in an FPP system, then 
there is a potential dynamic for building links between those moderates and the extra-
parliamentary groups.  Thus the choice of electoral system could have important 
consequences on the development and strategy of extra-parliamentary groups. 
 
However, while both the Assemblée and the Commons use FPP systems, the contexts in 
which they find themselves differ.  The latter is the key locus of institutional power in the 
British system, whereas the former is not.  While one might expect similar effects vis-à-vis 
the electoral systems, despite the French two-round system owing something to ideas of 
proportionality, there is in fact a difference. 
 
Essentially, this is a consequence of the relative weakness of French political parties, itself 
the result of the reduced role that parliament plays under the constitution of the Fifth 
Republic.45  Knapp and Wright note that the historical lack of parliamentary majorities under 
the previous Republics led to the creation of a system of ‘rationalised parliamentarianism’ 
which would compensate for that.46  Stevens suggests that the presence of cross-cutting 
cleavages in French society has produced many small parties that cannot consolidate 
themselves, particularly given that almost all of them are caucus parties, designed solely for 
the purpose of winning elections, rather than maintaining power.47  The two-round system 
also creates further dynamics towards fragmentation, with the first round creating conditions 
which lead to competition between ‘allied’ parties, as well as for individual candidates to 
escape party control.48  This last point is linked to the practice of cumul des mandats, which 
combines with the tradition of localism in French politics to allow the development of a 
strong regional base that is relatively disconnected from the changing national scene. 
 
This modulating effect is important to keep in mind, since when considering the location of 
the development of opposition, the electoral system is a key factor in the structure of 
political parties.  In a ‘pure’ FPP system (such as the British), there are very few parties, 
which rely on internal cohesion in order to maintain their position as viable parties of 
government (coalitions being rare).  At the other end of the scale, a PR system will enable 
                                                                                                                                                      
44 Aspinwall, 2000, p.432. 
45 See R. Elgie & S. Griggs, 2000, French politics: debates and controversies, London, Routledge, for a broader 
discussion on this. 
46 A. Knapp & V. Wright, 2001, The government and politics of France, 4th ed., London, Routledge, p.135. 
47 A. Stevens, 1996, The government and politics of France, 2nd ed., Basingstoke, Macmillan, p.217-9. 
48 Knapp & Wright, 2001, p.254-5. 
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many more parties to gain representation, and so any friction between coalition partners will 
be inter-party, rather than intra-party.  Considered thus, the French system, while using a 
apparently FPP system, displays more PR-like characteristics, due to the two round system 
and the aforementioned weakness of the parties. 
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OTHER NATIONAL FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL SPACES 
 
Having discussed the national assemblies, other national institutions also have to be 
considered.  Essentially, these are the second chamber of parliament and the head of state.  
While these do not play the same role as the lower chamber, in terms of decision-making 
and interest representation, they are still essential parts of the national decision-making 
process, and so deserve to be considered as possible locations for opposition. 
 
While both the House of Lords and the Sénat are involved in the formulation and 
promulgation of legislation, they are both relatively circumscribed institutions.  While the 
latter has a constitutional right to influence legislation through the navette system of 
amendments (Article 45 of the French constitution), in practice it is the Assemblée that has 
the final say in the process.49  Similarly, while the House of Commons is nominally free to 
legislate on any matter and to run its own affairs, in practice, this freedom is limited by the 
Parliament Acts, which allow the House of Commons to overturn any decision made by the 
Lords, except on the prolongation of the life of Parliament.50 
 
While the House of Lords is composed of a mixture of unelected hereditary and life peers, 
the Sénat is elected one-third every three years by an electoral college of regional 
representatives.51  This produces a rather paradoxical effect:  while it is easier for anti-EU 
elements to gain entry to the Sénat, there is a higher institutional capacity for opposition 
representation in the House of Lords.  This should be explained in some more detail.  
Leaving aside the hereditary element of the Lords, the remaining members are appointed on 
the basis of government-sanctioned ennoblements, either from retiring MPs or other public 
figures.  In the case of ex-MPs, they will be unlikely to be anti-EU, due to the Common’s 
FPP system, as discussed above, which means that such figures will be relatively rare.  In the 
case of pubic figures, while these are generally elevated on the basis of their political 
inclinations, the government of the day is unlikely to want to include people who are likely 
to cause difficulties on major lines of policy, of which the EU is one.  As a result, the 
chances of someone opposed to the EU entering the Lords is relatively small, even in 
comparison to the Sénat’s convoluted electoral system, which at least allows regional-based 
politicians to gain access to that institution.  At the same time, while political groupings play 
an important role in the day-to-day functioning of both chambers, the substantial number of 
                                                     
49 See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr for the text of the French Constitution in both English and French. 
50 See http://www.parliament.uk for further details of the Lords’ powers. 
51 The Sénat has the most comprehensive and understandable guide to the complex electoral procedure on its 
website at http://www.senat.fr  
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crossbench members in the Lords has no equivalent in the Sénat.52  As a result, within the 
Lords there are more opportunities for a member to avoid any party whip and present their 
opinions, including opposition to the EU. 
 
Turning to the heads of state, there is a rather stark contrast between the two countries.  In 
the British system, the monarch has no more than a figurehead role.  However, in France the 
President, who has a direct mandate, and who retains various executive powers to that office, 
has a much more important position.  Article 34 of the constitution lists the areas in which 
the Assemblée may legislate, leaving the so-called domaine réservée for the President.  The 
right of the President to appoint the Prime Minister (Article 8) and to dissolve parliament 
(Article 12) further highlight the President’s predominant role.53   
 
Once again, the differing means of access to the positions has an impact on the likelihood of 
anti-EU elements gaining access.  In the case of the British monarch, there is essentially no 
chance of such an event occurring, further compounded by the constitutional presumption 
that the monarch does not involve themselves in matters of politics.  For the French 
Presidency, the use of the same type of two-round system as found in Assemblée elections 
does offer some chance of anti-EU figures at least gaining a platform from which to make 
their views known.  However, the one-person nature of the post means that the European 
issue has to compete with many others, a state of affairs that does not work in its favour.54  
Consequently, it does not present a much more favourable outlook than the monarchy. 
 
One final note before moving on to institutions on other levels concerns the French political 
system.  While there was an assumption that the relationship between the President and the 
government would be made workable by both being of the same political affiliation, the co-
habitations that took place in 1986-88, 1993-95 and since 1997 demonstrated that this need 
not necessarily be the case.  Moreover, these periods have shown that for many French 
politicians, it is control of the Elysée that is the top prize in the system.55  As a result, the 
                                                     
52 Even in quantitative terms, the 6 non-attached members (out of 321) of the current Sénat (2001-04) is 
insignificant in comparison to the 180 (out of 700) listed Lords’ crossbenchers (at 10 Jan 2002). Details 
from the respective websites: http://www.senat.fr and 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldhome.htm  
53 Elgie & Griggs, 2000, discuss the Presidency in more depth. 
54 During the 1995 presidential elections, the issue of ‘European construction’ was not among the top five most 
important perceived themes of the various candidates in the first round.  BVA, ‘Le suivi de l’état d’opinion 
du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle’, poll published 25 April 1995. 
55 Stevens, 1996, p.60. On a related point, Leuffen notes that co-habitation can also have important impacts on 
France’s ability to negotiate within the EU system (D. Leuffen, 2002, ‘La cohabitation: Negotiation 
advantage or constraint?’, Paper presented at 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, 
European Consortium for Political Research, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Bordeaux, 26-28 September, 
2002). 
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Assemblée is not just a space for political debate, but also a space for manoeuvring towards 
the Presidency, a situation that could have impacts on the expression of opposition towards 
to the EU.  If an Assemblée politician becomes principally defined by his or her anti-EU 
stance, then that might have a negative impact on their chances of election to the Presidency.  
As a result, this might provide a check on would-be Presidents in their positions, although as 
shall be seen, this may be more of a theoretical problem than a practical one. 
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SUB-NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL 
SPACES 
 
In both France and the UK there are various sub-national levels of government, from the 
regional down to the local.  However, as previously discussed, moving down this scale, 
away from the national level – and, more pertinently, the European level – it has been 
hypothesised that there is increasing marginalisation of the European issue, as well as less 
interest on the part of anti-EU elements seeking representation.  As a result, while focusing 
primarily on regional level institutions, it is also necessary to note lower levels. 
 
At the regional level, France clearly has the more developed system, despite moves in both 
countries towards increased decentralisation.  The 1982 reforms in France, like the 1997 
reforms in the UK, marked important changes in the structuring of power within each 
country.56  In the former case, this meant a strengthening of the regional councils (conseils 
régionaux), through the introduction of direct elections on a mixed FPP/PR two-round 
system, and with the extension of their powers to cover parts of education, along with 
regional economic and transport planning.  While this new electoral system makes it 
somewhat easier than before for interest groups (in this case, anti-EU elements) to gain 
access, the limited nature of the councils’ work, and the relatively low profile of the 
institution, does not lend itself to a large carrying capacity for opposition. 
 
Having said this, the French system is still well developed in comparison to the British one.  
Effectively, there is an absence of regional government for most of the period of this study, 
until 1997 and the creation of regional assemblies in Wales and Scotland.57  Elected on 
mixed FPP/PR systems (full PR in the case of London), these assemblies have somewhat 
limited powers in a variety fields, all being nominally subject to overriding legislation from 
the House of Commons: even the Scottish Parliament, which has limited tax powers, suffers 
in this respect from the Commons’ supremacy in the British system.  Even if in practice 
Westminster does not get involved in decisions made by these bodies, this should not hide 
the limits under which they work.  A second point that should noted concerns the relative 
                                                     
56 The Committee of the Regions has produced useful summaries of the institutional arrangements in all EU 
member states on its website at: http://www.cor.eu.int/resolutions/rexetu03_en.htm.  The French Institut de 
la Décentralisation also produces many useful reports 
(http://www.idecentralisation.asso.fr/etudes/Jetrap.htm).  Also see V. Wright, 1990, ‘The administrative 
machine: Old problems and new dilemmas’, in P. Hall, J. Hayward & H. Machin (eds.), Developments in 
French politics, Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp.114-132 and H. Elcock & M. Keating (eds.), 1998, Remaking 
the union: Devolution and British politics in the 1990s, Portland, Frank Cass.  There have been further 
developments under the Raffarin government in 2002 to strengthen the regional level (see Le Monde 
28/10/2002, ‘La cohésion nationale à l'épreuve de la décentralisation’). 
57 The London Assembly can also be added to this short list, given its substantial size. 
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lack of connection between these British regional institutions and the national political 
scene, in comparison with France.  While French politicians are much more used to, and 
adept at, moving between different levels of government, the creation of these regional 
bodies in the UK has resulted in a hiving off of those elements with which they deal into a 
separate political territory.  Consequently, while the British regional assemblies are probably 
easier to access and carry opposition than their French counterparts, they are less connected 
to matters European. 
 
Below the regional level, there is an intermediate level of départements and county councils.  
Traditional foundations of local government in both countries, if for very different reasons 
(the French representing a top-down structure of the state, the British a bottom-up tradition), 
both have direct elections to their councils (conseils généraux in France) and both have 
limited powers in education and planning measures.  Using the same electoral systems as 
their national counterparts, it might be expected that both have the same level of access as 
the Assemblée and the Commons, but with a lower capacity, due to their smaller size and the 
restricted nature of their work.  Similarly, while the numerous communes in France and 
district and parish councils in the UK offer relatively easy access to interest representations, 
they do not really represent many opportunities for either substantial public profiles or 
influencing of public policy. 
 
In contrast to the plethora of sub-national institutions that do not offer substantial prospects 
for anti-EU representation, there is a converse situation at the supranational level.  Here 
there is really only one institution that offers possibilities, namely the European Parliament.  
Both countries send 87 representatives to the European Parliament, the French on a national-
list PR system and the British on an FPP system prior to 1999, and on regional-list PR 
thereafter.  The use of PR has meant that access for British opposition elements to the 
European Parliament has increased to the same sort of levels as the French have long had, 
for the reasons outlined in the discussion of electoral gateways earlier. 
 
However, a warning must be sounded here, concerning the way in which this ‘European’ 
institution is treated.  As has been clearly established, European elections are treated as 
second-order by both electors and those elected; the elections are a reflection of events on 
the national level rather than of those on the European level.58  This results in lower turnout, 
increased protest voting and more potential for new political groupings to breakthrough to 
                                                     
58 K. Rief & H. Schmitt, 1980, ‘Nine second-order national elections – A conceptual framework for the analysis 
of European election results’, in European Journal of Political Research, Vol.8-1, pp.3-44: Marsh, 1998. 
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positions of political representation.  This last effect has occurred in both countries, with the 
Front National (FN) making its electoral breakthrough in the European elections of 1984, 
and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) making its in 1999, after the change in the British 
voting system.  Consequently, representation in the European Parliament is as much 
conditional upon national concerns as it is upon attitudes towards European integration.  
This said, it is not to deny that anti-EU groups will be more likely to seek representation in 
an institution that deals explicitly in their field of activity and whose control would be a 
signal victory. 
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INFORMAL OPPOSITION 
 
As has been discussed above, formal institutions represent a structured means for opposition 
to be expressed, discussed and integrated.  Thus far, attention has been focused upon those 
institutions, because they offer the clearest means of identifying and isolating elements of 
opposition.  However, these institutions and that opposition sit within a wider framework, 
namely that of civil society.  This social and political artefact of formal democracy allows 
individuals of any background to engage freely in political activity, either singly or as part of 
a group.  Free from the constraints of seeking electoral success, these groups can adopt 
whatever structures and positions they feel best represent their interests and priorities, since 
that is their primary purpose. 
 
These informal groups can be broken down into three main categories, classified by their 
approach towards representation.  There are those that have tried and failed to gain entry to 
formal institutions, those that have successfully gained entry but which then leave formal 
institutions, and finally those that have not tried at all to gain entry.  Each of these requires 
more detail. 
 
When discussing the impact of electoral systems on opposition representation in assemblies, 
it has been noted that certain elements will be barred from election; most frequently under 
FPP, but also under PR.  Since it is precisely these elements that are most motivated on the 
issue of European integration – given that they have run for election – they can be 
considered to form a first set of informal groups outside of parliament to project their 
opinions.  However, it must be noted that it is unlikely that such people will give up their 
attempt to join formal institutions after one failure.  Indeed, it may well be that their informal 
opposition is more of a ‘holding position’ until such time as they are able to enter an 
institution and work from there.  Alternatively, there may be a recognition that formal 
representation is unlikely to occur (especially if the hurdles to access are high), but is still 
desirable.  In such a case, the search for formal representation becomes an addition and a 
supplement to informal opposition, with a view to reaching a point where both exist 
alongside each other. 
 
The second source of informal groups occurs when those who did pass the electoral hurdle 
into formal institutions step back outside.  By letting those who have strong views on the 
matter of European integration express them through the alternative outlet of non-party 
groups, party managers can potentially reduce the tension within the party on policy 
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positions.  Similarly, non-party groups offer those extremists the opportunity to give full 
vent to their feelings, without jeopardising their position within the party structure.  
Certainly, since the ultimate aim of any non-party group is to change public policy outcomes 
there is still a conflict between the governing party and those members of that party involved 
in non-party group activity.  However, that conflict is externalised in a way that it would not 
be otherwise. 
 
Since non-party groups are not just composed of marginal members of political parties, but 
also of non-party political figures, the ‘party political-ness’ of the groups is obscured and 
reduced.  This is also apparent in the creation of cross-party groups, which further limits the 
association between a group and a party.  However, a distinction should be made between 
non-party groups and intra-party groupings on specific issues.  This latter set - typified by 
such British groups as Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) and Labour Euro-
Safeguards Campaign (LESC), or Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s CERES grouping within the 
Parti Socialiste before it split away - are a means of organising party factions within the 
party structure, although some have developed links out beyond the Parliamentary party.  
While such groups play an interesting role in the development of parties’ policy outcomes, 
they are still essentially held hostage by the tensions of party cohesion and vote-
maximisation. 
 
There is a third source of informal opposition to consider.  This is the set of individuals who 
do not try to gain access to formal institutions in order to project their message: instead they 
are solely focused upon working around such institutions.  This is not to say that they have 
no interest in formal institutions, but that they attempt to influence them from the outside, 
rather than inside: possibly because their concerns are very specific and so unlikely to appeal 
to a large constituency.  The integration process is not an even one, inasmuch as its costs 
tend to be concentrated and its benefits diffuse.  Consequently, sectoral interest groups may 
well become mobilised against particular aspects of the EU’s programme.  This includes 
particular fields of economic activity (such as EMU or agriculture), policies with a 
horizontal impact (such as social or environmental legislation), or parts of European identity 
building (such as citizenship rights).  However, given the aforementioned unevenness, it is 
not possible to make an a priori judgement as to which groups will be affected by, then 
mobilised against, the integration process.  This source represents the element of informal 
opposition that is least predictable in its composition and development. 
 
Taken together, these three sources of informal opposition form an essential addition to our 
understanding of opposition within formal institutions, since the two interact with each 
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other.  Although they fall outside of those institutions, they are still affected by the levels of 
institutional access and carrying capacity.  This is clearest for the first source, but it is also 
true for the other two, both of which see benefits in organising outside of formal institutional 
spaces, beyond the control of those higher up the system. 
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INSTITUTIONAL SPACES IN FRANCE AND THE UK 
 
Having now covered the range of formal and informal institutions, it is possible to describe 
and analyse the overall size and configuration of institutional space within each country.  
Table 1 summarises, at least in terms of formal institutions, the levels of access and carrying 
capacity for each institution in France and the UK as described in the preceding sections: 
Figures 1 and 2 represent the same information graphically. 
 
Taken as a whole, there is a wider choice of spaces in France than there is in the UK, 
particularly in terms of access to institutions.  In the case of the two national chambers and 
the head of state, this difference is due to the very different electoral systems in operation 
and the general weakness of French political parties in the Assemblée.  As a result, while 
there is a similar carrying capacity in national institutions, there is a greater likelihood of its 
potential being realised in France, given this relative ease of access. 
 
Furthermore, the French space has been much more interconnected than the British one, a 
point underlined by the possibility of holding multiple elected positions, the cumul des 
mandats.  The 1985 law which permitted this was reformed in 2000, but even in its new 
reduced form it represents a much greater interlinking of spaces than occurs in Britain.59  In 
the latter’s case, while dual mandates became possible for those MPs holding seats in the 
Scottish and Welsh assemblies, this was the exception, and one which has become less rather 
than more common.  This aside, for the period under consideration, France’s institutional 
spaces can be considered as having relatively high levels of interaction and shared 
representatives.  Indeed, Stevens notes that it not only possible, but not uncommon, for 
politicians to build a successful political career without sitting in the Assemblée.60 
 
Putting all of these elements together, there is a more accessible and interconnected set of 
formal institutions in France than there is in the UK.  While overall carrying capacity does 
not seem to be that different between the two, the lower requirements for access in France 
seem to suggest that the carrying capacity there will be more fully exploited.  As a result, 
anti-EU opposition groups might be expected to locate themselves inside French formal 
institutions more readily than in British ones, with the corollary that informal opposition will 
be more common in the UK.  Indeed, beyond these general remarks it is possible to make 
                                                     
59 The Sénat’s website contains a full set of documentation on this question at: 
http://www.senat.fr/evenement/cumul.html  
60 Stevens, 1996, p.211. 
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some more detailed hypotheses, along the lines of those already outlined in the introductory 
chapter. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Formal Institutional Spaces in France and the UK, 1985-199961 
France  UK 
Institution Access Capacity  Institution Access Capacity 
 Type Level Type Level   Type Level Type Level 
Assemblée 
Nationale 
(not 1986-
88) 
2-round 
FPP 
MID AN HIGH  House of 
Commons 
FPP LOW AN MID 
(1986-1988) PR HIGH AN HIGH       
Sénat Electoral 
College 
FPP/PR 
MID AN MID/ 
HIGH 
 House of 
Lords 
Hered./ 
Appoint. 
LOW/ 
V.LOW 
AN HIGH 
President of 
the Republic 
2-round 
FPP 
MID SP LOW  Monarch Hered. V.LOW SP V.LOW 
Conseils 
Régionaux  
2-round 
FPP/PR 
MID AR LOW  Regional 
Assemblies 
(Scotland, 
Wales, 
London) 
PR HIGH AR LOW/ 
MID 
European 
Parliament 
PR HIGH AE HIGH  European 
Parliament 
(pre-1999) 
FPP LOW AE HIGH 
      (post-1999) PR HIGH AE HIGH 
Key: Appoint. = Appointed; AE = European Assembly; AN = National Assembly; AR = Regional Assembly; 
Hered. = Hereditary position; FPP = First Post the Post; PR = Proportional Representation; SP = Single Person 
position. 
 
                                                     
61 The levels in this table are relative, rather than absolute. 
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In the UK, the centrality of the Commons, and the use of the first past the post system will 
be the central factors.  Parties will tend to try and externalise opposition elements into new 
and existing non-party groups.  This is due to the small number of parties and their desire to 
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maintain party cohesion in order to be large enough to form a government majority.  This 
will be particularly pronounced at times when the government has a small majority in 
parliament, since the leverage that each individual Member of Parliament (MP) has grows.  
Consequently, the expected pattern would be a predominance of non-party groups over party 
or intra-party groups, with the former centred on disaffected members of political parties.  
Intra-party groups would develop, but not to the extent of seriously changing party policy. 
 
In France, the relative weakness of the Assemblée, the fragmentation of the party system and 
the weakness of the parties’ structures means that new party formations will emerge, 
differing only in respect to the European issue from their previous affiliations, without any 
electoral penalisation.  The link with small majorities that is expected in the UK would also 
not be an issue, since both government and opposition parties could be susceptible to the 
processes mentioned.  Moreover, the closeness of the new parties to the previous parties on 
other issues apart from the European one will enable working relationships between them to 
develop, potentially to the extent of joining together in a government coalition.  Here then, 
the pattern would be more one of new parties forming out of existing parties, based around 
key individuals, and so would be unlikely to be any more stable than those existing parties.  
Non-party groups would be formed not by disaffected politicians, but rather by non-party 
political elements, drawn to opposing the EU for a variety of reasons. 
 
In both countries, the development of opposition in formal institutions other than the 
parliament will be limited.  In the British case, this is due to the lack of alternative spaces, 
whereas in the French case, it is due to the other spaces not being conducive to anti-EU 
activity becoming the dominant variable.  The Presidency is a single post, and candidates’ 
positions on the EU are likely to count for less than positions on issues more relevant to the 
electorate (such as the economy, social services, health, etc.).  By contrast, sub-national 
institutions (and so, indirectly, the Sénat) are likely to be more focused on local issues, again 
relegating opposition to the EU to a more minor role.  The only partial exception to this 
might be found in the European Parliament.  The use of proportional representation in 
France for the whole period would suggest that oppositional elements might have found 
representation relatively early on, in comparison to both French domestic institutions and to 
British opposition groups, which would have been barred by the first past the post system in 
use until the 1999 elections. 
 
 
A theoretical framework has now been built for assessing the impact of institutions on 
opposition creation and development.  Ease of access and carrying capacity have been 
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identified as the two key concepts determining that impact and they have both been 
quantified.  This has permitted a more systematic picture of the institutional landscape in 
which opposition operates. 
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2: France and the UK in Europe, 1985-1999 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of France and the UK’s relationship and 
interaction with the European Union during the period under study.  This will include 
political developments at both the national and the EU level, changing public opinion and 
the creation and development of opposition groups.  As such, it provides the practical 
material with which to test the hypotheses laid out in the introduction, relating to opposition 
formation and development. 
 
Rather than taking a simple chronological approach to the period between 1985 and 1999, 
this chapter is organised by themes, since this allows for an isolation of the various elements 
that it is necessary to consider.  These elements will be recombined at the end of the chapter 
with some brief comments on emergent patterns, and also in later chapters when looking at 
factors in opposition formation, strategy and profile. 
 
The chapter is broken down into five sections.  Firstly, there is an overview of the 
development of the European Union itself over the study period.  A second section then 
focuses upon the reception of those developments in each country and the way in which the 
EU has been dealt with inside the national system.  A brief overview of the media landscape 
is followed by a consideration of public opinion in France and the UK towards the Union, 
both in terms of popular support and popular interest in the subject.  The final part of the 
chapter deals with the specific development of organised opposition to the EU in both 
countries. 
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THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SYSTEM 
 
The main hypotheses suggest that developments at the European level are important drivers 
of opposition mobilisation, formation and development.  This section will therefore consider 
how the EU has developed over the timeframe of the study, in terms of institutional 
structures and policy developments. 
 
One of the main rationales for taking the period 1985-99 was that it marked a relatively well-
defined period in the development of the European Community (EC) into the European 
Union.  1985 marked the start of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) for the Single 
European Act, after the various impasses of the 1970s and early 1980s had been largely 
resolved at the Fontainebleau summit in 1984.  1999 marked the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, itself the follow up treaty to the Treaty on European Union of 1992 
that had caused so many problems across the member states.  Thus the period gives three 
treaty cycles (negotiation, signing, ratification) to study and compare.  Additionally, the 
Single European Act and Maastricht provided for medium term projects, the single market 
programme and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) respectively. Figure 3 provides a 
quick overview of these dates. 
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A point to note here is that while all these events are plotted as discrete periods of time, in 
practical terms there was a lack of clarity of when each event began and ended.  The most 
extreme example of this is the single market programme, the roots of which predated even 
the Commission White Paper of 1985, and which had an official target date for completion 
of end of 1992, but that is still being followed up to the present day. Similarly, each of the 
treaties saw greater or lesser periods of debate before official negotiations began, as well as 
discussion after its entry into force about its impact, especially when looking at the medium 
term projects.  Indeed, Amsterdam was legally pre-programmed by Maastricht, largely as an 
exercise in tidying up the latter’s provisions.  Nevertheless, despite these caveats, they can 
still be used as a frame of reference. 
 
Given the constraints of space, it is not possible to enter into any great depth of detail in the 
matter of the Union’s development, and indeed there are more than enough excellent books 
on the subject.62  Instead, the main focus will be upon describing the basic timetable of 
events between 1985 and 1999, and particularly institution- and policy-building, since these 
are the main concerns of the hypotheses.  A clear understanding of these events, in 
conjunction with national responses to them, is essential in the evaluation of the posited 
process of group formation. 
 
Considered in these broad terms, the study period saw the rapid expansion of the 
Community/Union in both scope and depth.  The Single European Act not only formalised 
the single market project, but also introduced new competences for cohesion, the 
environment and research, as well as the beginnings of an integrated foreign policy.  It also 
extended the powers of the European Parliament and reintroduced qualified majority voting 
as an alternative to the de facto unanimity that had persisted since the Luxembourg 
Compromise of 1966.  The ‘1992’ project, as the single market programme was popularly 
known, marked an active attempt on the part of the EC to raise its public profile: clearly, if 
the single market was to create the full set of benefits promised, then both businesses and 
consumers needed to be informed.  The Commission used both experts (e.g. the Cecchini 
report of 1988) and politicians to help raise public awareness.63   
 
At the same time, the momentum of the Single European Act enabled the Community to 
reform its budgetary procedure and start more extensive modifications to the Common 
                                                     
62 See, for example, George & Bache, 2001; C. Archer, 2000, European Union: Structure and process, 3rd Ed., 
London, Pinter; Dinan, 1999. 
63 P. Cecchini, M. Catinat & A. Jacquemin, 1988, The European challenge 1992: The benefits of a single market, 
Aldershot, Wildwood House. 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP), resulting in 1988 in the Inter-institutional Accord between the 
Commission, European Parliament and Council, as well as the first set of medium-term 
Financial Perspectives for budgetary planning.  Finally, Commission President Jacques 
Delors exploited the increasing popularity of the EC and its work, as well as a reference in 
the Single European Act’s preamble, to persuade the European Council to agree to a 
committee on economic and monetary union, comprised of the heads of the national central 
banks under the chairmanship of Delors himself.64  The committee produced its report on 
EMU in April 1989, and the Strasbourg European Council was able to agree upon an IGC to 
prepare treaty revisions in December of the same year. 
 
At the same time, the situation in the wider Europe was changing rapidly.  1989 saw the ever 
increasing effects of Soviet perestroika and glasnost, as the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe used their new-found freedom of manoeuvre to liberalise their systems, leading to a 
summer of increasing migrations across the ever more porous Iron Curtain and deepening 
crises of legitimacy for the regimes of those states. On 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall 
was opened, rapidly leading to plans for the unification of the two German states in October 
1990. 
 
However, the moves towards German unification also had internal repercussions for the 
Community. Germany’s partners in the Community were uncertain as to its future direction.  
Indeed, the Germans themselves recognised that unification could result in looser ties with 
the Community.  This was especially true for Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had a very close 
relationship with French President Mitterrand, and who wished to demonstrate that Germany 
was committed to further integration.  Thus, at the Dublin European Council, in June 1990, a 
second IGC was agreed upon, to consider questions of ‘political union’.  This not only 
covered institutional reforms, but also increased cooperation in foreign and security policies, 
as well as internal affairs. 
 
From the official opening of the IGCs in December 1990 to their conclusion at the European 
Council meeting in Maastricht one year later, there was a relatively positive air about the 
proceedings.65  Many involved in the negotiations saw the opportunity to make a qualitative 
leap in the level of integration.  The Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht, created 
a new structure, the European Union.  The EU comprised three pillars.  The first was the 
European Economic Community, now renamed the European Community (EC), further 
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developed with a new co-decision procedure for the European Parliament; a consultative 
Committee of the Regions; a new selection procedure for the Commission; new 
competences, including provisions on citizenship of the Union; and a full programme for 
EMU.  Alongside this strong supranational pillar were created two weaker, 
intergovernmental pillars.  The second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
formalised European Political Cooperation and created potentially strong instruments for 
common action.  The third, co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs, reorganised the 
intergovernmental co-operation that had taken place before, but to no great effect.  On the 
top of the pillars was placed a set of common provisions, giving the European Council a 
guiding role and improved coherence between the various elements. 
 
The ambitious nature of the Maastricht project soon became apparent.  Even with the 
introduction of the subsidiarity principle, which limited the EC’s actions to those which 
member states could not perform better themselves, the increased profile of the Community 
in the wake of the ‘1992’ programme for the Single Market meant that public interest had 
been awoken, along with many fears.66  This was true not only in traditionally sceptical 
countries, such as the UK or Denmark, but also in more positive members, France and 
Germany being prime examples.  The seemingly sudden appearance of the Community in all 
walks of life caused people to question how it had happened and, more importantly, what 
basis it had in terms of legitimacy.  The ‘democratic deficit’ had already been a popular 
topic before Maastricht, and the treaty signed there opened as many questions as it 
resolved.67  All of this was demonstrated vividly when the Danes narrowly voted against 
ratification in June 1992, followed by the tiny majority in favour in France in September. At 
the Edinburgh European Council in December, special arrangements and ‘clarifications’ 
were made for the Danes, allowing them to vote narrowly in favour in May 1993. Finally in 
November 1993, Maastricht came into force, almost two years after its signature, and after a 
particularly tricky passage through the British parliament and a reference to the German 
Constitutional Court.68 
 
Despite the large and unanticipated difficulties of ratification, the underlying political 
commitment from the key Franco-German pairing and from others remained.  This 
commitment was to be tested once again after Maastricht, when the Exchange Rate 
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Mechanism (ERM) came under increasing pressure from currency speculators.  The entry of 
the British pound, after much procrastination, in 1990 came at a time when the ERM was 
becoming increasingly rigid, as the tight Bundesbank policy clashed with other countries’ 
economic needs, and speculators sensed a chance to break the central banks’ resolve to 
protect parities.69  First in 1992 and then again in 1993, the ERM was blown apart, if not 
actually destroyed, and many observers thought that EMU would have to be scrapped, as 
public hostility towards the reforms required to meet the convergence criteria grew.  
However, a strong political resolve rode out this storm and put EMU firmly back on track by 
1996. 
 
Another consequence of the end of the Cold War was the questioning in some other 
European countries of their neutrality and non-alignment policy.  The economic and political 
benefits of membership of the EU were weighed against these policies and were convincing 
for most, a fact highlighted by the negotiations between the EC and the European Free Trade 
Association on the European Economic Area in the early 1990s.  Here, the Association’s 
members soon realised that the relationship was highly asymmetrical and that they would be 
obliged to take up most of the Community’s acquis without having a say in its formulation.70  
Consequently, applications for membership where lodged by Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway, and in 1995 the first three of these states joined the EU, Norway having again 
rejected membership in a referendum.  Whilst largely painless as an enlargement, the new 
members brought their own particularities to the EU and were to leave their mark on the next 
treaty revision, which Maastricht had provided for. 
 
The follow-up IGC to Maastricht was always going to face difficulties.  Its timing had been 
based on the false assumption that by 1996 Maastricht would have been in force for almost 
five years and so would have provided much information on that treaty’s short-comings. The 
ratification process instead effectively took two years out of that period. Similarly, the IGC 
was intended more as a fine-tuning exercise than a major overhaul. This caused problems, as 
the momentum of the 1980s was lost to increasing systemic problems and generalised 
scepticism. The crisis of 1992-93 produced calls for a major re-think of EMU, but political 
exigencies of cross-linked deals done at Maastricht meant that it was never really likely that 
such an important project would be renegotiated. The Germans had been sold on EMU by 
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the close modelling of the European Central Bank on the Bundesbank and the Southern 
members by the provision of much increased structural aid. 
 
The result of this was that the IGC was seen by most as ‘Maastricht II’, rather than 
‘Amsterdam I’. The impending enlargement to the East (where countries had been placing 
applications for membership since the early 1990s) theoretically put extra pressure on those 
involved to make more radical proposals for institutional reform, a key theme of the IGC, 
but this was countered by the political inertia of the member states.  In June 1995, a 
Reflection Group was set up under the Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp to 
consider the key points of discussion and its subsequent report was the basis of the decision 
at the Madrid European Council in December of that year to open the IGC in March 1996.71 
 
The IGC was officially finished at Amsterdam in June 1997. Despite the late arrival of a new 
British Labour government to the negotiating table, and the resultant incorporation of the 
Social Charter into the treaty, it was clear that it was not only they who had reservations and 
the Treaty of Amsterdam produced no big advances.72  Amsterdam’s main achievements lay 
in the refinement of Maastricht. The co-decision procedure was simplified, to give the 
European Parliament full veto powers, and extended to more policy fields. The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy was restructured and developed more fully than time had 
allowed in Maastricht, and Justice and Home Affairs was partially incorporated into the EC.  
A new chapter on employment was added, to address the growing concerns about rising 
unemployment in the Union. A procedure for closer co-operation between member states 
was created, partly to allow the semi-incorporation of the Schengen Convention on free 
movement and partly to improve flexibility in light of the enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe. As part of a simplification process all treaty articles were renumbered 
sequentially and obsolete provisions deleted. But the most striking feature of Amsterdam 
was its omissions: despite the recognised need to reform the institutional structures in the 
face of enlargement, no agreement could be found, other than to limit the number of seats in 
the European Parliament to 700. An attached protocol declared that a full institutional 
restructuring would have to take place when the number of member states reached 20, with a 
possibility of resolving the Council vote weighting/number of commissioners question 
before then.  No IGC was provided for in Amsterdam apart from this protocol. 
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If Amsterdam was a damp squib, then the Commission was intent on maintaining the 
momentum towards enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, and one month after the 
European Council, it announced its “Agenda 2000” programme. This combined the 
Commission’s opinions on the various applications to join the EU with a set of proposals for 
reform of Union policies (especially CAP and structural funds) and budgetary requirements 
(in anticipation of the end of the Delors II package in 1999). On the basis of criteria laid 
down at Copenhagen (1993), the Commission was in favour of opening negotiations with 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia - as well as the previously 
agreed Cyprus - a proposition which the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 
confirmed. For those countries not invited, there would be continued links and a new 
European Conference, the first of which took place in March 1998. 
 
The reform element of Agenda 2000 was a long a drawn out process, and what was agreed at 
Berlin in March 1999 only came after much haggling and some rather noticeable watering-
down.73  At the same time, it was becoming apparent that there was a risk of leaving behind 
the other applicant countries semi-permanently.  As a result, the Helsinki European Council 
of December 1999, agreed to open negotiations with Romania, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta, to begin in early 2000.  It also agreed that while Turkey was 
to be recognised as an applicant, it would remain a special case. 
 
While this was happening, there were several important developments within the Union.  In 
May 1998, a special meeting of the Council decided that 11 countries had met the Maastricht 
convergence criteria for joining the Euro.  Despite the fact that, strictly speaking, almost 
none of the member states had met the criteria, only Greece failed to improve its economic 
position sufficiently to make the grade.74  The UK, Denmark and Sweden maintained their 
reserve on joining.  Seven months later, on 1 January 1999, the Euro was born, with the 
setting of “fixed and irrevocable” conversion rates of the 11 currencies. 
 
The success of the Euro’s launch was quickly overshadowed as the Commission found itself 
under attack by the European Parliament over fraud allegations.  In March 1999, it resigned 
en masse after a damming report by an independent committee on matters of fraud, nepotism 
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and mismanagement.75  The search for a replacement to Jacques Santer eventually led to 
Romano Prodi, the former Italian prime minister, but he could only be properly installed as 
President at the end of 1999, after the summer European elections, where the right finally 
broke the left’s control of the European Parliament.  Meanwhile, the protracted wrangling 
over the Agenda 2000 proposals came to a conclusion in March 1999 at Berlin.  It had taken 
almost two years to reach an agreement on the proposed reforms, as countries fought to 
maintain the funds they received from the budget while simultaneously trying to minimise 
their contributions.  Of particular note in the bargaining that resulted was the retention of the 
British rebate (albeit with concessions to other net contributors) and last-minute concessions 
to the French on the matter of agricultural payments.76 
 
By the end of 1999, the EU’s institutions had finally resolved their issues, only to find 
themselves at the edge of another IGC.  In December, at the European Council in Helsinki, 
the member states agreed to review institutional structures in the light of enlargement, as 
well as the further development of a defence capacity for the Union.  This second element 
dated back to an Anglo-French summit at St. Malo one year before, and was to lead to plans 
for the creation of a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force to be put in place by 2003. 
 
The net result of this development has been the creation of at least some European 
competence in almost every area of public policy.  Moreover, the profile of the EC/EU rose 
to a new level, first because of the single market programme and then because of the 
developments contained within Maastricht.  Unfortunately, data are not available to measure 
this directly for the entire period, but it is clear that, at least in intention, the Union has 
become increasingly aware of the need to involve the general public.77 
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EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE UK AND FRANCE 
 
A necessary complement to developments at the European level is the reception of those 
developments within the national systems of the UK and France.  The reasons for this are all 
interlinked.  First and foremost, it is only through looking at this reception that it is possible 
to understand the development of European integration as an issue within a national context.  
The first hypothesis of this thesis states that national systems receive and adapt European 
developments, producing a country-specific form of opposition.  Hence, it is only through an 
outlining of those national systems, and then a comparison with the initial European events, 
that it is possible to see where an interface has occurred and which issues have generated 
friction.  Such friction points are important because they provide potential proximate sources 
of opposition mobilisation, one of the key topics in the following chapter on group 
formation.  Finally, an analysis of the national reception of European developments also 
helps to build an understanding of national discourses on the EU: discourses that further 
explain the relationship between the European and the national levels. 
 
In practical terms, this requires a consideration of several elements.  At the broadest level, 
there is a need to cover the general sweep of national interactions with the European Union 
during the study period.  More precisely, attention will be focused upon events that might 
give rise to discussion and debate within national systems on matters European.  This 
includes both European events, such as treaty ratifications and policy developments, and 
national events, such as national elections, where Europe can potentially play an important 
role. 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter on institutional spaces, the size of a government’s 
majority in parliament potentially has a major impact on the pattern of opposition formation 
and development.  While this is particularly the case with First Past the Post systems, the 
extent to which the French two-round system is also affected by this mechanical effect 
should also be considered.  While this is discussed briefly during the following text, and in 
more detail in later chapters, it will help the reader to refer to Figures 4 and 5, showing the 
size of government majorities in the House of Commons and Assemblée Nationale 
respectively, in order to gain an impression of the actual figures involved. 
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In 1985, both France and the UK had realigned themselves with the rest of the Community.  
Mitterrand’s excursion into socialism in the early 1980s had been even less successful than 
Thatcher’s neo-liberalism and, with the British budget rebate secured at Fontainebleau the 
year before, both saw the development of a fully integrated European economy as an 
attractive proposition, if for differing reasons.78  While the UK saw the liberalisation across 
the EC as way to expand into new markets, in France the benefit was more focused on the 
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push it would give to economic modernisation and to moving further towards a more 
integrated Europe.  Coupled to an adventurous Commission under Jacques Delors 
(Mitterrand’s old finance minister), the scene was set for an agreement on revitalising the 
EC. 
 
Despite subsequent claims of being misled, Thatcher and her government were happy with 
the treaty signed in 1986, having been among the more vocal supporters of the single 
market.79  Similarly, Mitterrand used the Single European Act as part of his move towards 
becoming a committed European, alongside his growing friendship with German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl.  Quick ratification followed (aided in France by the co-habiting Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac) and the legislative programme of the 1985 White Paper was rolled 
into place.  But at this very point the problems that were to bedevil the British debate on 
Europe were beginning.80 
 
The general elections of 1986 and 1987 in France and the UK respectively, both revolved 
around national issues.  The switch to Proportional Representation (PR) in France had been 
an attempt to cushion the losses of the left after the failed reintroduction of socialist 
principles had weakened the French economy; the right had regrouped after the 1981 
elections and the Front National (FN) had begun to gather support on the far right.81  In the 
UK, Thatcher was confident that the on-going neo-liberal project of the Conservatives was 
in tune with popular wishes, not least because Labour was still in a state of disarray after the 
1983 election.82 
 
The 1988 presidential and general elections in France underlined this pattern.  The co-
habitation between Mitterrand and Chirac since 1986 had opened up the possibility of 
competing claims on the handling of the economy.  This was of importance, since the 
October 1987 stock market crash allowed Mitterrand to distance himself from the 
government’s tainted hands and feel secure in his candidature.83  Division on the right helped 
Mitterrand to return to power, and just about managed to mobilise voters into returning a 
small left majority to the Assemblée. 
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While Thatcher had seen the Single European Act as an end in itself, France and the other 
member states wanted to go further.  The Delors Committee on EMU was a case in point, as 
was the growing discussion within the British government about Sterling joining the ERM.84  
By September 1988, Thatcher was making her landmark speech at Bruges, setting out her 
view of a Community of “willing and active cooperation of independent sovereign states”, 
rejecting a “European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels”85 
 
To some extent, it was internal party divisions over Europe that made politicians reluctant to 
engage in discussion of the subject.  The 1989 European elections were to mark the first of 
many for the Conservative party where such divisions were to prove very difficult to 
manage.  Thatcher’s change in policy in the wake of her Bruges speech in 1988 set the party 
up for a deep split, while Labour completed its European conversion and concentrated on 
exploiting Tory divisions.86  In France, the lack of distance on European policies between 
the socialists, the Gaullists and the centrists left something of a hole in the campaigning, 
with anti-EU sentiment pushed to the peripheries.87 
 
If France was not having problems with the further development of the Community, then it 
was soon to have more fundamental concerns about a key pillar of the Community’s 
existence.  The collapse of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90 
quickly opened up the prospect of a reunified Germany.  The result was the creation of a 
second IGC on political integration, pushed by the Germans, to reassure France (and the UK, 
to a lesser extent) of its commitment to the EU as the centre of its European policy.  To 
some extent this also allowed the Germans to push their preferences for a more federal 
institutional system in balance to French moves towards EMU, a policy that was the logical 
development of their franc fort policy of the 1980s. 
 
Just as France was pushing on to the next stage of monetary integration, so the British debate 
on membership of the ERM came to a head, as Thatcher was forced into joining the system 
by her new Chancellor John Major.  By this time, membership had become a totemic issue, 
rather than one based on reasoned economic argument, a fact that was to come back to haunt 
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Major just three years later.  And it was clear that Thatcher had not made the choice 
voluntarily, as her distrust of all things European grew.  However, coupled with growing 
problems on domestic tax issues, her position became ever more untenable and in December 
1990 she was replaced by Major.88 
 
This left the way clear for the IGC negotiations proper of 1991.  The British government was 
free to pursue a more positive approach towards further integration, while for France it 
represented a opportunity to go a long way in achieving the geopolitical goal of Germany’s 
active participation in Western Europe and opening up German monetary policy.  If France’s 
goals were strategic, then British concerns were more parochial; John Major was happy to 
secure opt-outs from the final stage of EMU and the Social Chapter and the exclusion of the 
word ‘federal’ from the final text.89  In neither case was there a feeling that ratification 
would pose any great difficulty. 
 
Of course, in the event ratification was very difficult indeed.90  In France, what had been a 
relatively smooth process of amending the constitution before ratifying the treaty suddenly 
became a political football between the President and the two chambers of parliament after 
the Danish ‘no’ of June 1992, resulting in the rash promise by the President of a referendum.  
At the same point in time, the British government faced a newly confident group of 
eurosceptics on its backbenches, resulting in the start of a long and bitter passage through 
the Commons.  Without entering into much more detail, it was apparent in both cases that 
the debate was focused more on domestic concerns, or at best ‘Europe’ as a general issue, 
than it was on the specifics of the treaty in question.  In both cases, those in power lost much 
of their credibility and status.  Major was already suffering the effects of a very small 
majority in the Commons (which left him open to radical elements within his party pushing 
for more eurosceptic positions), while Mitterrand practically guaranteed himself another 
period of co-habitation after the 1993 general elections. 
 
By the time of the 1992 British and 1993 French general elections, considerations of 
incumbents’ work came to the fore.  In the UK, the surprise victory of the Conservatives was 
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achieved by negative campaigning on Labour’s tax plans, despite coming only a few months 
after the signing of the Treaty on European Union.  Mortimore notes that this election was 
marked by more attention to packaging than content of policy and certainly it was 
characterised by the rise of negative campaigning in the American style.91  In France, the 
sense of closure on the left’s period of power had been assured by the September 1992 
referendum, where Mitterrand had been saved only by Chirac’s belated support.  The 
election was fought largely over economic policy, with the right taking a moderate approach 
to the economic slow-down.  1993 was notable for the first campaigns by Philippe Séguin, a 
senior Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) figure, and Philippe de Villiers, a Union 
pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) radical, based in large part on a critique of EU 
membership.  Both had fought on the ‘no’ side for the referendum the previous year and 
sought to make further political capital, although without any great success.92 
 
Matters were not helped at all by the speculative attacks on the ERM during 1992-93.  The 
effect of German reunification on monetary policy had put increasing strain on the other 
currencies in the system, particularly those not closely linked to the Deutschmark.  In 
September 1992, the Bank of England fought in vain to keep Sterling within the system’s 
limits, finally resulting in the currency’s suspension from membership.  “Black Wednesday” 
marked not only a damaging blow to the Conservative’s European policy, but also the end of 
public confidence in their management of the economy, a factor that would play an 
important role in the 1997 general election.93  Things were made worse by the events of the 
following summer when the franc experienced similar pressures.  However, this time 
intervention was successful, and backed up first by the Bundesbank and then by a complete 
recasting of the ERM’s structure, leading many in the UK to claim that they had been 
unfairly treated. 
 
By the time Maastricht came into force, opinion in both governments and the public across 
the Union was much more subdued.  In France, the effort to get the economy into good 
enough shape to pass the EMU convergence criteria began.  However, this was to cause 
friction with many workers, leading to strikes; by 1995 it was not entirely clear whether the 
third and final stage of EMU would happen in 1999, let alone 1997, the first possible date.  
However, a strong political resolve by Mitterrand and then Chirac rode out this storm and 
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put EMU firmly back on track with the announcement at Madrid in December 1995 to 
proceed with Stage 3 in 1999. 
 
Even more than usual, the European elections of 1994 in the two countries were seen by 
most as little more than testing grounds for national issues.  In France, Bernard Tapie’s 
federalist group matched De Villiers’ breakthrough on an anti-EU platform; but the 
campaign was basically a dry run of the presidential election due the following year.94  
Similarly, the Conservative rout reflected popular discontent with the party, rather than their 
line on the Union, despite the sharp fall in popular support after 1992’s Black Wednesday.95 
 
France’s presidential election of 1995 revolved around the lack of a credible candidate on 
the left and the struggle on the right to gain support.  Goldey and Knapp highlight 
unemployment and political corruption as the key themes in the campaign, and so despite his 
success in the European elections, De Villiers made a very weak showing, with even fewer 
votes than the Trotskyite Arlette Laguiller.96 
 
For the British, free from the constraints of the ERM and enjoying an economic upturn, the 
problems of their Union neighbours seemed distant.  Major was continuing his fight with his 
party, his vision of being at the “heart of Europe” not being matched by his actions.  Minor 
issues over qualified majority voting weightings after enlargement to Austria, Finland and 
Sweden and the choice of a new Commission President were used by Major to give his party 
the impression that he was playing tough.97  While the rest of the Union was pushing on with 
extra-Treaty cooperation, as with the Schengen Treaty of 1995, the UK continued to fight 
with itself. 
 
Matters came to a head in 1996, when the beef crisis in the UK took on a EU dimension, as 
the Commission imposed a ban on beef exports from the UK.98  Even the election of Chirac 
was of no use to Major in his attempts to have the ban lifted; indeed, the French were to 
prove to be the most difficult state of all.  A last ditch attempt in 1996 to block the Union’s 
work, by means of a refusal to participate in meetings, backfired and seemed to do little 
                                                     
94 G. Grunberg, 1994, ‘France’, in Electoral Studies, Vol.13-4, pp.336-338; D. Goldey & A. Knapp, 1996, ‘The 
French presidential election of 23 April-7 May 1995’, in Electoral Studies, Vol.15-1, pp.97-109. 
95 R. Mortimore, 1994, ‘Great Britain’, in Electoral Studies, Vol.13-4, pp.341-343. 
96 Goldey & Knapp, 1996, p.100-2; 104. 
97 Wallace, 1997, discusses these events in more depth. 
98 Neyer provides an overview of this (J. Neyer, 2000, ‘The regulation of risks and the power of the people: 
Lessons from the BSE crisis’, in European Integration online Papers, Vol.4-6, at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-006a.htm). 
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more than raise Major’s unpopularity with the electorate.  The coincidence of the beef ban 
with the 1996 IGC was also to cause further delays and barriers. 
 
While it has been apparent that European issues have not played a major part in the elections 
up to 1995, the two general elections of May 1997 proved that this was not always the case.  
Admittedly, the contexts were very different, but the impact of membership of the EU 
played an important part in the fate of both elections. 
 
The Conservatives in the UK had struggled through the previous five years on a very small 
majority, which had served to further the internal party splits on European policy.  Matters 
were made worse still by the rapidly approaching question of membership of the single 
currency; James Goldsmith’s eurosceptic Referendum Party pushed the main parties into 
agreeing to hold a referendum on the issue.  However, while Goldsmith ensured that the 
parties had to take account of the Euro debate, this merely reinforced the large-scale use of 
tactical voting to get the Conservatives out of office after 18 years.  As noted before, the 
Labour party that replaced them were much more positive in their approach to EU matters, 
although the importance of this should not be overstated, given that this election came in a 
period of persistent drops in support for membership. 
 
In France, the situation was very different.  Chirac had a large majority in the Assemblée, but 
the pressures of meeting the convergence criteria for entry into the Euro (a political 
imperative) had resulted in much dithering over policy and a transport strike that had popular 
support.99  The need to re-establish his authority, to pursue further austerity measures and to 
clip the wings of more protests on the right from the FN and De Villiers, coupled with 
projections of a continued majority led Chirac to dissolve the Assemblée early.  However, 
factional fighting within the RPR and a coherent campaign by the left, working on concerns 
about unemployment and the Euro, saw the right’s vote collapse and Chirac faced with five 
years of co-habitation with Jospin’s government.  If the EU had been responsible, at least 
indirectly, for the election being called, then the result did not result in any great change of 
policy, since not to meet the criteria was not a credible policy option for any administration. 
 
The consequences were clear.  The IGC was left to tinker with the Treaties, although the 
lack of agreement was used as excuse to drag out the negotiations until the European 
Council at Amsterdam in June 1997.  It was only a partial coincidence that this date was 
                                                     
99 D. Goldey, 1998, ‘The French general election of 25 May-1 June 1997’, in Electoral Studies, Vol.17-4, pp. 
536-555, p.537. 
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three months after the British general election, as it had been clear that the Conservatives, in 
power since 1979, were probably going to lose to Labour.  The importance in this lay in the 
increasing hard line that the British had been taking, under domestic pressure, and which 
other governments hoped would disappear with a new administration.  This was in fact the 
case, and as part of Labour’s new European policy the Social Charter, which had been 
excluded from full incorporation into Maastricht, was fully communitarised.  Nevertheless, it 
was clear that it was not only the British who had reservations about the EU and Amsterdam 
was not the great leap forward that some had hoped for, particularly in the field of 
institutional reform. 
 
If this was the culmination of the French strategy of German containment then it was not to 
be an unqualified success.  The traditional Franco-German axis was weakened in the late 
1990s, first by Mitterrand’s replacement with Chirac, and then with Kohl’s replacement by 
Schröder in 1998, and the lack of coordination made progress difficult.  This was apparent in 
the confusion over the replacement of Santer’s Commission and in the problems of the 
falling value of the Euro after its introduction.  The new Labour government in the UK 
invested much time and effort building up a relationship with the Germans, while 
simultaneously working with the French to develop elements of military cooperation that 
had been dormant since the fall of the European Defence Community in 1954.  This latter 
process, begun at St. Malo in 1998, was partly a means to work to a mutual strength, but also 
was aimed at distracting attention from the on-going inability of Prime Minister Tony Blair 
to commit to joining the Euro. 
 
If the 1997 elections had seen the EU developing into a noticeable issue in campaigning, 
then that position was continued in the 1999 European elections.  The switch to PR in the 
UK allowed the strongly anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) to gain a national stage, 
through its campaigning and its first elected seats.  Still undergoing the consequences of the 
collapse of 1997, the Conservative party took a sceptical line, vowing to keep Sterling, a 
policy that helped it to regain seats lost in 1994.100  In France too, opposition groups (notably 
the pro-hunting Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (CPNT) and Pasqua and de Villiers’s 
Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF)) gained ground and extended the anti-EU vote in 
France.  However, in both countries, turnout continued to fall, suggesting that while 
                                                     
100 Note that this was also due to a considerable extent to the correcting impact on proportionality of the new 
voting system. 
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European elections were being fought more on European issues, fewer people were 
interested enough to vote.101 
 
It is really only at the end of the study period that European factors have played a significant 
role in electoral campaigns.  Even in the 1997 and 1999 elections, European issues were 
being considered in specific national contexts (‘how do the convergence criteria affect my 
job security?’, ‘do we want to lose the pound?’).  Putting this back into the question of how 
elections might affect public opinion, it has to be concluded that any effect would be 
minimal and confined to the last couple of years in the study period.  Even that effect might 
be seen not as elections affecting opinion, but opinion affecting elections.  Certainly this 
would be true in the British case, where the Euro/Sterling debate had been high profile since 
at least 1996 and where the Conservative position was based as much on perceived electoral 
benefit as it was on principle.  In France, something similar can also be seen, although the 
general commitment to a strong role in the EU by all the major parties gave the 1995 debate 
on the convergence criteria rather an insubstantial quality. 
 
                                                     
101 However, as Franklin has recently noted, structural and mechanical effects have to be taken into 
consideration, which have also led to a fall in turnout: M. Franklin, 2001, ‘How structural factors cause 
turnout variations at European Parliament elections’, in European Union Politics, Vol.2-3, pp.309-328. 
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NATIONAL MEDIA AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
In order to have a complete understanding of the formation and development of opposition 
to the EU, it is necessary to consider the role that the media play in those processes.  Earlier, 
opposition was categorised into elite, popular and intermediate levels, but there was no 
attempt to address the question of how these levels communicate with each other and within 
themselves.  Not only does the media form a key conduit for these communications, and so 
require an understanding of how it is used by various actors, but it also has the potential to 
become an actor itself.  As much as the media carries news and information, it shapes them 
to its own agenda and interests, a process that has a potentially deeply influential impact on 
elite and popular attitudes. 
 
Starting with this last point, that of influence, it must be considered whether the media does 
indeed shape opinions and attitudes.  As McQuail notes, there is little agreement on the 
nature or extent of the assumed effects of the media, since there is a paradoxical relationship 
between the general and the particular: “We can be sure that particular effects are occurring 
all the time without being able to see or predict the aggregate outcome or to know after the 
event how much is attributable to the media.”102  Even if a view of the media as all-powerful 
is rejected, then it can still be suggested that it is important in contributing to the 
construction of meanings within the public sphere.103  Whether intentional or not, if the 
media is seen as having an important mediating role, then the media landscape in the two 
case-studies must be considered. 
 
The size and scope of this piece of research does not allow for the consideration of the 
entirety of the various media present in France and the UK.  Indeed, that research which has 
been conducted has tended to focus either on specific events (e.g. European elections, or the 
Commission’s resignation in 1999), or on individual media in individual countries.  As a 
result, this brief overview will concentrate on the dominant media forms for news 
communication – newspapers and television – in order to give an impression of how they 
relate to the public discussion on European integration.  Where possible, other media will 
also be mentioned. 
 
                                                     
102 D. McQuail, 2000, Mass communication theory, 4th Ed., London, Sage, p.416.  At a more practical level, 
Curtice argues that the British press might have influenced some people to change their votes in the 1997 
general election, but that overall the effect was minimal, due to the different directions different newspapers 
pulled voters (J. Curtice, 1999, ‘Was it The Sun wot won it again?  The influences of newspapers in the 
1997 election campaign’, CREST Working Paper, No.75, at http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk) 
103 See McQuail, 2000, pp.417-422 for a discussion of the evolution of media effect research. 
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The best known media element vis-à-vis European integration is the British press, which has 
been the subject of much political as well as academic interest.104  This has been as much 
due to the concentration of newspaper ownership into a small number of hands as it has to 
actual content.  The almost complete enthusiasm for integration that had existed since the 
1975 referendum began to break down at the end of the 1980s, as the Conservative press 
followed Prime Minister Thatcher’s change of view after her Bruges speech, most famously 
captured in The Sun’s headline “Up Yours Delors!” (1 November 1990).  While the 
Maastricht Treaty was generally accepted at the time of signing, the crises of 1992, and the 
ejection of Sterling from the ERM in particular, saw a further wave of objections to the 
integration process, which was to continue throughout the decade. 
 
As Wilkes and Wring note, while most of the Conservative broadsheets were to follow their 
right-wing tabloid counterparts down this path of dissatisfaction, there was still support for 
membership on economic grounds from The Times, Telegraph and Economist.105  However, 
the shift did mark a recognition of the gap between public opinion and political parties, as 
well as the changing nature of membership.  This second point was best demonstrated by the 
clearly differentiated stance that The Sun took from 1997 of supporting the Labour party on 
its general European policy, but not on membership of EMU.  George goes so far as to 
suggest that the Labour party subsequently became beholden to this line, for fear of 
completely losing the support of a traditionally Conservative press.106 
 
In France the situation is much less dramatic, both because newspapers are much less 
influential and because have remained relatively homogeneous in their support.107  With the 
most popular newspapers on both left (Le Monde, Libération) and right (Le Figaro, Le 
Parisien) all expressing clear pro-European positions, it is perhaps not surprising that there 
is a clear majority who feel moved by the print press towards a more positive attitude 
towards the EU.108  Without the development of anti-European stances, such as occurred in 
the UK, the French press has remained essentially in line with the political elite’s position 
                                                     
104 P. Anderson & T. Weymouth, 1999, Insulting the public?: The British press and the European Union, 
London, Addison Wesley Longman, and G. Wilkes & D. Wring, 1998,’The British press and European 
integration: 1948 to 1996’, in D. Baker & D. Seawright (eds.), Britain for and against Europe: British 
politics and the question of European integration, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp.185-205, provide good 
starting points. 
105 Wilkes & Wring, 1998, p.204.  Forster, 2002, p.90, notes the Daily Telegraph switched to an oppositional 
position in mid 1991, followed later the same year by the Times and Sunday Times. 
106 George, 2000. 
107 Cros gives newspaper penetration figures of 127 per 1000 in France, against 421 in the UK: J.-J. Cros, 1997, 
‘Médias et vie politique’, in Institutions et Vie Politique, Les Notices de la Documentation Française, 
pp.123-129, p.123.  Note that weekly news magazines are more popular in France than the UK. 
108 Ockrent refers to a 1998 SOFRES poll that 54% of those surveyed felt more disposed towards European 
integration, 28% less so, with 11% feeling there was no influence:  C. Ockrent, 1999, ‘L’Europe à travers la 
presse’, in SOFRES, L’Etat de l’opinion 1999, Paris, Seuil, pp.121-132, p.127. 
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and has somewhat stifled the creation of a public debate: for example, the ratification of 
Maastricht did not result in the same splits in the media that were seen in the UK.109   
 
If the print press has developed upon divergent paths in the two countries, then television 
has seen much more stability.  In both countries, television (and to a certain extent, radio) 
has been seen as a generally pro-European medium.110  Unfortunately, given the difficulty of 
studying television’s content and impact, such assertions must remain little more than 
impressionistic.  At the same time, it is worth noting that in the UK the position of the 
government-owned BBC on European matters has been a source of much debate, usually on 
the part of opposition groups who feel that it has a pro-European ‘agenda’ out of keeping 
with its public service role.111 
 
From this quick overview of the media landscapes in the two countries, it can be seen that 
while the French media has been relatively acquiescent towards European integration as an 
issue, in the UK it has been both a forum for and a promoter of the various sides of the 
debate.  This difference should be kept in mind when considering how opposition has 
formed and developed in each national case study, since the media will have a noticeable 
constraining (or empowering) effect on that opposition in certain circumstances. 
                                                     
109 See Stone, 1993, for a discussion of the ratification. 
110 See C. De Vreese, 2001, ‘’Europe’ in the news’, in European Union Politics, Vol.2-3, pp.283-307.  Harrison 
and Wood present a more critical view (J. Harrison & L. Woods, 2000, ‘European citizenship: Can audio-
visual policy make a difference?’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.38-3, pp.471-495). 
111 Global Britain – an anti-EU group set up by Lords Pearson, Harris and Stoddart - has the most comprehensive 
set of data on this matter at its website (http://www.globalbritain.org).  
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PUBLIC OPINION 
 
In addition to considering the development of elite and media attitudes towards European 
integration, so is it also necessary to have an understanding of public opinion.  This opinion 
both shapes and is shaped by elite discourses, and so becomes an integral part of the political 
system.  Consequently, it is necessary to have a clear idea of popular attitudes towards 
integration and how they have changed over time and between the two countries. 
 
Moreover, measuring public opinion also plays a potentially vital role in explaining relative 
volumes of anti-EU activity.  While this subject is not directly addressed by the main 
hypotheses, which are concerned primarily with the forces at work in group formation and 
development, some understanding of the differences in volume between countries is clearly 
very useful.  If it can be shown that there is a factor that provides a plausible explanation for 
that difference, through popular attitudes towards European integration, then that would 
extend the predictive power of the hypotheses. 
 
The question “Do you think your country’s membership of the European Union has been a 
good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad or don’t know” has been one of the longest 
running questions asked by Eurobarometer and is the one that it most frequently used as a 
headline figure of ‘support’.  Figures 6 and 7 below represent the development of the figures 
for “Membership as a Good Thing” and “a Bad Thing” respectively. 
 
What the two charts show, is that France has been consistently higher in its support for 
EC/EU membership (and lower in its opposition) than the UK over the fifteen years of the 
study period.  Figure 8 quantifies this difference in chart form.  The period from 1985 to 
1992 saw a steady convergence of support levels between the two countries, from previously 
very high levels of difference.  To a large extent, that was a result of changes in British 
support, which had been strongly anti-membership in the early 1980s, rather than any 
movement on the part of French public opinion.  However, this process came to a halt in 
about 1992, leaving a relatively persistent difference of some 10% in support (and 
opposition) levels between the two.  As can be seen in Figures 6 and 7, this was also a period 
of falling support levels and rising opposition in both France and the UK, suggesting that 
both were moving at roughly the same absolute rates. 
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In these terms then, there is clearly a difference between the countries.  That difference fell 
in the first half of the time frame, but stabilised after 1992.  However, it should be noted that 
while there is a highly significant statistical relationship between the “Membership as a 
Good Thing” figures for the two countries, there is almost no correlation between the “Bad 
Thing” figures.112  That is to say, opposition levels are erratic in their development.  At a 
statistical level, this is due in part to the existence of the “Neither” option in the question.  
From the data, it is apparent that as levels of “Good Thing” fall, there is not just an increase 
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in “Bad Thing”, but also in “Neither”.  This seems to suggest that it is only in some cases 
that support turns into opposition; for the rest, judgement is reserved.  Opposition is 
therefore not just simply the withdrawal of support. 
 
 
 
However, while patterns can be discerned within this data set, care must be taken.  The 
Eurobarometer series is the only available systematic cross-national public opinion poll: for 
all the benefits that implies (in terms of comparability and scope), there is a question mark 
over whether the use of a single question on the ‘goodness’ of membership is a reliable 
measure of people’s attitudes.  Hix discusses this in terms of Easton’s theory of affective and 
utilitarian support, noting that there is a difference between supporting the system in value 
terms and believing that the system has political or economic benefits.113 
 
However, when looking at questions directed towards more utilitarian concerns of benefit, it 
is still possible to see a similar pattern to that for the membership question (see Figure 9).  
With the “don’t know” responses holding fairly consistently around the 15-20% mark, net 
percentages for benefit for membership moved in a positive direction in both countries 
during the period up to about 1990-91, before falling back quite sharply over the next three 
years, and stabilising over the remainder of the decade.  This mirrors the shifts in (affective) 
support for membership, leading to the conclusion that, at the very least, both are related 
functions of people’s attitudes towards European integration. 
                                                                                                                                                      
112 r = 0.520 and 0.069 respectively. 
113 See Hix, 1999. 
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This said, there is then another problem: while the Eurobarometer data might be internally 
consistent, that does not mean much if they are consistently incorrect.  In order to test this, it 
would be necessary to compare the findings to other public opinion polls.  Unfortunately, 
this is easier said than done, for two interlinked reasons.  Firstly, as has been noted, 
Eurobarometer is the only systematic cross-national poll that is available; hence direct 
comparisons cannot be made on the same, or even on similar, questions.  Infrequently, there 
are one-off questions asked in several countries, which cover the same topic, but these are 
insufficient to draw out any meaningful conclusions.  Secondly, opinion polls within 
individual countries tend to reflect national priorities and preoccupations. 
 
 
 
This national particularity was of course part of the reason that Eurobarometer was founded 
in the early 1970s.  However, it does make it difficult to find suitable data for comparison, 
particularly in France.114  While the British political debate on ‘Europe’ has been a constant 
source of friction and, therefore, of polling interest, in France, the relative hegemony of 
positive attitudes towards the European project meant that systemic questions of 
membership have been pushed aside in favour of more focused questions (such as voting 
intentions in European elections, support for the Maastricht treaty, and so on). 
 
                                                     
114 Marthaler has conducted in-depth interviews during 2002, but its usefulness can only develop in the long term 
(S. Marthaler, 2002, ‘’Europe’ and the French electorate in 2002: The other side of the Euro’, Paper 
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The result of all of this is that while there is at least one complete set of competing data on 
support for membership (and one incomplete one) in the UK, there is no such set for France.  
Hence, the comparison is necessarily incomplete and lopsided.  With that caveat, a good 
general fit can still be seen between the UK data sets in Figures 10 and 11, at least in the 
directions of changes in support and opposition.  In all of the polls there is rising support for, 
and falling opposition to, membership until the early 1990s, when there is a reversal.  While 
                                                                                                                                                      
presented at 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, European Consortium for Political 
Research, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Bordeaux, 26-28 September, 2002). 
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the Gallup data has the same four categories as that of Eurobarometer (Good, Bad, Neither, 
Don’t Know), the British Social Attitudes survey only asks if the respondent supports 
membership: hence the higher average levels of both support and opposition to membership 
during the whole period, compared to the other surveys. 
 
In brief, despite its incomplete nature, this comparison appears to give support to the figures 
produced by Eurobarometer.  These figures have demonstrated a certain level of internal and 
external consistency, to the point that it can be assumed that they provide a fairly accurate 
impression of public opinion in the two countries on the matter of support for the European 
Union. 
 
One further issue that must be addressed is the pertinence of the EU as an issue for the 
public.  While the data so far have provided an overview of people’s attitudes towards 
integration, it is important to contextualise those attitudes within individual’s broader 
attitudes.  For instance, while the early 1990s marked a high point in public support for the 
Union, that might be less meaningful if very few people thought it was an important subject, 
just as the falls in support throughout the subsequent period might not be matched by an 
increased sense of importance. 
 
In practical terms, this requires some gauging of how important the European Union and 
European integration is to people.  As before, the main problem is one of available data.  In 
the UK, MORI have conducted monthly surveys asking what the most important issues of 
the day are.115  By contrast, no French polling organisation runs such polls.  The closest that 
is available are exit polls from national and European elections, which regularly ask what 
issues voters based their vote on.116  While these cover somewhat different aspects of 
individuals’ rankings (elections potentially distorting ‘normal’ preferences), they will at least 
give an impression of relative movements within a country and of trends over time. 
 
                                                     
115 The full data set is available at http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml and is updated monthly.  The 
questions asked were “What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?” and “What 
do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?”. 
116 The sources used here are generally produced for newspapers (questions asked are also noted in brackets): 
Louis Harris France, 1986, Sondage sortie des bureaux de vote – élections législatives 1986, 16 March 
1986 (Quels sont les deux problèmes les plus importante dans votre vote?); Le Monde 22/06/1989, 
‘Sondage sortie des urnes’ (Parmi les problèmes suivantes, quels sont les deux qui ont le plus compté dans 
votre vote aujourd’hui?); Le Parisien 24/03/1993, ‘Apres le 1er tour des législatives de mars 93’ (Les 
problèmes les plus importants); Libération 16/06/1994, ‘Les électeurs de Tapie et de Villiers aux 
européennes’ (Au moment du voter, quels sont les problèmes qui ont le plus compté pour vous?); 
Libération 11/05/1995, ‘Sortie des urnes’ (Parmi les problèmes suivants, quels sont les deux qui ont le plus 
compté dans votre vote?); Le Parisien 28/05/1997, ‘1er tour: ce que les français ont voulu dire’ (Les 10 
thèmes qui ont le plus compté dans vos motivations de vote?); Sofres 13/06/1999, Les élections 
européennes de 1999 et la situation politique, 13 June 1999 (Motivation de vote). 
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Figure 12 shows the percentage of people citing the EU or ‘Europe’ as an important issue.  
The monthly data for the UK show a high level of short-term change, with peaks of interest 
lasting no more than a couple of months: the most consistent phase occurred in the first four 
years of the study period, when there was minimal interest.  At the same time, there is a 
gradual increase in importance accorded over time, particularly after 1996. 
 
In France, the very high levels of importance accorded to European construction in 1989, 
1994 and 1999 is, in large part, a function of these data being collected at European 
elections.  This is borne out by the much lower figures obtained in presidential and 
Assemblée elections.  Indeed, these latter figures are broadly comparable to those found in 
the UK at the same point in time.  Unfortunately, the data are too sparse to make much more 
comment on overall trends, especially when the figure is so low in the 1995 presidential 
election. 
 
 
 
However, simple percentages only tell half of the story.  It is also necessary to look at the 
relative importance of the issue in comparison with others: this removes the problem of 
changing absolute values by emphasising relative positions vis-à-vis other issues.  In Figure 
13, the data has been plotted on the basis of the ranking position of the European issue.  
While the pattern broadly follows that of Figure 12, it also highlights some additional points. 
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In France, even though the highest percentage score was for the 1999 European elections, 
Europe as an issue only came second (to unemployment).  In the other cases it has only been 
a high-ranking issue at the other two European elections.  By contrast, the UK has seen a 
rising relative importance, especially in the last two years of the period.  At the same time, it 
has only been the number one issue once in the UK (in June 1999, the month of the 
European elections).  The mean ranking position over the whole period is 7.5 in the UK and 
4.6 in France (7 if European elections are excluded), positions that suggest Europe is only 
rarely a key component in the general public’s lives.117 
 
The relationship between support and importance is rather complicated.  In the UK, 
importance started to move off its baseline at the end of the 1980s, just as support was 
growing, but importance continued to rise throughout the 1990s as support fell away.  In 
France, while importance rose in the 1999 election, when French support was at its lowest, 
this period also saw other issues gain even more importance.  Figure 14 shows the 
relationship between the two sets of data, plotting both percentages for those thinking 
membership is a “Good Thing” (marked “+ve” on the legend) and a “Bad Thing” (marked “-
ve”).118  While the “Good Thing” relationship supports an inverse correlation between 
membership and importance, the reverse cannot be said for “Bad Thing”.  Thus high levels 
                                                     
117 Evans has argued that the 2001 general election in the UK represented the start of a move towards Europe 
becoming a salient issue for voters (G. Evans, 2001, ‘European integration and British politics: Were the 
Conservatives waving or drowning in the 2001 elections?’, CREST Working Paper, No.92, at 
http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk).  However, even here it is still a process that is much closer to its start than its 
finish. 
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of public support result in a lower importance, but high levels of public opposition do not 
guarantee a high importance.119 
 
 
 
To summarise this section, it has been seen that support for, and opposition to, European 
integration has changed over time, resulting in a peak in support at the start of the 1990s, but 
falling away in both countries thereafter.  As levels of support fell, so too the issue appeared 
to gain in importance (on the basis of the more comprehensive British data).  This said, 
‘Europe’ as an issue was at no point the dominant one (pace the French European election 
exit polls), at best being of comparable importance to issues of economic activity, social 
welfare, health and security, all of which have had consistently high levels of importance.  
Thus, while public support has fallen during the 1990s, it is necessary to qualify any 
potential impact that might have upon organised opposition to the EU by remembering that 
‘Europe’ has largely been a peripheral issue for most individuals.120 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
118 Data has only been plotted where data is available for the same month, hence only two French points. 
119 This calls to mind Lindberg and Scheingold’s permissive consensus, used to describe the willingness of post-
war Europe to allow politicians to get on with governing without the need for an active citizenry (L. 
Lindberg & A. Scheingold, 1970, Europe's would-be polity: patterns of change in the European 
Community, Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall). 
120 This situation and its resultant dilemma for managers of political parties in the UK has been discussed by the 
author at greater length in S. Usherwood, 2002, ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The 
dilemma of public opinion and party management’, in Government and Opposition, Vol.37-2, pp.211-230. 
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ANTI-EU GROUPS 
 
The final section of this chapter looks at the development of groups opposed to the European 
Union.  In so doing, it aims to fill in the gaps left by the previous sections, as well as to link 
the various themes together.  Figures 15 and 16 show timelines for the creation of new anti-
EU groups during the study period in France and the UK. 
 
The mid-1980s represented a period in the European Community’s history when the 
discontents of the 1970s had been largely forgotten and there was a broad elite and public 
consensus on the positive nature of further integration.  This was the time of the 1992 project 
for the single market, a project which appealed to both traditional pro-integrationists (such as 
the French) and to the previously sceptical (such as the British).  That the reasons for their 
support differed enormously was not the issue, but rather that opposition was not a force in 
either country.  The groups that had fought against membership in the 1975 referendum in 
the UK had either collapsed or been incorporated into an umbrella group that was to become 
the Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB), a group that maintained a minimal presence 
throughout the 1980s.121  In France, anti-Europeanism was anathematic to an elite that 
constructed integration almost unreservedly as a positive force.122 
 
1989 is the first year in which moves against the integration process began.  The year before, 
there had been the turnaround in Margaret Thatcher’s European policy with the Bruges 
speech, which gave a convenient peg for the formation of the Bruges Group.  At the same 
time in France, rural elements who felt they were having their lifestyles attacked by 
European legislation began to mobilise in search of representation.  Working from their base 
in the South-East of the country, they contested seats under the title of Chasse-Pêche-Nature-
Traditions, although it was to be several years before this was to bear fruit.  Within a year of 
CPNT’s foundation, British fishermen were starting to organise their protest against the 
Common Fisheries Policy, using information campaigns and lobbying of MPs. 
                                                     
121 CIB’s current Chair, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, described this period in the group’s history as “keeping the 
torch alight”. Interview, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, Chair, Campaign for an Independent Britain, 4 
December 2001, House of Lords, London.  The Conservative European Reform Group had been formed in 
1980, but with only a passive agenda of criticising the costs of membership (see Times 30/10/1996, ‘Tory 
grandees break cover to defend European policy’).  Labour (Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign) and 
Conservative (Conservatives Against a Federal Europe) groups also maintained a minimal existence during 
this period. 
122 See Benoit, 1997, p.7. 
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However, these developments were each relatively isolated.  It was not until 1991-2 that 
opposition to the EU came into its own, as the European and national situations changed.  At 
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the European level, the Treaty on European Union rapidly became a symbol of a system that 
was out of touch not only with popular opinion but also with significant elements of national 
elites.  At the national level, the 1992 general election in the UK left the Conservative party 
at the mercy of hard-line eurosceptics, while in France the Maastricht ratification 
referendum in the same year provided an enticing opportunity to break with party lines.123 
 
The British general election came at the time of Maastricht ratification, and as that process 
became more drawn out, notably after the Danish ‘no’, the more the sceptics felt that their 
hand was strengthened: the parliamentary fight to ensure the passage of Maastricht was a 
bitterly fought contest, which deepened the divide between the two sides.124  In the aftermath 
of the ratification, new groups were set up to channel opposition into the political system (of 
particular importance were UKIP, set up by Alan Sked in 1992 as a successor to his Anti-
Federalist League, and the European Foundation, created by Bill Cash MP the following 
year).  While both of these groups drew in primarily Conservative party members and voters, 
neither fell into the same category as the Fresh Start Group, which was a purely intra-party 
set of Conservative MPs opposed to ratification, or Conservative Way Forward, an intra-
party grouping dedicated to the promotion of Thatcher’s ideas.125 
 
In France, the combination of Maastricht and the Gulf War pushed Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
out of the Socialist Party and towards the formation of the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) 
in 1991.  Chevènement worked together with the precursor of Philippe de Villiers’ 
conservative Mouvement pour la France (MPF), the Combat pour les Valeurs, to introduce a 
block in parliament to Maastricht’s ratification.126  Further strains took their toll within the 
right-wing coalition of the RPR and UDF, as Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin 
campaigned strongly against ratification, through the Rassemblement pour la Non, which 
drew on Pasqua and Séguin’s think-tank Demain la France.127  Along with the brisk adoption 
of anti-Europeanism to the Front National’s programme, the collapse of the consensus of the 
late 1980s in France was as deep as anything that the UK was experiencing, although not 
nearly as damaging to the government. 
 
                                                     
123 See Young, 1998, pp.375-411, on the UK and Milner, 2000, p.42, and A. Guyomarch & H. Machin, 1992, ‘A 
history of hesitations on the road to Maastricht’, in French Politics and Society, Vol.10-4, pp.60-80, for 
France. 
124 Baker, Gamble & Ludlam, 1994, easily remains the most detailed text on this episode. 
125 On the left, the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism was a relatively low-key body in both its membership and 
public profile. 
126 Benoit, 1997, p.49-67. 
127 Milner, 2000, p.42. 
 93 
 2: France & the UK in Europe 
 
One element in understanding the growth of opposition was the development in the early 
1990s of transnational infrastructures, which enabled anti-European ideas and strategies to 
be circulated much more efficiently than before.  In 1992, The European Anti-Maastricht 
Alliance (TEAM) was created at a protest meeting alongside the Edinburgh European 
Council of December 1992.  By 1999, it numbered some 25 member organisations, with 
another seven observers, from a total of 11 countries inside and outside the EU.128  Similarly, 
a network of left-wing ‘Committees for the Abrogation of the Maastricht Treaty’ was 
created at a London meeting in 1997, covering 18 countries, although this does not seem to 
have been as successful as TEAM.129 
 
The 1994 European elections were to mark something of a highpoint in French opposition.  
De Villiers’ MPF group, fighting under the banner of L’Autre Europe, took over 12% of the 
vote and sent 13 MEPs to the European Parliament.130  One of these, Sir James Goldsmith, 
was to use his position as a springboard to found the Referendum Party later that year in the 
UK.131  However, successes in France were short-lived, with poor showings in the 1995 
presidential election by De Villiers and the eclipsing of Pasqua.132  In the eyes of Benoit, the 
most comprehensive academic analyst of French movements, this marked the end of anti-EU 
policy positions as a meaningful force. 
 
In contrast to the French system, the UK was undergoing more subtle pressures, driven in 
large part by the small government majority.  Within the Conservative party the strength of 
the eurosceptical element was growing, helped along by formation of right-leaning 
groupings such as the European Research Group and the reactivation of Conservatives 
Against a Federal Europe (CAFE).133  At the same time, an incipient youth movement was 
developing, based on models found in Scandinavia, and the impact of EU regulations was 
becoming more visible to the general public, as typified by the British Weights and 
Measures Association (BWMA).  This grass-roots group aimed to preserve the use of 
imperial measures in the UK, against the perceived encroachment of the metric system.  This 
                                                     
128 British and Scandinavian groups were at the forefront of TEAM’s creation, and it was paralleled by the 
simultaneously establishment of the Anti-Maastricht Alliance in the UK.  TEAM modified its constitution 
(and name, to The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements) in 1997 and experienced most of its 
growth thereafter (http://www.teameurope.info/index.html).  Also see Annex 1. 
129 Research to date has only found traces of committees of that name in France, Spain and Italy. 
130 Milner, 2000, p.55. 
131 Benoit, 1997, p.61. 
132 Pasqua’s support for the unsuccessful candidature of Edouard Balladur was to push the former out of the 
limelight until the right’s collapse in the 1997 general elections. Benoit, 1997, 53. 
133 There was also movement on the left, with the creation in 1996 of the Labour-based People’s Europe 
Campaign, which enjoyed a brief period of notoriety before its effective dissolution in the run-up to the 
1997 general election. 
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seemingly esoteric issue was to become something of a cause célèbre in 2000-01, when a 
market trader was prosecuted for selling a pound of bananas.134 
 
In comparison to Maastricht, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty did not seem to provoke the same 
reaction, at least in terms of group formation.  However, since most anti-Europeans across 
the Union saw Amsterdam as the completion of what Maastricht had started, this was quite 
natural.  Of more concern was the progress towards the single currency, the Euro.  Despite 
the turbulence of the ERM in 1992-93 and the large strains on member states endeavouring 
to meet the convergence criteria by 1998, the beginning of Stage 3 of EMU in 1999 was a 
key target.  This was particularly true in the UK, even though it had been clear from the 
beginning that it would not start Stage 3 with the other member states, due to its opt-out.  
Nonetheless, the issue was sufficiently politically volatile for Goldsmith to fund the largest 
ever single-issue protest party, the Referendum Party, in the 1997 British general election.135  
While the Referendum Party had no appreciable effect on the election outcome, it did result 
in both the Conservatives and Labour committing themselves to a referendum on entry into 
Stage 3.136 
 
The 1997 British general election also highlighted the divisions within the anti-European 
groups.  UKIP had already endeavoured to move back towards other groups before the 
election, parting company with Sked on the way, and in 1997 it co-founded New Alliance in 
an effort to create an umbrella organisation to which others could rally, albeit 
unsuccessfully.  The vast majority of the Referendum Party, broken by the death of 
Goldsmith in 1997, ended up joining with millionaire Paul Sykes (who had bank-rolled anti-
Euro Conservative MPs in 1997) to form the Democracy Movement.137  At the same time, a 
few members persisted with seeking election under the banner of the Democratic Party, run 
by a former Referendum Party manager.  Despite this fragmentation, there was still felt to be 
enough space for the creation of Global Britain, under the direction of anti-EU members of 
the House of Lords. 
 
By the late 1990s, there was a shift in the focus of opposition, albeit in different directions.  
In the UK, as a referendum on the Euro became a certainty, so those against the Euro began 
                                                     
134 See the BWMA’s website at http://www.footrule.org for more information on the Steve Thoburn trial.  The 
UKIP was also an important fundraiser and campaigner in this case. 
135 See Young, 1998, pp. 406-411. 
136 A. Heath, R. Jowell, B. Taylor & K. Thompson, 1998, ‘Euroscepticism and the Referendum party’, CREST 
Working Paper, No.63, at http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk.  Note, however, the larger impact calculated by I. 
McAllister & D. Studlar, 2000, ‘Conservative euroscepticism and the Referendum party in the 1997 British 
general election’ , in Party Politics, Vol.6-3, pp.359-371. 
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to focus on arranging their campaign.  The first of these was to be Trade Unions Against the 
Single Currency, set up in 1997 to shift opinion in the unions and the Labour Party.  In 1998, 
after an appeal by the former Labour transport minister Lord Marsh, Business for Sterling 
was created as a forum for businessmen to act to protect the pound.  The group was careful 
to distinguish itself from anti-EU groups, since it proclaimed itself to be against merely the 
Euro, rather than the EU as a whole, although there is still some contact with UKIP and 
others.138  The key political counterpart to Business for Sterling has become the New Europe 
group of Lord Owen, founded in late 1998.  Again, this was an anti-Euro group rather than 
an anti-European one, although once more the line between the two was somewhat blurred, 
given the content of some of their output.139  Together the two groups were to form No in 
late 1999 as a potential body for fighting a referendum, a role that the cross-party Congress 
for Democracy was happy to leave open. 
 
In France, the focus did not fall so much on the Euro, which had become a relatively moot 
point after the 1997 general election had demonstrated the political commitment to the 
project.  Instead, more general concerns over sovereignty issues became more prominent, 
both in and outside of the party system.  Outside, various pro-Republican organisations 
began to work together under umbrellas such as the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté 
Nationale (1997) and the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France (1998).  These groups, 
while relatively small, represent a second wave of French non-party activity, along with the 
Front National splinter group, the Mouvement National Républicain, after the treaty-driven 
anti-Maastricht and Amsterdam groups.140 
 
Inside the French political system, the tensions within the RPR finally resulted in Charles 
Pasqua leaving to reform the Demain la France think-tank between 1996 and 1998, 
developing an extensive set of contacts with other groups, notably De Villiers’.141  De 
Villiers and Pasqua eventually decided to combine their efforts under the Gaullist banner of 
the Rassemblement pour la France for the 1999 European elections, thus reuniting the right’s 
opposition to the EU and gaining 13% of the vote, as well as 13 seats.142  This was a large 
                                                                                                                                                      
137 In 2001, Goldsmith’s widow, Lady Annabel, completed the circle, by becoming the Democracy Movement’s 
Honorary President. See http://www.democracymovement.co.uk  
138 Interview, Nicky Sinclaire, Council Member, UK Independence Party, 16 September 1999, UKIP central 
office, London; interview, Richard Eels, Information Manager, Business for Sterling, 14 September 1999, 
telephone interview. The former described contact as “passive”.  Also see http://www.new-europe.co.uk  
and http://www.bfors.com/  
139 See http://www.new-europe.co.uk/contents.html for examples. 
140 For more information on their work, see their websites at http://www.souverainete.org/, 
http://souverainete.ifrance.com/souverainete/ and http://www.m-n-r.com/ respectively. 
141 Milner, 2000, p.55. 
142 Some RPR members had formed Debout la République earlier in 1999 to protest at the ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, but had otherwise remained inside the party structures. 
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proportion of the anti-EU vote in these elections, which rose slightly from the 1994 figure to 
just over 40%.143  It also marked the first national seats for CPNT, with a surprisingly strong 
showing and six seats. 
 
The British experience of the 1999 elections highlights the impact of the differences in the 
two systems.  The Conservative party took a relatively negative approach towards the EU, 
although not one of outright opposition, and benefited from both the low turnout and the 
new PR system to increase greatly their representation in the European Parliament.  At the 
same time, the UKIP made its electoral breakthrough, winning three seats and some 7% of 
the vote, leading to something of a revival in its fortunes.  However, this revival was to be 
short-lived, as the party soon ejected both its executive council and its leader, Michael 
Holmes, as it struggled to make the transition to party politics. 
 
 
                                                     
143 Milner, 2000, p.42-3. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has laid out the key elements necessary for the application of the model of 
institutional space to the events that actually took place in the two case studies.  The locus of 
interest is in how opposition to the European Union has been created and then subsequently 
developed.  By combining the hypotheses laid out in the introduction and the previous 
chapter on institutional spaces with the factual events of this chapter it is possible to move 
towards an analysis and discussion of those hypotheses in the chapters that follow. 
 
Before moving on to that analysis, some comments should be made on the various elements 
touched upon in this chapter.  In particular, it is useful to consider how the different elements 
fit together and relate to opposition formation and development.  Taking the development of 
the EU itself as a starting point, then it can be seen that this has been a key driving force in 
the evolution of European policy within the national frameworks, since it necessarily 
requires a national response.  However, it is also clear that those European-level 
developments have been the (partial) result of those same national-level European policies.  
Hence the two are locked into a continual process of action and reaction. 
 
At the same time, other factors are at work.  While the EU-national cycle is essentially 
confined to elite groups, there is also the matter of national public opinion to be considered.  
Given that politicians are reliant upon public support in order to retain office (most 
obviously at election times), they have to take into account public concerns about the 
integration process.  Admittedly, as has been seen, such concern has come only rarely to the 
fore in either France or the UK electorates and so it lacks special resonance for either them 
or politicians.  The fall in public support for membership in both countries during the 1990s, 
and a consequent mismatch with pro-integration elites, made this an increasingly dangerous 
game to play, both in mobilising public opposition and in opening up political space for 
opposition politicians. 
 
In all of this, the media has played a key role, in disseminating news, providing a national 
forum for debate and expressing opinions.  In so doing, it has become both a medium and an 
actor itself, by framing – intentionally or unintentionally – the way in which the debate on 
European integration has been conducted.  As a result, when looking at the processes at 
work in opposition formation and development, it is necessary to consider whether and to 
what extent the media has had an impact on those processes. 
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Finally, the creation of various opposition groups needs to be seen not only as a consequence 
of all these other factors, but also as a contributory factor.  By definition, these groups aim to 
change national opinions and attitudes, and so it should be expected that as they start to work 
towards that goal, they will change the debate.  This is not to claim at this stage that they are 
influential, but rather that they become part of the debate, actors whose voice will be 
expressed, even if not heard or acted upon.  Coupled with the internal dynamics of group 
formation (often driven by personal factors), this makes opposition groups an essential part 
of the analysis. 
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3: Factors of Group Formation 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter and the next, the actual events and developments that have taken place in 
France and the UK with respect to opposition to the European Union will be used to test the 
hypotheses.  Here the primary concern will be with the factors that shape group formation, 
while the next chapter deals more with the actions that groups take and the volume and 
profile they have.  Taken together, they will permit an evaluation of the hypotheses laid out 
at the start of this thesis, in particular those concerning the way European events drive group 
formation and the way in which national institutional spaces shape that formation. 
 
The starting point on this evaluation has to be the following question: why do groups form at 
all?  It is only by having an appreciation of the dynamics of group formation, in the broad 
sense, that it can be decided what to look at when discussing the parameters of anti-EU 
group formation.  To this end, the first part of the chapter deals with this question, and 
suggests that as well as proximate factors, it is also necessary to be aware of more basic 
principles and critiques of integration in order to understand properly how and why groups 
have formed as they have. 
 
The second important point to be covered at this point is the choice of groups to be studied.  
Clearly, given the hypotheses proposed in the introduction and the model of institutional 
spaces laid out in Chapter One, it is essential that a full and complete set of groups is 
included in the thesis.  To this end, some comments are made on the process of identifying 
and selecting groups, as well as the problems that this can result in. 
 
From this starting point, a basic taxonomy of the groups under study can be constructed, 
focusing on three dimensions in particular.  Firstly, groups will be divided up into those that 
have EU opposition as their sole or primary focus (hereafter, primary-focus groups) and 
those that only have it as a secondary part of their work or identity (secondary-focus groups), 
in order to see whether this is related to other characteristics of the respective groups.  
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Secondly, differences between groups that have adopted a position of opposition against the 
entire EU system and those that are only concerned with one aspect of EU and its policies 
will be looked at.  Thirdly, the type of group form will be considered, be it a political party, 
an intra-party group or a non-party group.  Together, these three dimensions will give a 
clearer picture about the form of organised opposition to the EU in both countries. 
 
This will then lead on a consideration of the groups’ ideologies and critiques of integration.  
The starting point will be an application of a left-right scale to groups’ positions, in order to 
help appreciate differences between them.  However, given that some groups are not easily 
positioned on such a scale, the particular critiques of integration that they provide will also 
be looked at. 
 
After this, the impact of proximate factors will be considered.  As stated in the main 
hypothesis, group formation is seen as the result of European events impacting on national 
systems.  As a result, it is necessary to see to what extent group formation has been triggered 
by, or is associated with, such European events, from treaties to policy developments.  At the 
same time, it is important to consider two alternative possibilities, namely that national 
events have been the triggers for group formation, or that internal developments within 
groups have led to new groups being created. 
 
The final point to be covered in this chapter concerns the relationship of individuals with 
groups.  While the primary focus of this thesis is the role of groups in the opposition process, 
it must also be recognised that such groups are composed of individuals, who have 
individual interests, over and above any common interests with the rest of the group.  
Consequently, groups have to be looked at as vehicles for those individual interests and the 
ways in which individuals have shaped groups considered.  This requires the identification 
of key figures within groups, and a consideration of how their preferences have shaped that 
group’s formation. 
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WHY GROUP AT ALL? 
 
While this thesis looks specifically at how anti-EU groups are created and develop, it is 
useful to understand the creation and development of groups more generally.  Through such 
a process it is possible to identify those systemic elements that need to be taken into account 
in this particular area of interest.  To this end, the question must be posed of why groups 
form in the first place.  In other words, what benefits does organised collective action offer 
over individual action? 
 
Two main groups of gains can be identified as resulting from group action, falling under the 
headings of efficiency and of legitimacy.  In terms of efficiency gains, group action allows a 
more productive division of labour between members.  Group action not only allows for 
simultaneous work on different tasks, which would not be possible for individuals, but also 
permits the matching of tasks to skills, so optimising available resources.  Over and above 
this, work focused on a specialist area offers more scope for developing a learning curve far 
beyond that which would be possible for an individual constantly moving from one area to 
another. 
 
However, an efficient group is not necessarily an effective one, with regard to securing its 
goals.  This is where legitimacy gains come in.  By forming a group, individuals can 
increase the credibility of their message, by showing that they are not alone and that 
consequently they speak for a section of society.  This idea that groups are in some way the 
‘voice of the people’ not only increases their legitimacy vis-à-vis other organised groups, but 
also serves to increase the group’s profile within society and so attract more members, so 
completing a cycle of legitimisation. 
 
It is in the fusion of efficiency and legitimacy gains that groups can develop effectiveness 
gains.  They are better able to achieve their group goals, because they can optimise their 
collective resources and because they are able to use their representative function as a lever 
against other, stronger groups. 
 
In all of this, there is the logical presupposition that common interests on the part of 
individual actors lead to group formation and collective action, for the reasons outlined 
above.  In the present case, a common interest in opposing the European Union will bring 
people together into collective organisations in order to maximise their voice and presence. 
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However, such a pluralistic view suffers when approached from a rational choice 
perspective.144  In rational choice theory, it is individuals, not groups, who act rationally.  
While individuals might be brought together with others on the basis of common interests or 
goals, there is both a temptation to free ride (by providing less-than-proportionate resources) 
and a potential for a conflict of interests (when the group is pursuing multiple goals, which 
individuals will weight differently).  Olson suggests that since such problems will increase 
with group size, due to increasing enforcement issues, there will be a tendency towards small 
groups, where individuals are easier to persuade to cooperate and where individual benefits 
are higher. 
 
Behind Olson’s theory of collective action, it is important to highlight the idea that it is not 
common interests that bring together the group, but rather individual interests that are best 
served by common action.  Therefore, when considering factors in group formation and 
development, notice has to be taken not only of external environmental factors (such as the 
development of the European Union), but also of internal factors (such as members’ and 
group interests). 
 
The reason behind this dual approach to understanding factors of group formation is more 
simply expressed as the need to understand the intersection of interests and events.  While it 
is a first step to say that such-and-such a group has formed because of the Maastricht Treaty, 
that does not explain what it is about that treaty that leads individuals to organise into a 
group to express their unhappiness.  The reasons might be related to individuals’ political 
economy (as expressed on a traditional left-right scale), or to the impact on their lives (as 
might be the case for those working in business, the environment or fishing), or to the 
inadequacies of existing opposition groups (be that on grounds of effectiveness or of clashes 
of personality).  Given such a variety of options, it is necessary to have at least a basic 
awareness of groups’ ideologies or critiques of integration in order to understand why they 
have been created at particular points. 
 
This is not to underplay the impact of external events.  Indeed, as the main hypothesis states, 
group formation is driven by European events, modulated through national structures.  As a 
result, when looking at each group, some account must be made of developments in three 
distinct areas.  The first of these is the development of the European Union itself and of its 
policies, which has been hypothesised as the key motor of group development.  However, 
                                                     
144 The central text on this is M. Olson, 1971, The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of 
groups, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
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account should also be taken of possible alternatives.  Consequently, the second area is that 
of developments in national polities, which may or may not be related to the aforementioned 
developments at the European level.  Finally, the possibility of groups being created as a 
result of internal processes of group evolution and/or schism has to be considered. 
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GROUP SELECTION 
 
A point that has not been addressed so far is the question of how groups are selected for 
inclusion in this study.  This has not been an issue thus far, given the relatively general way 
in which groups have been discussed.  However, in this chapter and the next there is a 
process of quantification of group activity and as a result it is essential that the set of groups 
contained therein is complete and accurate.  In this section, the means of ensuring this and 
the resultant problems are discussed. 
 
The first step in the process is ensuring that all possible groups that could fall under the 
scope of the thesis are recorded.  This logically begins with a survey of existing directories 
of groups.  While this is relatively well provided for in the UK, where there are the 
directories of the European Movement and the Bruges Group, as well as the Euro-Sceptic 
Web Resource, in France no such directories exists.145  Even in the UK, it has to be 
recognised that such directories are all incomplete and overlapping.  The direct consequence 
has been a need to build a completely new and complete directory of anti-EU groups out of 
this existing material.  For the purposes of this thesis, that new directory contains two 
discrete elements.  Firstly, an information sheet was produced for each and every group that 
was considered for inclusion, detailing elements such as group history, size, activities, 
critique of integration and key individuals.  Secondly, a website was built, with links to all 
available websites (almost all currently existing groups having one).146 
 
As this directory was being built, particular care was made to follow up any mention of other 
groups: for instance, websites often contain links to other groups with similar aims or 
overlapping memberships.  This was enhanced in three ways.  Firstly, by the systematic 
survey of media coverage, using the Lexis-Nexis database, for any references to individual 
group’s activities.147  Secondly, by the use of that literature which discussed opposition to 
the EU in the two countries.  Thirdly, by the surveying of the Internet for references to any 
groups.  The value of this approach was clearly shown in the steady growth of groups 
discovered, over and beyond those including in the pre-existing directories already 
mentioned.  In particular, it was essential in the case of France, where the large majority of 
                                                     
145 European Movement, 2000 – the content of this has been subsequently added to at the Britain in Europe 
website (http://www.britainineurope.org/templ.phtml?id=5); Tame, 1997; http://www.euro-sceptic.org/.  in 
France, the closest that comes to such a directory is a listing of ‘souverainiste’ groups 
(http://www.souverainisme.org/), however this contains very many groups that have no interest at all in the 
European Union and excludes many groups that do. 
146 This website is based on the author’s homepage: http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm. 
147 http://www.lexis-nexis.com/. 
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groups outside of the well-known party groups were only detectable through a combination 
of these surveying processes. 
 
As the directory was been built, a second process was begun, of weeding out those groups 
that did not fall within the scope of the thesis.  The guiding criterion of inclusion was the 
definition of opposition to the EU provided in the introduction, i.e. those groups working 
actively against the Union and its development.  The essential element within that definition 
is the idea of active efforts on the part of the group against the EU, or some part of it.  If it 
can be shown that a group has made any such effort, then it has been included in the 
following chapters. 
 
The issue that immediately presents itself with such a qualifying criterion is whether groups 
that claim anti-EU positions, but which do nothing to pursue those positions, should be 
included or not.  On the one hand, it could be argued that the saliency of the issue is the 
relevant dimension, the simple existence of anti-EU tendencies.  The positive side to this 
approach would be an increased certainty that all potentially oppositional elements within a 
national system are covered.  However, it also raises the problem of knowing where to draw 
the line.  It is entirely conceivable that many groups in society would say that they are 
opposed to the EU, if they were asked, but it was otherwise an issue that had not previously 
occurred to them, even at the level of setting out their views.  This leads on to the alternative 
viewpoint, namely that only active and salient oppositional elements are of concern.  By 
definition, unrealised potential opposition is inconsequential, because it goes no further than 
the statement of an opinion.  The practical result of this would be that it is only necessary to 
take account of those groups that substantive action to pursue their aims. 
 
In practice, the problem is more one of theoretical interest than of any great consequence.  
The vast majority of groups that espouse anti-EU policy positions also conduct active 
strategies to back up those positions.  The few exceptions have not been included in the main 
text, but rather listed in Annex 1, along with an explanation of their individual situations.  
The divide between the two groups is clear: those inside have all pursued at least one 
significant action against the EU, while none of those outside have made any attempt to do 
so. 
 
Annex 1 also includes two other sets of groups that have not been covered by the research.  
The first set is another example of the problems of inclusion.  In the course of constructing 
the directory it became apparent that several ‘groups’ were actually single individuals.  The 
advantages of grouping have just been discussed in the previous section, including 
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legitimacy gains.  In a rational world, if a group of individuals try to portray their group as 
representative of a larger section of society, then it is no surprise that single individuals will 
try to do the same, especially since a group of one is much easier to manage than a group of 
several.  The development of the internet has also made it much easier for an individual to 
reach a large audience at low cost and to display the accoutrements of being a group.  
However, in all the identified cases of single-people groups there is once again a lack of 
active pursuit of stated aims.  This is particularly true for such groups that only exist in the 
form of an internet site.  In the cases of single-person groups, where that person is already in 
a position of power or responsibility, it may well be that the person is active in their 
opposition, but never in the name of their ‘group’.  Instead, they act in their own name, 
giving the lie to the existence of the group as a meaningful entity.  Consequently, all such 
groups have been excluded from the research. 
 
The final set of groups in Annex 1 has been excluded for very different reasons.  
Transnational groups are a very interesting development since the early 1990s, bringing 
together previously isolated national movements.  They represent the more formal end of 
increasing contact between nationally based groups, with regular meetings and information 
sharing.  In their most institutionalised form, they are associated with the various groups 
within the European Parliament that represent anti-EU positions.  British groups were at the 
forefront of developing such groups, along with the Danes, as awareness grew of the 
existence of parallel movements in other countries, be it through referenda campaigns or 
meeting in the European Parliament.  In the latter case, anti-EU groupings have never 
progressed beyond an ad hoc means of exploiting the European Parliament’s funding and 
office allocation system.148  However, in all cases these groups act solely as fora within 
which national groups meet to exchange information and views.149  Given the focus in this 
thesis on national systems, it is argued here that transnational groups are better thought of as 
a strategy of anti-EU groups, rather than as a form.  Since what activity and structures there 
are rest outside of the national frameworks that are under consideration here, further 
reference to these groups will be limited to notes in the chapter on group strategies.  The list 
in Annex 1 contains a full list of these groups and their constituent members from France 
and the UK. 
                                                     
148 See G. Benedetto, 2001, ‘Scepticism and its antithesis: The case of eurosceptics in the European Parliament’, 
Paper presented at 7th Biennial ECSA Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, 31 May–2 June 2001. 
149 This is true of even the predominant transnational group, TEAM, who state on their website: “The TEAM 
network does not intervene in the domestic politics of individual countries or in the internal affairs of its 
affiliated organisations. Neither does it seek to impose a common policy on its affiliates as regards EU-
issues. It provides information and contacts at the request of its member and observer organisations in 
particular countries.” (http://www.teameurope.info/about/organisation.htm).  
 107 
 3: Group Formation 
 
A BASIC TAXONOMY 
 
This section provides a basic taxonomy of the various groups under study, using three 
different approaches.  As a first step, a division is made between those groups that are either 
solely or primarily focused upon the question of opposing European integration (i.e. 
primary-focus groups), and those that have only a secondary focus on the subject (i.e. 
secondary-focus groups).  The reasons for this are as much practical as anything else: with 
almost 60 groups operating in the two countries, particular attention needs to be paid to 
those that have an anti-EU focus.  This is not to imply that groups with only a secondary 
focus on opposition to the EU are not important, but that the reasons for their creation may 
well not be linked to proximate events in the integration process, a question that will be dealt 
with in the following section of this chapter. 
 
The second step taken here is a consideration of the type of opposition that different groups 
are expressing.  Here there are two major cleavages: one lies between those who oppose the 
entire EU system and those who oppose only one part of it; the other between those who 
seek withdrawal from EU membership and those who see possible resolutions to their 
critiques while still remaining within the system.  These two cleavages will not only provide 
more elements of a taxonomy of groups, but will also give some initial evidence of 
underlying ideologies and critiques of integration. 
 
The final step is one of particular relevance to the hypotheses, since it concerns the type of 
group that is formed.  Here, there is a differentiation between political parties, factions 
within such parties and finally non-party political groups.  As discussed in previous chapters, 
it is hypothesised that this choice will be related to the institutional spaces available to 
political actors within a national system.  Hence, it is important to clarify the choices that 
have been made, and then to understand whether these have been the result of the 
hypothesised pressures, or some other factors. 
 
In terms of ascertaining these various factors, a variety of sources have been used.  Firstly, 
the groups’ own materials and literature have been used, backed up in some cases by 
comments from group members (either directly, in interviews, or indirectly, from 
newspapers).  Secondly, available academic literature has been used to provide extra 
support.  Thirdly, newspaper reports have been used to see what kinds of actions a group has 
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been involved in and what kind of image it is trying to present to the press.150  However, it 
has to be noted that the availability of information on different groups is very uneven; as a 
result, where there is some uncertainty, this has been noted in the text. 
 
 
FOCUS 
While presenting the question of focus as an either/or choice, it must be recognised that the 
reality of the situation is more complex than that.  At one end of the scale, there are groups 
that are purely about opposing the European Union and nothing else.  Then there are groups 
that express positions on other issues, but work from a base-point of such an opposition.  
These are followed by those who hold other policy positions for reasons unrelated to their 
opposition, and those positions can be less important, as important as, or more important 
than opposing the EU.  Finally, there are those who hold an anti-EU position solely as a 
derivative function of other positions.  This division can be reduced to a primary-
focus/secondary-focus table (Table 2 below) from which to work, placing the first two 
categories listed as primary-focus.151 
 
As just noted, Table 2 provides a brief overview of the groups under inspection in this 
chapter and the next.  Rather than presenting each group individually, there will be a 
description of the two main sets (i.e. primary-focus groups and secondary-focus groups) in 
general terms and then of those groups that present particular problems. 
 
Primary-focus groups 
In most of the cases listed under this heading in Table 2, there is a clear primacy of the 
European issue.  This operates at different levels, from stated goals of a group, to actions 
taken.  Indeed, the large majority of groups not only have a primary focus on opposition, but 
a sole focus, with no other policy positions.  Of all the groups listed under the ‘sole/primary’ 
heading in the Table, only the following make any reference to policy positions outside of 
the topic of European integration: 
 In the UK, the UK Independence Party (UKIP); 
 In France, L’Autre Europe, the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht 
and the Mouvement pour la France (MPF). 
                                                     
150 In large part, newspaper articles have been obtained via the Lexis-Nexis system and from individual 
newspaper archives, both on-line and in hard copy. 
151 In this section, and others that follow, Demain la France has been split into early and late periods.  This is due 
to the large structural changes that the group under went in 1996, when it was relaunched by Charles 
Pasqua.  Likewise, the name Combat pour les Valeurs is also used to describe Combat pour la France, 
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In all the other cases, there is only reference to the European Union and the group’s position 
on it. 
 
Table 2: Groups classified by extent of focus on opposition to the EU 
British Groups 
Sole/Primary Secondary 
Anti-Federalist League 
Anti Maastricht Alliance 
Anti Common Market League 
Britain Out of Europe Campaign 
British Weights & Measures Association 
Bruges Group 
Business for Sterling 
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism 
Campaign for an Independent Britain 
Congress for Democracy 
Conservative European Reform Group 
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
Democracy Movement 
European Foundation 
European Research Group 
Fresh Start Group 
Global Britain 
Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign 
New Alliance 
New Europe 
No 
People’s Europe Campaign 
Referendum Party 
Save Britain’s Fish 
Trade Unions Against the Single Currency 
UK Independence Party 
Youth Against the European Union 
Youth For a Free Europe 
British National Party 
Conservative Party 
Conservative Way Forward 
Communist Party of Britain 
Democratic Party 
Federation of Small Businesses 
Green Party 
National Democrats 
National Front 
The Freedom Association 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
which although theoretically a successor organisation, was to all practical intents and purposes the same 
group. 
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Table 2: Groups classified by extent of focus on opposition to the EU (Cont’d) 
French Groups 
Sole/Primary Secondary 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France 
L’Autre Europe 
Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de 
Maastricht 
Debout la République 
Demain la France (late) 
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale 
Mouvement pour la France 
Rassemblement pour le Non 
Action Française 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Demain la France (early) 
Front National 
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Mouvement national Républicain 
Parti Communiste Française 
Rassemblement pour la France 
 
Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature 
 
Looking at the four groups that remain (i.e. those with non-EU policies), there is a difference 
between UKIP on the one hand, and the three French groups on the other.  While UKIP 
holds itself to be a “moderate, mainstream party”, with a full range of policy positions on 
subjects ranging from the economy, to education and the environment, it is apparent from its 
manifesto that all of these positions are derived from the party’s opposition to the EU.152 
 
By contrast, the three French groups hold positions on subjects that are not linked in the 
same way to European integration, although that is still a dominant theme.  Philippe de 
Villiers’s MPF has a party’s slogan of “Souveraineté, Probité, Liberté, Sécurité”, while 
Benoit has characterised its philosophy under the key words of “identity, the nation, family 
and values”.153  In relative terms, there has been reweighting away from the European issue 
in the MPF compared with its predecessor organisation, L’Autre Europe.  When L’Autre 
Europe was formed to fight the 1994 European elections, it was much more strongly focused 
on opposition to further integration, with De Villiers’s other interest in anti-corruption being 
                                                     
152 For example, the section on ‘Home Affairs’ talks almost exclusively about how the EU has undermined the 
British legal system, about the EU’s immigration and asylum policy and about the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: even the section on fighting crime ends by mentioning that proposed increases in policing will be 
paid for by the money saved by withdrawal from the EU 
(http://www.independence.org.uk/html/home_affairs.html). UKIP’s manifesto is available on-line at 
http://www.independence.org.uk/html/manifesto.html: the document is dated May 2001, but is broadly 
similar to party policy since its foundation in 1993. The quote comes from the introduction. 
153 [Sovereignty, Probity, Liberty, Security]; http://www.mpf-villiers.org/index1.html: Benoit, 1997, p.59. 
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relegated to a minor position.154  Since the formation of the MPF, and especially after the 
failed link-up with the RPF, these other issues have come more to the fore. 
 
The Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht presents another example of the 
interplay of different issues.  While the group was explicitly set up to oppose European 
integration, it has also expressed opposition to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
and to military action by the West in Iraq, both issues of much concern to the French left.155 
 
Secondary-focus groups 
When looking at groups with only a secondary focus on opposition, there is a much more 
varied pattern, precisely for the reason that a large number of combinations of other issues 
can take precedence.  However, these groups can be placed under four broad headings, based 
on their primary foci. 
 
The first set consists of far-right parties, who oppose integration on xenophobic or quasi-
xenophobic grounds.  The members of this set – the Front National and Mouvement 
National Républicain (MNR) in France, and the British National Party (BNP), National 
Front and National Democrats in the UK – all base their positions around the defence of 
national sovereignty and identity, ideas that will be discussed later on. 
 
The second set sits at the other end of the spectrum, and includes those groups that derive 
their opposition to the EU from their communist or Trotskyite ideological viewpoint.  While 
these are mostly French – the Parti Communiste Française (PCF), the Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire (LCR) and Lutte Ouvrier – there is also the Communist Party of Britain, 
which holds similar views. 
 
The third is more heterogeneous, comprising as it does groups that do not hold extreme 
positions on the political spectrum, but who do consider national sovereignty and 
independence to be key policy positions.  Almost all of the these groups could be classified 
as right-wing – Action Française, Combat pour les Valeurs, the Conservative party, 
Conservative Way Forward, the first incarnation of Demain la France, the Rassemblement 
pour la France (RPF) – but the socialist Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) of Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement must also be included.  The relative importance of Europe as an issue varies 
from group to group; however, in all the cases it cannot be considered as the primary focus 
                                                     
154 Benoit, 19978, p.59, notes this topic as the last of a series of ‘neo-nationalist’ positions, all the others being 
linked to the European Union. 
155 See http://membres.lycos.fr/comit.  
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of the group.  Even in the cases of the MDC or the RPF, where an anti-EU position has been 
a key component of policy, or of the Conservative Party, which seems to have discussed 
little else for many years, a primacy of European issues cannot be attributed, both because of 
the extent of other policy positions and because of opposition being derived from broader 
ideologies. 
 
On this second point, in the cases of Action Française, Combat pour les Valeurs, 
Conservative Way Forward, the MDC and the RPF, this opposition is essentially a function 
of wider beliefs about the integrity of the state: consider Chevènement’s opposition to 
Corsican independence in recent years.  Mention has already been made of the breadth of 
Conservative party policy on non-European issues, which make its opposition secondary, 
while still important.  Finally, Demain la France, as originally set up by Pasqua and Séguin 
in 1991, was a general think-tank that provided a wide range of policy positions around the 
official Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR) line: it was only after its second relaunch 
in 1998 that it increased its focus on European policy.156 
 
The fourth and final set is a mixed bag of groups that can be characterised as being 
motivated by particular interests.  These range from the environmental and rural concerns of 
the Green Party and Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions (CPNT) to the libertarian agendas of 
the Democratic Party and The Freedom Association.  The last member of this set, the 
Federation of Small Businesses, is likewise driven by the concerns of its members and their 
relationship with the EU. 
 
 
TYPE OF OPPOSITION 
The second dimension in the taxonomy of groups is the type of opposition that the group 
expounds.  As noted above, this can be reduced to two major cleavages: between opposition 
focused on only one policy area (such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or the 
Common Fisheries Policy) and that which is opposed to the entire EU system: of these latter, 
there are some who simply seek withdrawal of membership and others who feel that 
solutions can be found inside the Union.  Using these two cleavages, a three-way 
classification can be produced, as shown in Table 3. 
 
                                                     
156 See Le Monde 13/03/1991, ‘En créant l’association “Demain la France” MM. Pasqua et Séguin veulent 
“dynamiser l’opposition” et “hâter l’alternance”’ for more on Demain la France’s original programme. 
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Table 3 is broken down into three headings.  At the most focused level, there are groups that 
have very limited objections to the European Union, falling within a single policy area.  
Such groups are either agnostic or positive towards the rest of the European system: their 
aims are restricted to specific policy reforms or the ending of a particular policy.  Usually 
this will be a substantial policy area, such as membership of the single currency, but it can 
be as specific as the repeal of metric measurements.157 
 
However most groups do not restrict themselves to a single issue, but instead raise questions 
about the system as a whole.  At a first step, this involves critiques of various aspects of the 
Union, including policy areas, decision-making processes, legitimacy and accountability, all 
in proportion with each group’s particular concerns and philosophies.  Normally this is then 
followed up by a set of proposals for resolving these problems.158  The exceptions fall into 
two categories.  Firstly, there are those groups that merely provide a critique without any 
particular set of solutions, as is the case of various British groups that profess no particular 
position in their roles as clearing houses for individuals to gain a stage.159  Here the 
Referendum Party is also to be found, since it never went beyond wanting to ask the British 
public what kind of Europe they wanted.160  The second category comprises those groups 
that do not seek to reform the EU, but simply to withdraw from it, groups listed in a separate 
column of Table 3.  It should be noted that only those groups that have explicitly used the 
word ‘withdrawal’ have been included in this category, even though there are several groups 
whose proposed reforms are so substantial that in the unlikely event of ever being agreed to, 
they would effectively mean the end of the Union in its present form.  This is particularly the 
case for French groups on the far left, which oppose such basic elements as free 
movement.161  However, there is a substantial difference between those groups prepared to 
discuss withdrawal as an option and those that stop short of that point.  This difference is 
best highlighted by the stance of the Bruges Group and Conservatives Against a Federal 
                                                     
157 The latter being the goal of the British Weights and Measurements Association, who attribute the introduction 
of metric units into the UK to EU directives.  See http://www.footrule.org/ and 
http://www.bwmaonline.com/ for a full justification of the BWMA’s position. 
158 The most extensive example of such a reform is the Mouvement pour la France’s ‘Projet pour la France’, 
available at: http://www.mpf-villiers.org/  
159 This includes the European Foundation, the European Research Group and Global Britain. 
160 The proposed question the party wanted to ask was as follows: “Do you want the United Kingdom to be part 
of a federal Europe? Or do you want the United Kingdom to return to an association of sovereign nations 
that are part of a common trading market?”  The phrasing of the question should indicate where the 
Referendum Party’s own preferences lay. 
161 See P. Taggart & A. Szczerbiak, 2001, ‘Crossing Europe: Patterns of contemporary party-based 
euroscepticism in EU member states and the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe’, Paper 
presented at American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August - 2 September, 2001.  The 
Green Party is similarly opposed to the Maastricht treaty, EMU and the single market: the full ‘Manifesto 
for a Sustainable Society’ is available at: http://www.greenparty.org.uk/policy/index.html  
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Europe (CAFE), both of which state their policy as being renegotiation in the first instance, 
but withdrawal if their goals are not met.162 
 
Table 3: Groups classified by type of opposition to the EU 
British Groups 
Withdrawal Generalised Opposition Sectoral Opposition 
Anti Common Market League 
Anti-Federalist League 
Britain Out of Europe 
Campaign 
British National Party 
Bruges Group* 
Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism 
Campaign for an Independent 
Britain 
Communist Party of Britain 
Conservatives Against a 
Federal Europe* 
Democratic Party 
Federation of Small 
Businesses 
National Democrats 
National Front 
New Alliance 
The Freedom Association 
UK Independence Party 
Anti Maastricht Alliance 
Conservative Party 
Conservative European 
Reform Group 
Conservative Way Forward 
Democracy Movement 
European Foundation 
European Research Group 
Fresh Start Group 
Global Britain 
Green Party 
Labour Euro-Safeguards 
Campaign 
Referendum Party 
Youth Against the European 
Union 
Youth For a Free Europe 
British Weights & Measures 
Association 
Business for Sterling 
Congress for Democracy 
New Europe 
No 
People’s Europe Campaign 
Save Britain’s Fish  
Trade Unions Against the 
Single Currency 
 
* - if renegotiation is impossible 
(Continued on next page) 
 
As before, rather than analyse each group’s form of opposition, some more general 
comments will be made.  The most notable of these is the difference between the division of 
groups in each country.  While the UK has substantial numbers of groups under the sectoral 
and withdrawal headings, France has none.  To some extent this difference is explained by 
the criteria employed: as noted above, various French groups propose such extreme reforms 
to the EU that it would bear only a passing resemblance to the current Union.  There are 
                                                     
162 See http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/about-bg.htm and European Movement, 2000, p.17 respectively. 
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frequent references to “another Europe” or a “new Europe”, but without recourse to talk of 
withdrawal from the current EU.163 
Table 3: Groups classified by type of opposition to the EU (Cont’d) 
French Groups 
Withdrawal Generalised Opposition Sectoral Opposition 
 Action Française 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté 
de la France 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-
Traditions 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Comité pour l’Abrogation du 
Traité de Maastricht  
Debout la République 
Demain la France 
Etats Généraux de la 
Souveraineté Nationale 
Front National 
L’Autre Europe 
Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Mouvement National 
Républicain 
Mouvement pour la France 
Parti Communiste Française 
Rassemblement pour la France 
Rassemblement pour le Non 
 
 
Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature 
 
At the other end of the scale, CPNT does not count as a sectoral opposition group, because 
its critique has developed well beyond its original opposition to hunting directives.164  
                                                     
163 For example, “Reporter l'euro. Rejeter le pacte de stabilité. Renégocier le traité d'Amsterdam. Construire une 
autre Europe.” [‘Delay the Euro. Reject the stability pact. Renegotiate the Amsterdam treaty. Build another 
Europe.’], from a press release by the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France, 10 February 1998, ‘Un 
collectif d'associations et de personnalités appelle à une nouvelle Résistance’, at: http://www.souverainete-
france.org: or “Les principes ici posés impliquent une rupture des processus en cours au profit d'une Europe 
nouvelle qui serait bâtie sur la formule d'une réelle association.” [‘The principles outlined here imply a 
break with current processes, leading instead to a new Europe that will be built on the basis of a genuine 
association’]: from the founding ‘Appel’ of the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale, at: 
http://egsn.free.fr/ht/comitedes9.html  
164 http://www.cpnt.asso.fr/ documents this policy position, which covers issues such as transparency and 
subsidiarity. 
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However, this should not disguise the fact that there is still a clear divergence between the 
views expressed by groups in each country.  In the UK there seems to be much more 
willingness to express explicit positions of withdrawal than there is in France, where even 
styles of language do not fully account for a more circumspect position.  Similarly, there is a 
clear difference in sectoral opposition groups, most notably against the Euro.  Even the brief 
emergence of a couple of French campaigns during 2000-01 in the run-up to the introduction 
of Euro notes and coins (i.e. outside the study period) did not amount to anything like the 
organisations that have developed in the UK, for reasons that will be discussed later.165 
 
 
TYPE OF GROUP 
The third and final element of the taxonomy of groups concerns the forms that groups have 
taken.  This is not only useful for understanding differences between groups but also key in 
addressing one of the central hypotheses of the thesis, namely the impact of institutional 
structures on group formation and development.  It is therefore necessary to use a means of 
classification that allows inferences to be drawn about the link between groups and 
institutional structures.  To this end, groups have been divided on the basis of their ‘party-
ness’, i.e. the extent to which they are political parties. 
 
The reason for this choice is clear.  In democracies, there are two basic types of organised 
groups, political parties and non-party political pressure groups.  The essential difference 
between these two types revolves around the pursuit of elected office.  By definition, those 
elected offices will be found in formal political institutional spaces (to use the terminology 
developed earlier in Chapter One).  Thus parties are associated with formal institutions, and 
‘non-parties’ with activities around formal institutions, in the informal space of civil society.  
The difference in group form thus implies a difference in group goals and strategy.  
Moreover, this difference in form is going to be affected by the possibilities that formal 
institutions offer, both in terms of access and of carrying capacity: thus national political 
systems with high levels of access and carrying capacity should have many parties, which 
will attempt to exploit those options.  Conversely, systems with a low chance of access and a 
small carrying capacity should have fewer party-based groups, since informal opposition 
will be more likely to be an optimal group strategy. 
 
                                                     
165 These French groups were essentially rearguard actions, the most notable being Combats Souverainistes, run 
by three dissent RPF MEPs during 2001.  Their website (http://www.jeboycotteleuro.com) went off-line in 
January 2002, but is currently being rebuilt as a more general ‘eurocritical’ website.  Also active at a 
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Table 4 shows a three-way division of the groups.  In addition to the ‘party’ and ‘non-party’ 
categories, an ‘intra-party’ category has also been included.  This covers those groups that 
form within political parties, but outside of formal party structures, in which party members 
can work with like-minded colleagues, usually with the aim of influencing party policy.  In 
the present analysis, the criterion for inclusion in this category is based on statements made 
by such groups on their political nature.  Consequently, groups such as the Bruges Group or 
the early Demain la France are not included, despite their almost exclusive relationships with 
the Conservative party and the RPR respectively.166 
 
In all cases, classification into the three categories is based on self-assessments made by the 
groups themselves.  The potential confusion that this causes for the intra-party category has 
already been noted, but it is also true for the other two categories.  Amongst the ‘parties’ 
there are groups such as the Democratic Party, which has only contested one by-election 
since its formation in 1998, caucus parties such as L’Autre Europe, which had very little 
organisation, single-issue parties such as UKIP and the Referendum Party, and traditional 
mass parties, such as the Conservatives or the Parti Communiste Française.  In short, there is 
a huge variety of forms within the ‘party’ heading. 
 
Similarly, the non-party category includes groups as diverse as the 200,000-strong 
Democracy Movement, with its strongly decentralised structure, umbrella groups such as the 
Congress for Democracy and the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France, which 
essentially act as contact points for other groups, and the Federation of Small Businesses, a 
lobby group that has developed an active anti-EU policy. 
 
Thus it is apparent that the party/non-party division does not capture the full variety of group 
forms.  However, it does highlight the key factor of office seeking, which is related to 
groups’ perceptions of the opportunities open to them in a national system, a matter that will 
be dealt with in the following chapter.  In both countries, there are substantial numbers of 
both parties and non-parties with anti-EU positions, the large number of British non-party 
groups accounting for the main difference in the volume of groups.  Even taking into 
account that some groups are essentially successors to other groups (e.g. L’Autre Europe as 
the precursor of the MPF, or the Anti-Federalist League reforming as UKIP) – a point 
                                                                                                                                                      
relatively stage was Gardons le Franc, set up by PCF member Michel Redjah, which campaigned for dual 
circulation of the Franc and the Euro (La Tribune 30/04/2001, ‘Gardons le Franc’) 
166 In both cases, the groups claim to have no formal links with these parties: Interview, Robert Oulds, Director, 
Bruges Group, 29 May 2001, Bruges Group office, London; Le Monde 13/03/1991, ‘En creant l’association 
“Demain la France” MM. Pasqua et Séguin veulent “dynamiser l’opposition” et “hâter l’alternance”’. 
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discussed later on in this chapter – it is still clear that France has proportionately more 
parties than the UK, due to the relative absence of non-party groups. 
 
Table 4: Groups classified by form of group 
British Groups 
Party Intra-Party Non-Party 
Anti-Federalist League 
British National Party 
Conservative Party 
Communist Party of Britain 
Democratic Party 
Green Party 
National Democrats 
National Front 
Referendum Party 
UK Independence Party 
Anti Common Market League 
Conservative European 
Reform Group 
Conservatives Against a 
Federal Europe 
Conservative Way Forward 
Fresh Start Group 
Labour Euro Safeguards 
Campaign 
People’s Europe Campaign 
Anti Maastricht Alliance 
Britain Out of Europe 
Campaign 
British Weights and Measures 
Association 
Business for Sterling 
Bruges Group 
Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism 
Campaign for an Independent 
Britain 
Congress for Democracy 
Democracy Movement 
European Foundation 
European Research Group 
Federation of Small 
Businesses 
Global Britain 
New Alliance 
New Europe 
No 
Save Britain’s Fish 
Trade Unions Against the 
Single Currency 
The Freedom Association 
Youth Against the European 
Union 
Youth For a Free Europe 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that French intra-party groups have been relatively rare: 
Rassemblement pour le Non only existed for the duration of the Maastricht referendum 
campaign before developing into Demain la France, Combat pour les Valeurs lasted for little 
more than two years within the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) before becoming 
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L’Autre Europe, and Debout la République was only created in 1999 by members of the 
RPR.  By contrast, British intra-party groups have existed on both left and right since the 
early 1960s and show no sign of either assimilation by their respective parties or of 
separating out.167  This difference implies that the British party system is more capable than 
the French of sustaining intra-party factions on the European issue. 
 
Table 4: Groups classified by form of group (Cont’d) 
French Groups 
Party Intra-Party Non-Party 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-
Traditions 
Demain la France (late) 
Front National 
L’Autre Europe 
Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Mouvement National 
Républicain 
Mouvement pour la France 
Parti Communiste Française 
Rassemblement pour la France 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Debout la République 
Rassemblement pour le Non 
Action Française 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté 
de la France 
Comité pour l’Abrogation du 
Traité de Maastricht 
Demain la France (early) 
Etats Généraux de la 
Souveraineté Nationale 
 
Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature 
 
 
                                                     
167 The Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign began life in 1962 as the Labour Committee on the Five Safeguards 
on the Common Market, while the Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) started in 1971 as 
Conservatives Against the Treaty of Rome (CATOR).  See European Movement, 2000, pp.29 and 17 
respectively for details of both organisations’ evolution.  It should also be noted that CAFE has run down 
its activities since 2001, when Iain Duncan Smith became leader of the Conservative Party, as a result of its 
stated position of withdrawal from the EU. 
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IDEOLOGY AND CRITIQUE OF INTEGRATION 
 
In order to understand the theoretical underpinnings of groups’ opposition to the European 
Union, it is necessary to apply a yardstick by which to measure their positions at a more 
abstract level.  This section will do just that, working from the starting point of a left-right 
categorisation. 
 
The idea of a left-right spectrum in political views is not new.168  Using basic indicators, 
such as the relative importance of the individual and society, of freedom and security, of 
private enterprise and state action, it is possible to build up a spectrum, on which groups can 
be placed.  However, such a process presupposes that there is a depth of ideological 
thinking, i.e. that groups say more than just that they are opposed to the European Union.  
However, this is not always the case, as can be seen in Table 5.  Rather than trying to 
construct a spectrum of left-right positions for the groups, there is a three-way split of left, 
right, and neutral/indeterminate.  
 
The criteria for this classification are simple.  As a first step, again using groups’ own 
materials, those groups that express clear left- or right-wing views have been placed into 
those categories.  This set consists almost entirely of political parties, both mature (e.g. the 
Conservatives and the PCF) and more recent (e.g. the MNR and MPF).  To this set are then 
added those groups that clearly identify themselves with either this first set of groups, or 
with other parties that occupy clear positions on a left-right scale.  Here can be found all of 
the intra-party groups identified in the previous section, as well as such bodies as Trade 
Unions Against the Single Currency and the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de 
Maastricht, both of which are composed of various left-leaning elements, including both 
politicians and trade unions.169  Those groups that do not meet these criteria are left in the 
‘neutral/indeterminate’ category. 
 
A brief note should be made on the Green Party, since there is a somewhat different 
rationale for its inclusion under the ‘left’ heading.  As noted previously, the Green’s position 
on the Union is derived from the latter’s impact on environmental issues, rather than the 
                                                     
168 For example, Downs’ theory of party of party competition, which uses the left-right scale to plot party 
systems, dates from 1957: A. Downs, 1957, An economic theory of democracy, Hew York, Harper. 
169 Trade Unions Against the Single Currency has various trade union affiliates, at both branch and national level; 
listed in European Movement, 2000, p.36.  The Comité pour l’abrogation du traité du Maastricht is 
composed of members of the PCF, the MDC and trade unionists.  A representative list of signatures can be 
found with their ‘Appel’ of 16 May 1998, at: http://membres.lycos.fr/comit/appel4.html.  Britain Out of 
Europe Campaign also falls into this category, given its rejection of the EU as a Communist project: 
http://www.angelfire.com/id2/booec/. 
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Union per se.  While “Ecology parties have not turned to Socialist doctrines and […] they 
have been free to develop ideas and programmes unconstrained by any particular ideology”, 
at the same time, Ware points to a predominance of left-wing policies among such parties, 
given the need for a high level of state intervention and international coordination.170  This 
impression is reinforced when looking at the Green Party’s manifesto, which has a strong 
liberal tendency on matters such as crime, foreign policy and migration.171 
 
Table 5: Groups classified by ideological standpoint 
British Groups 
Left Neutral/Indeterminate Right 
Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism 
Communist Party of Britain 
Green Party 
Labour Euro Safeguards 
Campaign 
People’s Europe Campaign 
Trade Unions Against the 
Single Currency 
Anti-Federalist League 
Anti Maastricht Alliance 
British Weights and Measures 
Association 
Bruges Group 
Business for Sterling 
Campaign for an Independent 
Britain 
Congress for Democracy 
Democracy Movement 
Democratic Party 
European Foundation 
Federation of Small 
Businesses 
Global Britain 
New Alliance 
New Europe 
No 
Referendum Party 
Save Britain’s Fish 
UK Independence Party 
Youth Against the European 
Union 
Youth For a Free Europe 
Anti Common Market League 
Britain Out of Europe 
Campaign 
British National Party 
Conservative European 
Reform Group 
Conservative Party 
Conservative Way Forward 
Conservatives Against a 
Federal Europe 
European Research Group 
Fresh Start Group 
National Democrats 
National Front 
The Freedom Association 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
                                                     
170 A. Ware, 1996, Political parties and party systems, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.43. 
171 http://www.greenparty.org.uk/policy/index.html 
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Table 5: Groups classified by ideological standpoint (Cont’d) 
French Groups 
Left Neutral/Indeterminate Right 
Comité pour l’Abrogation du 
Traité de Maastricht 
Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Parti Communiste Française 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté 
de la France 
Etats Généraux de la 
Souveraineté Nationale 
Action Française 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-
Traditions 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Debout la République 
Demain la France 
Front National 
L’Autre Europe 
Mouvement National 
Républicain 
Mouvement pour la France 
Rassemblement pour la France 
Rassemblement pour le Non 
 
Source: based on groups’ websites and promotional literature 
 
From Table 5 it can be seen that in both countries a broad spectrum of political ideologies is 
represented by different groups, with notable left- and right-wing groupings.  In France, as in 
the UK, there are more right-wing opposition groups than left-wing ones, although this is 
partly due to the number of intra-party groups on the right, the left consisting primarily of 
parties and non-parties. 
 
However, the main difference is the large number of neutral or indeterminate groups in the 
UK, as compared to France.  The reasons for this are twofold.  Firstly, all but one of the 
sectoral opposition groups in the UK fall into this category, since they do not develop 
critiques of integration above and beyond their particular area of concern, so making it very 
difficult to extrapolate a position on a left-right scale.172  Secondly, the British system is 
characterised by the large number of groups that make explicit attempts to overcome 
ideological barriers in order to build opposition to the EU, whereas in France the tendency 
seems to be to preserve ideological divides.  Consequently in the UK, several ‘umbrella’ 
groups can be seen, acting as fora or clearing houses for anti-EU across the political 
spectrum.173  In the same way, some groups that might seem to be a priori right-wing 
groups, because of their predominance of Conservative party members, such as the Bruges 
                                                     
172 Trade Unions Against the Single Currency is the obvious exception, representing an even more highly focused 
attempt to influence opinions. 
173 The Campaign for an Independent Britain and Congress for Democracy being the most notable.  Also see the 
following chapter. 
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Group or the European Foundation, have attempted to promote their cross-party nature by 
the prominent inclusion of non-Conservatives in their organisations and by constructing their 
opposition to the EU in broad terms.174 
 
So what can be said about groups that do express clear left- or right-wing views?  As one 
might expect, there is a sense on either side that the European Union is a means for 
promoting the opposite side’s political economy.  For the left that means the Union is an 
agent of free market economics, using the internal market programme to override not only 
workers’ rights but also the democratic system more generally.  For the right, the implication 
is of a creeping European super-state imposing extra bureaucratic and welfare constraints on 
national systems.  This paradoxical state of affairs is a reflection of a more general 
uncertainty about the ideological nature of the EU, with its simultaneous development of a 
deregulated internal market and a more marked social policy since the late 1980s.175 
 
The left’s critique of integration clearly centres on this fear of a threat to its constituency.  
Indeed, this might explain the somewhat ambiguous stance of the PCF in the mid-1990s, 
when it was opposed to EMU, but was in favour of European monetary stability.176  In the 
UK, the Labour Euro-Safeguard Campaign’s (LESC) opposition to EMU is founded on 
resultant cuts to public investment in the welfare state and the potential for increased 
unemployment in certain regions of the eurozone.177  But perhaps the most forceful example 
of the left’s critique of the integration comes from the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité 
de Maastricht: 
 
“Depuis sept ans, les peuples d'Europe font la douloureuse expérience de 
l'application du traité de Maastricht. Aucun domaine n'est épargné : services 
publics privatisés, terres mises en jachère pour empêcher les paysans de produire, 
marins-pêcheurs à qui l'on interdit de pêcher, jeunes que l'on voue au travail 
précaire, au chômage, travailleurs licenciés, système de protection sociale 
                                                     
174 The Bruges Group’s mission statement reads in part: “Fundamental reform is required of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, European Court and European Parliament in favour of 
national sovereignty. There has been no popular agreement to the huge transfer of power from the people to 
Brussels which has already taken place. Furthermore, economic and monetary union must be declared a 
non-starter” (http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/about-bg.htm).  Similarly vague is the European 
Foundation’s mission statement, whose substantive objectives read as: “To further European commerce and 
democracy; To renegotiate the Amsterdam and Maastricht treaties; To argue against the creation of a 
European army; The widening and enlargement of the Community to include all applicant European nations 
but only if they do not have to adopt the acquis communautaire in the process; To resist the coming into 
being of a European federal or unitary state; To campaign against Britain adopting the Euro” (http://www.e-
f.org.uk/ef/mission.htm). 
175 W. Goldstein, 1993, ‘The EC: Capitalist or dirigiste regime?’, in A. Cafruny & G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State 
of the European Community, Vol. 2, Harlow, Longman, pp.303-320, provides a relatively early discussion 
of this development in the light of the Maastricht treaty. 
176 F. Greffet, 2001, ‘Le PCF: combattre le déclin par la mutation?’ , in P. Bréchon (ed.), Les parties politiques 
français, Les études de la documentation française, Paris, La Documentation Française, pp.105-126, p.122 
177 http://www.lesc.org.uk/mission.htm.  
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démantelé, modération salariale imposée par la Banque centrale européenne aux 
actifs et aux retraités, régime de retraite menacé, système d'enseignement remis 
en cause.”178 
 
If the left is preoccupied with the effects of the EU on workers and welfare systems, then the 
right is concerned primarily with the question of sovereignty.  On the far right, this manifests 
itself as opposition to the development of European policies on immigration and security 
and, in the French case, voting rights for EU nationals in elections.179  For the mainstream 
right, issues of national self-determination are prominent.  For example, the RPF describes 
itself as “une formation politique à vocation majoritaire qui a pour objectif de réunir les 
Français sur les principes qui découlent de la Souveraineté nationale […]”.180  Similarly, the 
Thatcherite Conservative Way Forward holds as a principle that “[e]ach nation must be free 
to determine it's [sic] policies to the benefit of it's [sic] citizens”, an echo of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Bruges speech, where she held as her first guiding principle the idea that “willing 
and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a 
successful European Community”.181  Indeed, the four other principles that Thatcher 
outlined in her speech – practical Community policies, encouraging enterprise, avoiding 
protectionism and having a NATO-led defence – represent a checklist to which most right-
wing groups in the UK – and, to a more limited extent, in France – could subscribe.182  The 
most notable exception to this is the ruralist CPNT, who construct their conservative view of 
the Union from the starting point of the erosion of regional – rather than national – identities.  
Despite this, there is still a critique of integration that talks of “[l]e pouvoir confisqué” and 
                                                     
178 [For seven years, the people of Europe have had the painful experience of the application of the Maastricht 
treaty. No area has been untouched: privatised public services; land put in fallow to prevent the farmers 
from producing; fishermen stopped from fishing; young people, to whom one gives skilled work, 
unemployed; workers laid off; a dismantled system of social protection; wage moderation imposed by the 
European Central Bank on both the active and the retired; pension plans threatened; the educational system 
called into question] (emphasis in the original).  From the ‘Appel’ of 16/17 January 1999, at: 
http://membres.lycos.fr/comit/appel7.html.  
179 Startin noted these three areas as the main focuses of the Front National during the 1990s: N. Startin, 1997, 
French political parties, Europe and the Maastricht treaty, Unpublished MPhil thesis presented at the 
Department of French Studies, University of Birmingham, p.103.  The British National Party discusses 
membership primarily as a block to political and economic freedom on its website, but also implies a 
repatriation of immigration policies as a priority: see http://www.bnp.org.uk/policies.html.  The BNP’s 
opposition to the EU is best seen as a strategic choice, designed to bolster public support, but which also 
allows the party to achieve other goals. 
180 [“a political formation of a majoritarian vocation, which has the goal of uniting the French people under the 
principles that spring from national sovereignty.”] From the RPF’s Charter, at: 
http://213.186.36.114/~rpfie/charte1.html.  
181 http://www.conwayfor.org/principles.htm; The full text of the Bruges speech is available, with a brief 
commentary, on-line at: http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/mtbruges.htm  
182 Indeed, the Bruges speech as acquired something of a totemic significance amongst UK activists, both left and 
right, not only for its vigorous defence of national prerogatives, but also as the Damascene conversion of 
Thatcher against the integration process, a conversion that several would hope could be replicated more 
widely among the British public. As just one example, consider the first sentence of Bruges Group co-
Chairman, Martin Holmes’ commentary: “It is impossible to overstate the importance of Margaret 
Thatcher's Bruges Speech […]” (http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/mtbruges.htm).  
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“[u]ne Europe trop lointaine”, requiring reforms that bring power back down towards the 
people.183 
 
While left and right have been treated so far as logically separate poles of a spectrum, it must 
be kept in mind that it is not always immediately obvious where to place a particular group.  
The Mouvement des Citoyens of Jean-Pierre Chevènement is a notable case in point.  
Created by Chevènement from an anti-EU stream of the Parti Socialiste during the 
Maastricht referendum campaign in 1992, the MDC has developed what Benoit describes as 
a ‘gothic edifice’ of an ideology: with foundations based on national independence and 
sovereignty, as well as anti-German and American elements, its programme appears to 
contain as many Gaullist parts as it does socialist ones.184  However, working on the basis of 
the MDC’s point of origin, and its subsequent entry into the leftist government coalition 
after the 1997 elections to the Assemblée Nationale, the primary inclination of the party is 
clearly to the left. 
 
While left and right have developed distinctive critiques of the European integration process, 
the endpoint is very similar for both sides.  As has been discussed earlier in this thesis, one 
of the key problems of building opposition groups has been the lack of common ground 
between actors, firstly in agreeing what the problems are and secondly on the solutions to 
those problems.  However, this should not overshadow the fact that, in practical terms, both 
left and right are able to find common ground in saying that they do not like particular 
elements of the European Union.  The best examples of these common elements are also, 
almost by definition, the largest: the Maastricht treaty and the Euro.  Certainly, the very size 
of these elements requires at least some response from either side, given the potential impact 
on Europe’s (and national) political economies.  The very existence of critiques on both left 
and right also shows that these elements have been built out of compromise: for example, the 
Maastricht treaty may have created the framework for a single currency, with an associated 
reform of national finances, but it also enhanced social policy, gave citizenship rights to EU 
nationals and developed foreign and interior policy coordination.  As one observer noted at 
the 1994 European elections in France: 
 
“Apparue avec force lors du referendum sur Maastricht, cette coupure reste 
vivace et transcende les oppositions politiques traditionnelles: de droite ou de 
gauche, les anti-Maastricht partagent la même phobie de l'Europe 
                                                     
183 [“confiscated power” and “a Europe that is too far away”]; http://perso.wanadoo.fr/cpnt/programme.htm.  
184 Benoit, 1997, p.62. 
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supranationale, condamnent le projet de monnaie unique, critiquent le poids des 
"bureaucrates de Bruxelles".”185 
 
The overlap of left and right also helps to understand the third category, that of 
‘neutral/indeterminate’ in both countries.  In the French case, the existence of strong poles of 
opposition on either side of the ideological spectrum, each based around parties, would seem 
to make non-partisan opposition less likely.  The MDC-PCF-LO-LCR grouping on the left 
and the MPF-RPF-FN-MNR set of parties on the right provide logical starting points for a 
broad sweep of partisans, both moderate and more extreme.186  Since the objects of both 
sides’ opposition are very similar, as has been discussed, secondary considerations of 
political ideology, more broadly constructed, come to the fore.  This has the effect of pre-
empting the development of non-partisan groups beyond the Alliance pour la Souveraineté 
de la France and the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale, neither of which seem to 
have made a large impression on either political debate or public opinion.187 
 
In the British case, the reverse appears to be the case.  With the major political parties not 
wishing to be drawn into explicitly anti-EU positions, and wishing to preserve their 
coherence in Parliament, the most obvious route for opposition to develop was outside of the 
party system in a non-party political climate.  This has resulted in a large number of groups 
that cannot be categorised as either left or right.  They can be divided into two main types. 
 
Firstly, there are those groups that fall under the ‘neutral’ heading.  This is to say that they 
have never elaborated a position beyond that of opposing the European Union for reasons 
unspecified.  As mentioned above, this includes umbrella groups and those groups that are 
trying to distance themselves from political parties.188  Sectoral opposition groups can also 
be included here, since they do not make extrapolations on the deficiencies of the integration 
                                                     
185 [First appearing at the time of the referendum on Maastricht, this division [across parties] remains long-lived 
and transcends traditional political oppositions: whether right or left, the anti-Maastricht campaigners share 
the same phobia of supranational Europe, condemn the single currency project, and criticize the importance 
of "bureaucrats in Brussels".]: Les Echos 08/06/1994, ‘Elections Europeennes – France: les partisans de 
Maastricht sont sur la defensive’. 
186 Note how Benedetto, 2001, considers the ideology of the RPF only to differ from that of the RPR on the 
matter of European integration – much the same could be said of the relationship of the MPF and MDC to 
the UDF and Parti Socialiste respectively. 
187 The most notable act of the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France was the organisation of the rally in 
Versailles in January 1999 against the Congrès ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty, while the Etats Généraux 
de la Souveraineté Nationale has overseen the publication of some tracts and several conferences.  Details 
of these organisations’ work can be found on their websites: http://www.souverainete-france.org/ and 
http://www.souverainete.org/ respectively. 
188 This covers the Anti-Maastricht Alliance, Campaign for an Independent Britain, Congress for Democracy, 
Democracy Movement, Federation of Small Businesses, Global Britain and New Alliance in the first set, 
and the Bruges Group and the European Foundation in the second.  Youth Against the European Union and 
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process from their specific concerns with their particular policy area.189  A final member of 
this set would be the Referendum Party, which never articulated a clear critique of the EU 
during its existence, even if its leader’s views tended towards the right.190  The lack of a 
political ideology or of an overarching critique of integration has been an asset to these 
groups, by avoiding the need to have agreement by the groups’ members on such a position, 
and so allowing the group to focus on their work, be it of providing a space for individual 
opinions or of achieving specific policy reforms. 
 
Secondly, there are those groups that are indeterminate in their position on a left-right 
spectrum, despite a more extensive elaboration of their position towards the European 
Union.  Essentially, these groups can be described as having a populist agenda.  UKIP and 
its predecessor, the Anti-Federalist League, along with the Democratic Party have developed 
political programmes that elaborate positions over and above simply opposing the European 
Union.  As mentioned above, in the case of the UKIP/Anti-Federalist League, this 
programme is essentially dependent upon withdrawal from the EU: the £8.5 million 
contribution of the UK to the Union (plus another £11.5 million in indirect savings from 
higher economic growth, lower benefit payments, reduced bureaucracy and increased fishing 
revenues) will be reinvested into agricultural subsidies, regional spending, higher pensions 
and more health care for the elderly, lower taxes for the poorly paid, increased funds for the 
NHS, schools and police, lower petrol duties and higher defence spending.191  This mixture 
of left- and right-wing elements is a hotchpotch of policies that are made possible by 
withdrawal from the EU, having little ideological coherence.  Indeed, the Democratic Party 
makes no bones about its policies being decided purely on the basis of what ‘the people’ 
want.192  In both cases, the resultant policy falls under a one-word heading of populism, even 
if that populism is conditioned by rather different impulses. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Youth For a Free Europe also fall into this category: in both cases, these groups developed out of the 
absence of specific anti-EU youth movements in the UK, as will be discussed later on in the chapter. 
189 This covers the British Weights and Measures Association, Business for Sterling, New Europe, No and Save 
Britain’s Fish. 
190 Goldsmith’s personal critique was actually more complex than being simply the same as the standard model 
of the right, as laid out above.  While the party’s manifesto was against a Europe that was “bureaucratic, 
corporatist and dominated by Germany”, Goldsmith was favour of European defence and diplomatic 
coordination and a common currency in parallel to national currencies.  See Daily Telegraph, 28/06/1996, 
‘Goldsmith spells out his vision of Europe’ for more on the manifesto and Financial Times, 28/10/1995, 
‘Knight’s tilt at political power’ on Goldsmith’s ideas. 
191 See http://www.independence.org.uk/html/manifesto.html for full details of the breakdown of the 
‘independence dividend’ and spending plans. 
192 As the party’s website (http://www.democraticparty.org.uk) explains, this works as follows: “Prior to an 
election, the Democratic Party will publish a detailed manifesto of 'promises to implement' specific policies. 
These policies will have been established from extensive surveillance of public demand and decision, 
utilising public meetings, opinion polls, media surveys, referendums etc.” 
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This section can be summarised in the form of Table 6 below.  This Table highlights the 
main points on the matter of groups’ critiques, the objects of that critique and their form, on 
the basis of their position on a left-right spectrum.  This emphasises that the main cleavage is 
not necessarily between left and right, but between those groups with clear ideological 
positions and those without.  While left- and right-wing groups have different initial 
critiques, they share many of the same objects of those critiques and have very similar group 
form characteristics.  By contrast, groups with a neutral or indeterminate position often lack 
fundamental critiques, have a more diverse set of EU elements that they oppose and almost 
entirely shun party forms. 
 
Table 6: Characteristics of groups classified by ideological standpoint 
 
 Left Neutral/Indeterminate Right 
Critique EU as threat to 
workers and to 
democratic system 
Often unclear or 
unprecised 
EU as threat to 
national sovereignty 
and independence 
Objects of Critique EMU, Maastricht, 
Internal Market 
EMU, Maastricht, 
sectoral policies 
EMU, Maastricht, 
immigration & 
asylum policy, 
defence policy 
Group Form Mainly party and 
intra-party 
Mainly non-party Mainly party and 
intra-party 
 
 
 
The relationship between group ideology and group form is not that of simple cause and 
effect.  As much as it can be observed that groups with strong ideological positions on the 
left-right spectrum are mainly parties, and that parties mainly have strong ideological 
positions, that does not explain which comes first.  Clearly, individuals who come together 
under the banner of an anti-EU party do not then decide also to adopt a clear position 
ideologically.  But similarly, the degree of ideological homogeneity is not the basis for 
individuals to decide that the best way to express their opposition to the EU is via a 
particular group form.  The resolution of this situation lies in combining the ideological 
stance of a group with the extent of its focus on opposition to the EU.  The left-right 
spectrum is constructed, as discussed above, on a variety of factors, in none of which does 
European integration specifically figure.  And it is precisely this which makes groups with 
clear positions on that spectrum more likely to be parties: members’ interests converge on 
more than simply opposing integration, to the extent that a party will be representative of the 
vast majority of each member’s interests.  This is then reflected in the fact that very few of 
the groups under the ‘left’ or ‘right’ headings have a primary focus on opposing the 
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European Union.193  Put more simply, most parties have many policies, which makes placing 
them on a left-right scale relatively easy, while non-party groups do not have the same 
breadth of policies, so making them appear to be indeterminate on that same scale. 
                                                     
193 Those that are primary focus groups are all non-parties or intra-party groups, with the exception of L’Autre 
Europe and the MPF, both of which also have substantial non-EU policies, as discussed earlier. 
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PROXIMATE FACTORS 
 
So far in this chapter, the analysis has proceeded on the basis that groups have formed due to 
ideological or structural factors.  However, while these may well explain the underlying 
process of group formation, they do not explain the specific timing of a group’s formation.  
Why do different groups develop at different times, even if they share the same ideological 
background and characteristics? 
 
At the abstract level, it might be expected that groups form when members’ interests are 
either threatened by developments in public policy (protective action) or given an 
opportunity to raise the impact of those interests (promotional action).194  In the former case, 
members will coalesce in order to protect their interests against what they perceive to be 
negative developments in public policy, either at a national or a European level.  In the 
latter, developments in public policy might not directly affect group members, but will give 
them an opportunity to utilise wider public disquiet.  This lets them build a constituency 
upon which they can then receive more attention for their interests, which in turn would 
make them more likely to be incorporated into future policy developments. 
 
In either case, it would be expected that the process of group formation was associated with 
particular events at either the national or the European level of governance.  This comes 
back to the first main hypothesis, concerning group formation.  In this, it was stated that it is 
developments at the European level that are the driving force of group formation, 
developments that are modulated by national structures to produce country-specific results.  
If this is the case, then it will be possible to identify associations between these groups and 
European events, with national changes in public policy playing no more than that 
modulating role. 
 
In order to test this, a grid can be constructed on the basis of different types of proximate 
factors, both European and national.  This grid is presented below as Table 7.  For each 
country, there are five categories under which each group can be placed.  ‘European 
constitutional events’ refers to those events that fundamentally change the structure of the 
Union.  This encompasses not only treaty revisions (in the study time frame, Single 
European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam), but also the act of joining the European 
Community, since there are several groups in the UK that have persisted since the 1960s, 
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through the act of membership in 1973.  ‘European policy events’ covers developments at 
the European level that do not entail constitutional change, i.e. the formulation, elaboration 
and implementation of specific policy areas, such as EMU or the Common Fisheries Policy. 
 
The third heading, ‘national European policy events’, shifts the focus to the national level.  
Here are those groups that have formed as a result of developments in European policy at the 
national level.  This is broadly constructed, to cover not just changes in policy by the 
government of the day, but also shifts in public debate on European integration more 
generally.  It also includes the specific manner of implementation of European policies by 
national governments, where a group sees it as the government’s responsibility. 
 
The fourth heading of ‘national policy events’ is a critical category, since it covers all groups 
whose formation appears to have no apparent link to developments in the European Union or 
a country’s response to those developments.  While this would logically include those 
groups that pre-date the EU, it would also cover any group that grounds its formation on 
reasons that are clearly non-European in nature.  Since such a category is potentially vast, a 
final category of ‘group evolution’ has been marked out, since it covers many cases. 
 
While talking about groups being protective or promotional, both these headings are 
essentially looking at external stimuli to group formation.  This still leaves the matter of 
internal stimuli to group formation.  As Olsen highlighted, groups exist because of an 
overlap of individual interests, not because of a common group interest.195  Hence it may 
well be that this overlap is not sufficient to hold individuals together, resulting in a split or 
re-foundation of a particular group.  Therefore, this ‘group evolution’ heading has been 
included for those cases where it is apparent that such internal processes are at work, rather 
than any one particular external event. 
 
As before, the classification of groups is based on groups’ own materials, but there is more 
use made of other sources, notably newspapers from the period and interviews.  This is for 
two reasons.  Firstly, groups are often not explicit in saying why they have formed, resorting 
to vague expressions of their unhappiness with the EU.  Secondly, even when they do give 
reasons, groups may not be providing the whole picture, especially when the circumstances 
                                                                                                                                                      
194 These are terms more usually applied to pressure groups, but fit well here.  See R. Hague, M. Harrop & S. 
Breslin, 1998, Comparative government and politics: an introduction, 4th ed., London, Macmillan, pp.116-
7. 
195 Olsen, 1971. 
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are of a delicate nature.196  Hence, external observers are likely to be more forthcoming 
about the processes at work. 
 
Table 7: Groups classified by proximate factors in formation 
British Groups 
Factor Groups 
European 
Constitutional 
Events 
Anti Common Market League 
Anti-Federalist League 
Anti Maastricht Alliance 
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism 
Conservatives Against a Federal 
Europe 
European Foundation 
Fresh Start Group 
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign 
European Policy 
Events 
British Weights and Measures 
Association 
Business for Sterling 
Conservative European Reform 
Group 
New Europe 
People’ Europe Campaign 
Save Britain’s Fish 
Trade Unions Against the Single 
Currency 
National 
European Policy 
Events 
Britain Out of Europe Campaign 
Bruges Group 
Business for Sterling 
Congress for Democracy 
European Research Group 
Global Britain 
New Europe 
Referendum Party 
Trade Unions Against the Single 
Currency 
Youth Against the European Union 
National Policy 
Events 
British National Party 
Communist Party of Britain 
Conservative Party 
Conservative Way Forward 
Federation of Small Businesses 
Green Party 
National Democrats 
National Front 
The Freedom Association 
Group Evolution Anti-Federalist League 
Campaign for an Independent Britain 
Conservatives Against a Federal 
Europe 
Democracy Movement 
Democratic Party 
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign 
New Alliance 
No 
UK Independence Party 
Youth For a Free Europe 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
                                                     
196 Given the level of personal tensions that exist between different members of the anti-EU community in both 
France and the UK, this is as much as internal problem as it is external. 
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Table 7: Groups classified by proximate factors in formation(Cont’d) 
French Groups 
Factor Groups 
European 
Constitutional 
Events 
Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité 
de Maastricht 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la 
France 
Debout la République 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Rassemblement pour le Non 
European Policy 
Events 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions 
National 
European Policy 
Events 
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale 
National Policy 
Events 
Action Française 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Demain la France (early) 
Demain la France (late) 
Front National 
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Parti Communiste Française 
Group Evolution L’Autre Europe 
Demain la France (late) 
Mouvement National Républicain 
Mouvement pour la France 
Rassemblement pour la France 
 
Source: Based on groups’ materials, newspapers and interviews 
 
In some cases, groups appear more than once.  This happens when it is possible to discern 
two or more different strands to the group’s formation that fall into different categories. 
 
Looking at Table 7, in both France and the UK there are groups in each of the five 
categories.  Given this, and the often rather specific nature of each group’s formation, each 
category will be discussed in turn, to draw out common themes as well as particular cases. 
 
EUROPEAN CONSTUTITIONAL EVENTS 
This category contains a number of groups in both countries.  However, that hides the 
differences in their background.  While the UK has three groups that date back to the 1960s, 
in France there are no equivalent groups: similarly, while there are French groups that are 
associated with the Amsterdam treaty, the same is not true of the UK. 
 
Taking the oldest groups first, there are the remnants of three groups that predate British 
membership of the European Community.  In the case of the Anti Common Market League, 
this means 1961 and the first British application under Harold Macmillan.  The League was 
set up directly as a result of this application, in an attempt to bolster Conservative 
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opposition.197  Likewise, LESC originally dates back to 1962, when it was set up (as the 
Labour Committee for the Five Safeguards on the Common Market) for similar reasons.198  
The third group, CAFE, only came into existence in 1971 (as Conservatives Against the 
Treaty of Rome), this time by reason of the government’s third application.199 
 
The second set of groups under this heading is that associated with treaty reforms.  As 
mentioned earlier, this covers the Single European Act, Maastricht and Amsterdam.  In 
neither country are there any groups that date from 1986-7.200  However, the Maastricht 
treaty was directly linked to several groups.  In France, there were the two campaigning 
groups that developed to fight for the ‘no’ side in the referendum of 1992: Chevènement’s 
MDC and Pasqua and Séguin’s Rassemblement pour le Non.201  In the UK, the Fresh Start 
Group sprang out of two Early Day Motions tabled in the wake of the Danish ‘No’ vote and 
Sterling’s ejection from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), organising some 50 MPs 
into a well-coordinated campaign of opposing parliamentary ratification.202  The Anti 
Maastricht Alliance (and its European-level counterpart, TEAM) was set up at the ‘counter-
summit’ that ran alongside the Edinburgh European Council of December 1992 to promote 
cooperation between existing groups with a view to opposing the Maastricht treaty and the 
EU more generally.203  It joined the Anti-Federalist League, which Alan Sked had developed 
from his Bruges Group base to field candidates in the 1992 general election, specifically 
against any MP who would vote for the treaty.204  Likewise, left-wing elements spent the 
winter of 1991-92 discussing how to campaign against Maastricht, resulting in the 
foundation of the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism in May 1992.205 
 
By contrast, the European Foundation, while linked to the Maastricht treaty, was based on a 
rather different rationale.  Created after British ratification of the treaty, the Foundation was 
to carry on the momentum built up by Conservative opponents during that process, by 
                                                     
197 See http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=62 for a summary by the pro-European Britain in 
Europe of the League’s evolution since then. 
198 See European Movement, 2000, pp.29-30. 
199 See European Movement, 2000, pp.17-20. 
200 A feature that all European countries have in common. 
201 Startin, 1997, pp.93-100.  Note that Combat pour les Valeurs formed before the announcement of the 
referendum. 
202 Forster, 2002, pp.86-8, describes the Fresh Start Group as a “party within a party”, given its levels of 
financing, militancy and organisation. 
203 European Movement, 2000, p.2. 
204 Sked announced the creation of his party in a letter to The Times on 12 October, 1991. 
205 Details of this group are sparse: the only available history comes from a piece in an irregular on-line 
magazine: ‘Campaign against Euro-Federalism’, Cultural Review, undated, at: http://www.w-
mids.freeserve.co.uk/caef.htm  
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disseminating more widely the materials and arguments that had been used.206  As with 
Debout la République in France six years later, the ex-post nature of this group does mark it 
out from the others in this category, but the proximity of the conclusion of the ratification in 
Parliament with the group’s foundation is not coincidental and shows the different ways that 
individuals respond and adapt to changing circumstances. 
 
This leads on to the final collection of groups under this heading, namely those associated 
with the Amsterdam treaty, all found in France.  The confusingly named Comité pour 
l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht was a left-wing umbrella for socialists and communists 
created in early 1997 in anticipation of the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference, 
both to strengthen opposition within France and to build links with other countries.207  
Likewise, the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France slowly coalesced from late 1997 
onwards, taking on its full form as French ratification took place, reaching a peak in January 
1999, demonstrating against the Congrès at Versailles.208  Debout la République, an anti-
Amsterdam group of RPR dissents who wished to contribute to “la reconstruction de 
l'opposition qui, pour reconquérir le cœur des Français, doit renouer avec les valeurs 
républicaines et nationales, racines du gaullisme”, symbolically founded themselves on the 
day of ratification by the Sénat two months later.209 
 
One key question that should be addressed at this point is why different treaties have had 
different impacts, in terms of group formation.  At one level, a treaty reform is a basic unit 
of the Union’s development, so it could be argued that similar mobilisation effects would be 
similar between each such event.  However, this is to disregard the clear difference that 
marks the three treaties under consideration, namely content.  In this respect, there is a 
fundamental difference between the Single European Act and the two later treaties.  The 
headline objective of the Single European Act was the creation of the internal market 
through the removal of barriers to free movement.  This negative integration, as Scharpf 
terms it, contrasts with the positive integration of Maastricht and Amsterdam, where new 
common policies were built up.210 
                                                     
206 Financial Times 18/08/1993, ‘Tories to set up anti-EU forum’ and Daily Telegraph 25/09/1993, ‘Tory rebels 
unite to keep Maastricht wounds open’. 
207 Le Monde 18/05/1998, ‘Manifestation contre Maastricht et Amsterdam’.  The initial founding conference was 
held in London, with delegates from 18 countries (http://membres.lycos.fr/comit): however, equivalent 
groups only appear to have developed since in Spain and Italy. 
208 Figaro 19/08/1998, ‘Opposition – Alliance contre alliance’ and Milner, 2000, p.56 
209 [the rebuilding of the opposition which, to regain the hearts of the French, must once more take up republican 
and national values, the roots of Gaullism]: from a group communiqué, cited in Les Echos 16/03/1999, 
‘Creation d’un courant anti-Amsterdam au RPR’. 
210 See, for example, F. Scharpf, 1999, Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.  Also C. Knill & D. Lehmkuhl, 1999, ‘How Europe matters. Different mechanisms of 
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In broad terms, positive integration is likely to have a much higher profile than negative 
integration, both because it creates something, rather than simply taking something away, 
and because the policies it creates are explicitly European, rather than national.  This is 
particularly true of Maastricht, which radically extended the European project, including 
emotive issues such as citizenship, voting rights and a single currency.  Amsterdam, while 
still following the positive integration line of Maastricht, did not achieve the same level of 
interest or notoriety because it was more of a refinement than an extension.  While the 
creation of an employment policy did raise some concern on the left, this was not in the 
same order as that for EMU, partly because of the weak state of the European economy in 
the second half of the 1990s.  Therefore, it is suggested that it was the combination of 
positive integration and significant policy expansion that made Maastricht responsible for 
the lion’s share of the groups in this category, leaving Amsterdam a clear second and the 
Single European Act a distant third. 
 
 
EUROPEAN POLICY EVENTS 
Given the nature of this category, it is not surprising that the groups that fall within it are 
exemplified by sectoral opposition.  In the UK, there are four anti-EMU groups, all of which 
developed in 1996-99.  The most substantial of these is Business for Sterling, founded by 
Lord Marsh in June 1998.  Organising opposition in the industrial and financial sector, its 
argument was that “for Britain, with its special trading, investment and financial patterns, the 
risk of jeopardising our competitive edge through excessive integration remains too high to 
be acceptable.”211  It was joined a year later by Lord Owen’s more politically-orientated 
New Europe, which also centred its critique on the Euro, while maintaining clear support for 
the European Union more generally.  Around these two groups, there was also the 
beginnings of the Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, which while first launched in 
1997, did not really properly organise itself until 2000.212  Finally, the left-wing People’s 
Europe Campaign pre-dated all of these, being set up in 1996, but was quickly wound down 
in the run up to the 1997 general election, so as not to weaken Labour’s attacks on 
Conservative divisions.213 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
europeanization’, European Integration online Papers, Vol.3-7, at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-
007a.htm. 
211 From the letter announcing the launch of BfS: Times 11/06/1998, ‘EMU rebuffed by business leaders’. 
212 European Movement, 2000, p.36 gives the 1997 founding date, but it was only with after a reorganisation and 
relaunch in 2000 that Trade Unions Against the Single Currency was mentioned in any newspaper reports: 
see Daily Mail 12/09/2000 ‘Broadside by Morris shatters Euro truce’. 
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Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions, although subsequently the bearer of a much wider critique 
of integration, originated in the South-West of France in the late 1980s as a response to 
European directives limiting the hunting seasons for various species of birds.214  Likewise, 
Save Britain’s Fish was created in 1990, after several years of uncoordinated actions by MPs 
and fishermen.215  The Conservative European Reform Group was set up in 1980 and spent 
the first ten year’s of its existence protesting (rather than opposing) against the costs of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the budget as a whole.216  In all three cases it does not 
seem that there was a particular single event that triggered group formation, but rather that a 
‘tipping-point’ had been passed, in terms of Union ‘interference’ in the relevant sector. 
 
Finally, there is the British Weights and Measures Association (BWMA), which differs 
somewhat from the other groups here, in that its focus of opposition is as much the British 
government as it is the European Union.  As its statement of aims has it: 
“The latest regulations enforcing metrication are being imposed in order to 
comply with European Union directives and not on account of any desire by the 
British people. Our wishes, convenience, traditions and culture are being treated 
with contempt. Parliament, which let the measures through without debate, must 
be woken up to its responsibility in this matter.”217 
 
 
NATIONAL EUROPEAN POLICY EVENTS 
While the previous two categories have been straight forward in the processes at work in 
group formation, a much more complicated picture emerges in this category, largely due to 
the interface of the European and the national levels.  However, it can be broken down into 
two main sub-sets: changing government policy and opposition evolution. 
 
The first of these is also the largest and contains distinct elements.  Firstly there is changing 
policy as the result of a new government.  Under this heading, come the anti-Euro groups 
Business for Sterling, New Europe and Trade Unions Against the Single Currency, all of 
which came into existence after the election of a more pro-Euro Labour government in May 
1997.  While none of these groups made the link explicit themselves, the general awareness 
that a decision on membership was made more likely under the new administration was 
                                                                                                                                                      
213 Times 20/04/1997, ‘Labour currency rebels lie low’. 
214 Le Monde 26/02/1992, ‘Le lobby des chasseurs contre l’Europe’. 
215 See http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/hisfsh.htm for a full history of the group’s work. 
216 It tabled one amendment against the 1986 EC Finance Bill (Guardian 15/11/1985, ‘Du Cann warns of pull-out 
pressures’), but otherwise limited itself to members making speeches in Parliament. 
217 The full “statement of views and aims” can be found at: http://members.aol.com/footrule/. Menno Spiering 
has written a useful piece on the BWMA’s arguments about the involvement of the EU in metrification (M. 
Spiering, 2001, ‘The imperial system of weights and measures: Traditional, superior and banned by 
Europe?’, in Contemporary British History, Vol.15-4, pp.111-128). 
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clearly a prompt to their formation.  Certainly this was the case for Congress for Democracy, 
an “embryonic national anti-Euro campaigning organisation” set by the Conservative MP 
Michael Spicer in late 1998 to act as a focus for any future referendum on membership.218 
 
But governments do not need to change for policy to change.  This was most famously seen 
in 1988, when Margaret Thatcher made her Bruges speech.  The shift that announced in her 
dealings with the rest of Europe also catalysed the work of Patrick Robertson in building 
support for a new group that opposed further integration.219  The Bruges Group not only took 
its name from the town where the speech had been made, but also took Thatcher’s critique as 
a starting point for its own policies. 
 
Similarly, policy can change because of external events.  While the timing of the formation 
of the Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale in mid-1998 would potentially link it to 
the Amsterdam treaty, there does not appear to be any direct link between the two events.  
Instead, the aim seemed to be a general attempt to increase the profile of sovereignty as an 
issue and to move it to the centre of political debate.220   
 
The second sub-set in this category covers those groups that have developed as a result of 
the evolution of the public debate on European integration and national policy towards it.  It 
should not be confused with the ‘group evolution’ category that follows below, since the 
groups here are effectively formed ex nihilo, rather than from internal processes or pressures 
within existing groups.  This is most clearly seen with the case of Youth Against the 
European Union: inspired by equivalent groups in Norway and Denmark, Youth Against the 
European Union’s founders saw that there was a lack of a youth-based anti-EU group.221  In 
the cases of the European Research Group, Global Britain and Britain Out of Europe 
Campaign, the founders were already active in opposition movement, but created new 
groups to meet particular needs.  Michael Spicer developed the European Research Group in 
1994 to promote coordination of centre-right opposition across Europe, while Lords 
Stoddart, Pearson and Harris formed Global Britain as an anti-EU research unit in mid-
                                                     
218 European Movement, 2000, p.14.  Also see the Congress’ website at: 
http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/.  
219 Robertson is somewhat unreliable as a source on this point: at the time of the Bruges Group’s foundation in 
February 1989, he claimed to have developed his opposition while working on a speech for MP John Bowis 
(Financial Times 08/02/1989, ‘Young man in a hurry’); Two and a half years later, he claimed to have been 
galvanised by an article by Jacques Delors that he had read in 1988 (Daily Telegraph 10/01/1991, ‘The man 
who founded Bruges’); and shortly after that, he moved his conversion to the cause to his time at school at 
Dulwich College (Daily Telegraph 12/04/1991, ‘The gadfly of Bruges’). 
220 See http://www.souverainete.org/  
221 http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/index.html has an informal history of the group. 
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1998.222  Likewise Bob Lomas, the founder of Britain Out of Europe Campaign, had been 
active in UKIP, but wanted to pursue other issues, as varied as marches and promoting an 
anti-EU farming union.223 
 
The Referendum Party also belongs in this sub-set, although for slightly different reasons.  
James Goldsmith had already been active in France as a member (and MEP) of L’Autre 
Europe, but within six months of the 1994 European elections, he had begun to talk of 
forming a party to force a referendum in the UK on the results of the 1996 IGC.224  
However, by the time that the party actually became anything more than an idea, in 
November 1995, the focus was no longer on the Amsterdam treaty, but on Britain’s 
relationship with the EU more generally.225  Moreover, it was suggested at different points 
that the idea of an anti-EU party running in a British general election pre-dated Goldsmith’s 
announcement of his interest in Europe by several years.226  Given his untimely demise 
shortly after the election and the lack of a proximate relationship to any European event, it 
may well be impossible to have a clear and unambiguous answer to the question of 
Goldsmith’s motivation. 
 
NATIONAL POLICY EVENTS 
As mentioned above, this category is the one that potentially presents the biggest challenge 
to the hypothesis that it is European events that drive group formation.  If groups can be 
found that oppose European integration, but which are obviously not formed as a result of it, 
then there would be cause to reconsider the causal processes.  However, despite the 
relatively large number of groups in both countries that do fall under this category, there is 
an explanation that is consistent with the hypothesis. 
 
In all but one case (the second Demain la France), these groups only have a secondary focus 
on opposition to the EU.227  Given this fact, it might be assumed that the development of the 
EU was not a motivating factor in their original creation, but rather a policy line that 
                                                     
222 European Movement, 2000, p.24-5 and 27. 
223 http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=64  
224 Times 28/11/1994, ‘Goldsmith forms a Euro referendum party’. 
225 N. Carter, M. Evans, K. Alderman & S. Gorham, 1998, ‘Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum party’, in 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.51-3, pp.470-485, p.472.  The delay between Goldsmith talking about forming a 
party and it actually developing is ascribed here to delays in setting up a viable organisation, even with the 
large sums of money available. 
226 In April 1996, there was a story that Patrick Robertson (formerly of the Bruges Group, and later the director  
of the Referendum Party) and Chris Monckton had developed the idea of running anti-EU candidates in the 
1989 European election, decided that the time was not right, but had subsequently sold the idea to 
Goldsmith (Independent 26/04/1996, ‘A big little Englander’).  Goldsmith claimed later the same year that 
he had the idea, with Mark Slater, after the Maastricht treaty (Daily Telegraph 14/10/1996, ‘Lunch with a 
predator’). 
227 See Table 2. 
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emerged subsequently, or as a consequence of other policy positions.  Certainly, this has to 
be the case for those groups that predate the integration process that began in the 1950s.228 
 
However, it should then also be possible to identify the points at which these groups 
developed their anti-EU position, since that point would be the logical equivalent of the 
other groups forming in the first place.  Table 8 does just this. 
 
Table 8: ‘National Policy Event’ groups classified by proximate factors in the 
development of their anti-EU position 
 
Factor UK France 
European 
Constitutional 
Events 
Communist Party of Britain 
Conservative Party 
National Front 
The Freedom Association 
Action Française 
Combat pour les Valeurs 
Demain la France (early) 
Demain la France (late) 
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire 
Lutte Ouvrier 
Mouvement des Citoyens 
Parti Communiste Française 
European Policy 
Events 
British National Party 
Federation of Small Businesses 
Green Party 
National Democrats 
Front National 
National 
European Policy 
Events 
Conservative Way Forward - 
National Policy 
Events 
- - 
 
Source: Group materials, newspapers and interviews 
 
It is clear from Table 8 that there is a strong concentration of groups in the first category, 
relative to the distribution in Table 7.  This is understandable if it is considered that the EU 
is not a primary concern for these groups, hence policy positions will only develop at major 
events in the EU’s development: the rest of the time, certainly before such trigger events, 
there will be less knowledge about the EU and less need to have a position. 
 
                                                     
228 In the UK, the Conservative Party and the Communist Party of Britain; in France, Action Française, Lutte 
Ouvrier, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and the Parti Communiste.  
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Thus, while there are several groups that have opposed the integration process from the very 
beginning, particularly on both extremes of the political spectrum, there are also old groups 
that have only relatively recently become mobilised against the EU.  The communist and 
Trotskyite left in France was already opposed to the project of European integration in the 
1950s, while the far right was already attempting to join mainstream opposition to British 
membership in the 1975 referendum.229  However, radical right-wing groups, such as Action 
Française and The Freedom Association, only developed anti-EU positions at the time of the 
Maastricht treaty.230 
 
The Maastricht treaty is also linked to the development of several other French groups.  De 
Villiers’ Combat pour les Valeurs, set up in early 1992, rapidly moved from its values-based 
charter to strong opposition to the treaty’s ratification, even if de Villiers did not seem to 
have a particularly well-defined anti-EU critique at the time.231  Likewise, the use of Demain 
la France as the base for the Rassemblement pour le Non ensured that even before its 
relaunch, the former had developed a clear opposition to the EU.232  Finally, and as 
discussed already, the MDC was created just before the French referendum, as a result of 
Chevènement’s split with the Parti Socialiste on the issue.  The reason for including it here is 
that Chevènement was also clearly motivated by French policy in the Gulf war, a matter over 
which he resigned in 1991.233 
 
The last two groups in this category present some particular issues, if for different reasons.  
The relaunched Demain la France was exceptional in having a primary focus on opposing 
the EU, a position that it inherited and enlarged upon from the original group, hence its 
policy is considered to derive from the Maastricht treaty.  Its inclusion in the ‘national policy 
events’ category in Table 7 is based on the movement of Charles Pasqua away from the RPR 
in order to create a distinctive position.  It meant utilising the role he had developed in the 
                                                     
229 A. Guyomarch, H. Machin & E. Ritchie, 1998, France in the European Union, London, Macmillan, p.23; 
Zellentin, 1971.  Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p.99, mention the rejection of the National Front application to 
join the National Referendum Campaign (NRC). 
230 See http://action.francaise.free.fr/chistoire.htm for a potted history of Action Française’s work since 1899.  
The anti-fascist Searchlight has a short note on The Freedom Association’s development at: 
http://www.searchlighteducationaltrust.org/Handbook/2_4.html; also see European Movement, 2000, p.26-
7. 
231 One commentator noted at the time: “En réalité, M. de Villiers n’a trop d’idées sur l’Europe, ou s’il en a, elles 
paraissent être les produits d’un nouveau poujadisme européen.” [In truth, Mr. De Villiers does not have 
many ideas about Europe, or if he does, they appear to the product of a new European poujardism], Le 
Monde 25/06/1992, ‘Le débat sur le traite de Maastricht: Le nouveau combat de M. de Villiers’. 
232 Agence France Presse 02/04/1993, ‘Philippe Séguin assuré d’être élu président de l’Assemblée nationale 
française’. 
233 http://www.mdc-france.org/mdc/mdc.html#historiquedumdc. 
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referendum campaign and then using it as a basis upon which to build other policy positions, 
which he then did with the Rassemblement pour la France.234 
 
The Conservative party has long suffered from internal divisions on the question of 
European integration.235  As has been noted elsewhere in this thesis, this has resulted in the 
formation of several splinter groups, some aligned and some unaligned to the party.  
However, it has really only been since their removal from government in 1997 that a more 
active opposition has developed.  While this be could tied to the Amsterdam treaty or the 
Euro, it is essentially the continuation of a strand of conservatism that dates back through 
Maastricht to the days of the first two applications to the Community and that is generally 
suspicious of any ‘entanglement’ with continental Europe.236  This makes it hard to identify 
an exact proximate cause at a European level, which leaves the possibility that it is the fact 
of not being in government that has allowed the party to give fuller reign to its anti-EU 
elements.  This question will be discussed below. 
 
At the European policy level, there are groups that have all formed since the relevant country 
has been a member of the Union, but which predate the Single European Act.  The BNP, the 
National Democrats and the Green Party had policies opposed to the EU from their 
inception, based on their (very different) ideologies.237  The Front National did not hold any 
particularly strong views on European integration initially, but Startin attributes three 
developments to its rising scepticism during the late 1980s: the tone of François Mitterrand 
and Jacques Delors’ federalist rhetoric, the Schengen agreements, and finally the plans for 
EMU.238  Finally, the Federation of Small Businesses’ opposition can be ascribed to the 
development of the costs on its members of internal market regulation and the single 
currency.239 
 
The final group, Conservative Way Forward, is exceptional in that its policy is derived not 
directly from European events but rather from Margaret Thatcher’s personal attitude towards 
the EU.  The group was set up by George Gardiner MP (later to fight the 1997 general 
                                                     
234 Le Monde 10/06/1998, ‘Charles Pasqua envisage de présenter sa liste aux européennes’ discusses this 
strategy. 
235 D. Baker, A. Gamble & S. Ludlam, 1993b, ‘1846…1906…1996? Conservatives and European integration’, in 
The Political Quarterly, Vol.64-4, pp.420-434, is a good starting point. 
236 See J. Buller, 2000, ‘Understanding contemporary Conservative Euro-scepticism: statecraft and the problem 
of governing authority’, in Political Quarterly, Vol.71-3, pp.319-327; A. Clark, 1997, The Tories: 
Conservatives and the nation state 1922-1997, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
237 See http://www.bnp.org.uk/eurofuture.html and http://www.greenparty.org.uk/policy/index.html.  
238 Startin, 1997, p.103. 
239 See the FSB’s “10 minute policy brief” on the EU for a fuller exposition of its position: 
http://www.fsb.org.uk/policy/natpolicyunit/BRIEFS/EUROPE/EUROPE1.ASP  
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election for the Referendum Party) in 1991, after Thatcher’s premiership had ended, in order 
to carry on her policies in the Conservative party.240 
 
Taken together, it can be seen that in all the cases – with the problematic exception of the 
Conservative party – the development of opposition to the EU can still be attributed to 
relatively specific and proximate developments at the European level.  In groups that have 
developed such an opposition, many of which are parties, then it has remained a secondary 
part of the group’s policy (with the qualified exceptions of Combat pour les Valeurs and the 
later Demain la France, both cases where other factors influenced the focus), rather than 
becoming its dominant focus.  Once again the high degree of overlap between these groups 
and those with a secondary focus on EU opposition has to be noted: only Chasse-Pêche-
Nature-Traditions has origins in Europe-related proximate factors and a secondary focus.  
Therefore, it might be added that not only is anti-EU group formation driven by European 
events, but also that such groups are likely to remain focused on European integration.  
Likewise, groups that are formed by non-European events are unlikely to become groups 
with an overwhelming focus on European integration. 
 
GROUP EVOLUTION 
The fifth and final category in the classification of proximate causes of group formation is 
that of group evolution.  As discussed previously, this category differs from the others, in 
that it is concerned with internal processes and pressures within groups, rather than with 
external events.  This category can be broken down into three sets: groups formed by 
divisions, those formed by the joining together of two or more groups, and those that arise as 
successor groups.  Figures 17, 18 and 19 depict the relationships between the majority of the 
groups mentioned in this category. 
 
The most obvious reason for creating a new group is that of internal dissent, which comes 
back to Olsen’s theory of collective action.  If the overlap of individual interests is too small, 
then some members will be tempted to take action outside of the group, so as to maximise 
their position.  More prosaically, conflicts between individuals within a group can 
sometimes make collective action impossible and someone has to leave.241  However, it 
appears that such events are relatively rare.  The split between Bruno Mégret and Jean Marie 
Le Pen in 1999 (leading to the creation of the MNR) was a clear example of a personal 
                                                     
240 See http://www.conwayfor.org.uk/aboutus.htm.  
241 This is a more general problem within the anti-EU movement, given the numerous strong personalities 
involved.  See the following section for more on this. 
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friction, coupled with a divergence on the Front National’s strategy.242  Likewise, the split of 
the RPF in 2001 into the MPF and RPF resulted variously from disagreement on party 
funding and a difference in group goals.243 
 
 
 
 
The only other instance of a split is not quite so clear.  Alan Sked had been a leading light in 
the Bruges Group from its inception in 1989.  However, his frustration with the government 
over signing the Maastricht treaty, and his view that there was no alternative to withdrawal, 
led him to create the Anti-Federalist League in late 1991.244  This appeared to cause no 
                                                     
242 Mégret wanted to present a more positive image of the FN, including the possibility of working with other 
parties, considering Le Pen as too bullying to let the FN ever become respectable (The Economist 
03/09/1998, ‘Who’s boss?’). 
243 The RPF argue that there was little policy agreement beyond opposition to the EU and that the MPF members 
were looking to find any way out of the pact (Interview, Eric Cesari, Secretary General, Rassemblement 
pour la France, Paris, 7 November 2001, Rassemblement pour la France Headquarters, Paris).  The MPF 
deny this, pointing to an unacceptable funding system proposed by the RPF (Interview, Thierry de la 
Perriere, Secretary General and MEP, Mouvement pour la France, Paris, 9 November 2001, Mouvement 
pour la France Headquarters, Paris).  Relations between the two groups have been frosty since the split. 
244 Times 12/10/1991, ‘Debate for Maastricht’. 
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problems with the Bruges Group, until Sked stood in the 1992 general election: one month 
later, he was ‘kicked out’ of the Group.245  Thus while not technically a split, the difference 
in strategy and tactics was to result in the formation of a new group. 
 
The alternative to groups splitting is their coming together.  Indeed, the two actions are 
sometimes closely linked: the RPF was created by the fusion of de Villiers’ MPF and 
Pasqua’s Demain la France in order to present a joint list at the 1999 European elections.  
Likewise, the Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB) was an umbrella organisation to 
restore some unity to the National Referendum Campaign’s members after they had lost the 
1975 referendum and had each gone their different ways.246 
 
Other joint ventures have been driven by external events.  New Alliance was established 
after the 1997 general election to try and build a coherent programme between the various 
anti-EU groups then active (particularly the remnants of the Referendum Party and UKIP).247 
Unlike the RPF and CIB, the groups involved did not formally merge, instead using the new 
group as a forum.  This was also the pattern used by Business for Sterling and New Europe, 
which announced the No group in late 1999 as a coordinating mechanism for their work on 
opposing British membership of the Euro.  In both cases, it might be suggested that the 
reason that the old groups did not formally merge was due to the presence of a dominant 
group (UKIP and Business for Sterling respectively), which wanted to retain its 
independence while benefiting from shared action. 
 
The third and final set of groups in this category covers those groups that have formed as 
successors to existing groups.  With only two (linked) exceptions, all of these groups 
replaced groups that were not defunct, but instead changed some notable aspect of the 
previous group’s work.  The exceptions stem from the collapse of the Referendum Party 
after the 1997 general election: after a year of negotiations, the remnants of the Party found 
new funding from Paul Sykes (the millionaire who had bankrolled prospective MPs willing 
to make commitments never to join the Euro) and founded the Democracy Movement.248  At 
the same time, a former regional agent for the Referendum Party, Geoff Southall, set up the 
                                                     
245 Times 16/05/1992, ’Bruges bruises’.  This was due in part to the group’s increasing alignment with the 
Conservative Party. 
246 European Movement, 2000, p.12-4, and http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/cibwhat.htm have details of the 
CIB’s evolution from its founding in 1976 as the Safeguard Britain Campaign. 
247 European Movement, 2000, p.32-3, and http://www.users.dircon.co.uk/~iits/newalliance/admin.htm.  
248 Independent 25/09/1998, ‘Goldsmith fund Sykes’ anti-euros’.  European Movement, 2000, p.20-2, notes that 
before this, Referendum Party members had been urged to join or influence other political parties, so as to 
affect candidate selection in favour of anti-EU figures. 
 146 
 3: Group Formation 
 
Democracy Party, adopting the same line on the EU, and adding other policies on a rather ad 
hoc basis.249 
 
The remaining groups offer an array of modifications on their predecessors.  Most 
mundanely, UKIP was essentially a relaunch of the Anti-Federalist League, but with a wider 
remit to contest all elections, particularly to the European Parliament.250  L’Autre Europe 
was a reorientation of Combat pour les Valeurs towards the 1994 European elections, 
focusing more attention on de Villiers’ European policies.  More fundamentally, the highly 
informal nature of Youth Against the European Union was a prime concern when some of its 
members created Youth For a Free Europe, which eventually replaced the earlier group in 
function, if not in its membership.251 
 
However, the most extreme example is probably that of Demain la France.  In 1996 and 
again in 1998, the group was turned from a think-tank into a ‘mouvement d’action et de 
combat’.252  At the same time, Charles Pasqua consolidated his position within the group, 
installing his close ally William Abitbol (later to be an RPF MEP) as president, and 
excluding Philippe Séguin as the group moved away from the RPR.  In short, the group was 
effectively redesigned as a vehicle for Pasqua, in both organisation and objectives, a 
development brought to a logical conclusion in the group’s uniting with the MPF to become 
the RPF in 1999. 
 
A note should be made here of the evolution of the anti-EU groups within the European 
Parliament (see Figure 19).  It was only after the 1994 elections that a truly anti-EU 
formation first developed: Europe des Nations (EDN), brought together L’Autre Europe with 
Dutch and Danish MEPs.253  The removal of the RPF members from the RPR led to the 
latter joining the European People’s Party after the 1999 elections, allowing the new RPF to 
form the core of the Union pour l’Europe des Nations (UEN).  The EDN replaced the RPF 
members with UKIP and CPNT MEPs and renamed itself Europe of Democracies and 
Differences (EDD).  While these shifting alliances in the European Parliament did not have 
an impact on individual parties, it is still interesting to note the emergence of an increasingly 
                                                     
249 Daily Telegraph 13/11/1998, ‘Millionaire launches party to take on EU’. 
250 Press Association 13/09/1993, ‘Party to be re-launched’. 
251 The Youth Against the European Union website (http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html) 
cites differences on the extent of Youth For a Free Europe’s opposition to the EU, and its desire for a fresh 
start as reasons for the lack of complete overlap between the two groups. 
252 [a movement of action and combat], Le Monde 20/06/1998, ‘Charles Pasqua transforme Demain la France en 
mouvement autonome par rapport au RPR’. 
253 The EDN only just reached the minimum numbers required to form a group, and the loss of an MEP meant the 
group had to disband, until Goldsmith persuaded an Ulster Unionist to join in 1997, in return for a promise 
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solid anti-EU faction within the institution and the potential that opens for increased 
transnational cooperation, a subject discussed in the next chapter.254 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
that the Referendum Party would not contest seats in Northern Ireland in the general election (Carter et al, 
1998, p.476). 
254 Even the move of the Danish People’s Movement from the EDD to the GUE/NGL (Confederal Group of the 
European United Left - Nordic Green Left) in June 2002 was not the result of a change in policy, but rather 
due to tensions with the Danish June Movement. For more details on the move, see:  EU Observer 
20/06/2002, ‘Danish NO MEPs part company’, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=6716. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE GROUP 
 
So far the primary concern has been with groups, since they have greater resources, and thus 
influence, than individuals.  At the same time, it must also be recognised that group interests 
are essentially made up of individual interests.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
relationship of individuals and groups, to see how those individual interests aggregate and 
shape groups.  To this end key individuals can be identified, in order to see how they have 
shaped particular groups. 
 
The first step in this is the recognition that individuals do not have equal weight within a 
group.  This is due to an unequal distribution of resources, both in the physical and 
motivational senses of the word.  Individuals who provide the funding for a group might 
well expect influence over group policy.  Likewise, someone who is prepared to invest 
themselves in organising and leading a group would have more influence than someone who 
contributes only intermittently.  From Olsen’s viewpoint, weaker members have an incentive 
to stick to those who are more powerful, since it allows them to free ride towards achieving 
at least some of their goals.255  In the longer run, it may be that some of the weaker members 
gain enough resources to set up their own group and so achieve all of their goals without the 
help of the original strong member. 
 
Furthermore, the history of anti-EU in both the UK and France has been marked to a 
noticeable extent by the work of a relatively limited number of people.  In many cases, as 
will be seen below, it appears that the formation of a group can be ascribed to one or two 
keys individuals.  To take an example, the European Movement’s ‘A-Z of anti-EU and anti-
EMU organisations in Britain’ focuses as much on individuals as it does on groups, with an 
implicit sense that it is an individual’s involvement in a group that makes the group anti-EU, 
rather than the group making the individual anti-EU.256 
 
None of this is to deny the importance of concentrating the focus at the group level.  Rather, 
by understanding the role of individuals within groups, it is possible to enhance further the 
understanding of group formation and development.  While there are occasional actions by 
individuals, these are exceptional and very rarely have any lasting impact: even the most 
dedicated individuals are involved in some kind of group.257 
                                                     
255 Olsen, 1971. 
256 European Movement, 2000. 
257 A good example of this would be Paul Sykes.  Mr. Sykes, a retail millionaire, was a member of the 
Conservative Party, but stood down as their Prospective Parliamentary for Barnsley in 1996 after 
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In terms of motivation for becoming active opponents of the European Union, individuals 
fall into one of two main camps: those who see such opposition as a means to an end and 
those who see it as an end in itself.  Both camps are opposed to the integration process in 
some way, but while the latter are essentially only interested in having an impact on that 
process, the former use it as part of strategy to some other goal, usually wider political 
influence.  Such a strategy has echoes of Taggart’s view of euroscepticism in parties, which 
characterises such a policy as a means to break into the set of parties that form part of viable 
government coalitions.258 
 
Certainly, there is more such opportunistic opposition in France than in the UK.  All of the 
major French figures can be considered to be opportunists to a greater or lesser extent.  
Certainly, Philippe Séguin’s vehement opposition to the ratification of the Maastricht treaty 
did not last: with his manoeuvring for the post of Prime Minister after Chirac’s election in 
1995, his rhetoric was much toned down, and by 1997 he was in favour of the Amsterdam 
treaty.259  This change of heart made it easier for Charles Pasqua to edge Séguin out of 
Demain la France and relaunch it as a vehicle for his own purposes, as discussed above.  
Likewise, Philippe de Villiers has demonstrated an opportunistic streak on several occasions.  
Firstly, he rapidly turned Combats pour les Valeurs from its initial broad-based ‘chartre pour 
l’alternance’ into a campaigning vehicle against the Maastricht treaty.260  Then he used his 
increased profile on the issue to fight the 1994 European elections on the L’Autre Europe 
list, in which he made much of his opposition to the EU, before again broadening his 
programme with the foundation of Mouvement pour la France in time for the 1995 
                                                                                                                                                      
differences on European policy (Sunday Times 30/06/1996, ‘Tory tycoon quits over Europe’).  During the 
1997 general election, he offered money towards campaign expenses for any Conservative candidate who 
would make a commitment to never joining the single currency (Times 13/03/1997, ‘Millionaire offers 
Tory candidates cash to condemn single currency’), and rebutted any link to the Referendum Party (Daily 
Telegraph 21/04/1997, ‘Millionaire pays the price for Europe’).  After the election, Sykes remained in the 
Conservative Party for a while, before leaving in 1997 after further disagreements about European policy, 
resulting in the co-founding of the Democracy Movement with the remains of the Referendum Party (Daily 
Telegraph 31/10/1997, ‘Single currency “will lead to political integration”’).  Subsequently, Sykes has 
created his own group, the British Democracy Campaign, after disagreements with the Democracy 
Movement (http://www.britishdemocracycampaign.co.uk/).  In September 2002, he announced plans to set 
up a campaign in support of a ‘No’ in a future referendum on EMU membership, setting up a clash with 
existing groups such as No and Congress for Democracy (Guardian 03/09/2002, ‘Anti-Euro lobby in 
disarray as tycoon bids to hijack official No campaign’). 
258 Taggart, 1998.  Schedler posits that this is a characteristic strategy of ‘anti-political establishment’ parties in a 
variety of policy fields (A. Schedler, 1996, ‘Anti-political-establishment parties’, in Party Politics, Vol.2-3, 
pp.291-312). 
259 Benoit, 1997, p.56.  Also see N. Startin, 2001, ‘Maastricht, Amsterdam and beyond: The impact of the EU on 
the French right’, Paper presented at 51st Political Studies Association conference, Manchester, 10-12 April, 
2001 
260 [Charter for a change of government] Le Monde 20/05/1992, ‘Au Palais des congres de Paris une trentaine de 
parlementaires UDF et RPR ont assisté au lancement du mouvement de M. de Villiers’. 
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presidential election.261  In all of these groups, it is clear that de Villiers has set out the 
policy positions to his own preference. 
 
This is understandable, given the French model in which political parties are essentially 
caucuses built to elect their leaders to office.262  But this does not explain why there are also 
opportunistic individuals in the UK.  Patrick Robertson, co-founder of the Bruges Group, 
should not be considered an opportunist so much for his use of Thatcher’s speech as a 
springboard to setting up the Group, as for his subsequent behaviour.  After a period in the 
wilderness, having fallen out with the Bruges Group, he eventually found a post with 
Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, but did not pursue any further anti-EU actions after the 
Party folded in 1997.263  Similarly, James Goldsmith’s motives might be questioned: several 
observers remarked at the time on his habit of getting very involved in what were to prove 
passing fancies.264  Certainly, the strategy and tactics of the Referendum Party were driven 
very much by his personal beliefs.  That said, this should not obscure his involvement with 
L’Autre Europe in the 1994 European election and his funding for the European Foundation 
and the Bruges Group.265 
 
In the second camp are those individuals who have seemingly made opposition to the EU 
their one goal.  The best example here would be Alan Sked.  Sked developed his anti-EU 
stance during his time as the convenor of European Studies at the London School of 
Economics in the 1980s and quickly became an important member of the Bruges Group.266  
However, his increasing conviction that withdrawal was the only possible option clashed 
with the increasing alignment of the Group with the Conservative Party and after the 1992 
general election the two parted company.  At this point, Sked consolidated his Anti-
Federalist League into the UK Independence Party, which he was to lead until 1997, when 
he resigned.267  Thereafter, he has continued to participate in various anti-EU activities, 
                                                     
261 Benoit, 1997, p.60. 
262 Stevens, 1996. 
263 Robertson went on to work in public relations, most famously being General Augusto Pinochet’s media 
representative during his extradition proceedings from the UK in 1999 (Guardian 20/01/1999, ‘Pass notes 
No 1332 Patrick Robertson’). 
264 Financial Times 28/10/1995, ‘Knight’s tilt at political power’; Sunday Telegraph 21/04/1996, ‘My time with 
Jimmy’. 
265 Guardian 12/06/1996, ‘Jimmy’s gold lands MP in funds trouble’, which also points out that he funded the pro-
European European Movement in 1975, and both Labour and Conservative Parties. 
266 Daily Telegraph 01/05/1993, ‘History man has harsh lesson for the voters’; Interview, Alan Sked, Founder 
and former leader of Anti-Federalist League and UK Independence Party, 23 May 2001, London School of 
Economics, London. 
267 Sked himself claims that the work was incompatible with his position at LSE (Interview Sked), although there 
were also splits over policy towards the Referendum Party (Times 06/06/1997, ‘UK party split over links 
with Goldsmith’), infiltration of the party by BNP supporters (Evening Standard 10/07/1997, ‘Sked 
Missal’) and a very poor showing at the Uxbridge by-election, where the party only got 39 votes (Press 
Association 07/08/1997, ‘Home news’).  Changing UKIP policy will be discussed in the next chapter, 
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registering the All-Party Alliance Against Brussels as a name of a possible future group, and 
even working for the Conservative Party during the 2001 general election.268 
 
In the same vein, Lord Stoddart of Swindon has consistently expressed his opposition since 
voting against membership in 1972.269  His work after his elevation to the Lords opposing 
the Single European Act led to him taking up the chair of the Campaign for an Independent 
Britain in 1989, a position he still holds to the present day, as well as being the president of 
LESC.  That this was only possible by his retirement from the Labour Front Bench would 
seem to suggest that his opposition was not designed to further his career.270 
 
At a somewhat more qualified level, politicians such as Bill Cash and Michael Spicer could 
also be considered as members of this group.  Parliamentary opponents of the Maastricht 
treaty and dominant figures in the European Foundation and the European Research Group 
respectively, both have been dedicated in their work in opposing the EU.  At the same time, 
their positions has worked in their favour as the Conservative Party has become more overtly 
opposed to the EU: Spicer was elected chair of the 1922 Committee of Conservative 
backbenchers in June 2001, while Cash became Shadow Advocate General three months 
later.271  However, given their continued work since these appointments, these can be 
considered to be a side benefit more than anything else. 
 
This brief overview of some of the more notable individuals in the anti-EU movement is 
intended to demonstrate that individuals’ paths through time often traverse more than one 
group and, to some extent, also drive the development of new groups.  As has been noted 
before, there is no one coherent critique of European integration; indeed, there are almost as 
many different critiques as there are individuals.  Therein lies the rub, for it means that any 
significantly-sized group is likely to contain some variety of critiques and solutions.  Under 
a dominant leadership, this variety is managable, but without any effective means of 
coercing group unity (except in the obvious case of parties), there is much scope for 
individuals to dissent and form new groups that are more in line with their views. 
                                                                                                                                                      
although it will suffice here to say that the main policy shifts have occurred at the same time as changes in 
the leadership: Michael Holmes’ removal in October 1999 provoked similar upheavals in UKIP (Guardian 
15/10/1999, ‘UKIP in turmoil as leadership is ousted’) 
268 The Alliance’s website (http://www.aaabhq.freeserve.co.uk/) is no longer working: Sked promoted the 
Conservatives at various public meetings, but remains completely outside the party structure; Interview 
Sked. 
269 http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/cibstod.htm gives an overview of Lord Stoddart’s work: Interview Lord 
Stoddart). 
270 At the same time, health problems were also a factor in his retirement. 
271 Guardian 28/06/2001, ‘Hardliner to lead backbenchers’: Guardian 18/09/2001, ‘Duncan Smith defends 
frontbench appointments’. 
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SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, a basic taxonomy of anti-EU groups was developed as an essential step 
towards testing the hypotheses, using it to expose the processes at work in group formation.  
In so doing, it has been possible to test the validity of the first two hypotheses, namely that 
European events drive group formation and that national institutional structures then shape 
those groups. 
 
The taxonomy of groups revealed several important points.  Firstly, groups are diverse in 
their form, their extent of focus on EU opposition and their critique of European integration.  
Secondly, that diversity differs between countries, in a manner that is consistent with the 
hypotheses of the thesis.  In France there are relatively more parties than non-parties 
compared with the UK, which can be attributed to the higher levels of access and carrying 
capacity in the French system.  Moreover, parties tend to have less extreme views than non-
parties, and are more likely to make opposition to the EU a secondary focus of their work, 
which would be expected, given that parties have to take account of other, institutional 
pressures in their form and strategy. 
 
This is further supported by the analysis of the ideological background and critiques of 
integration that groups hold.  While left- and right-wing groups both hold distinctive 
critiques, the key cleavage appears to be between groups with a explicit ideological position 
and those without, given that the objects of ideological groups’ critiques have a large 
overlap.  Once again, non-parties are much more likely to have an indeterminate or neutral 
position on a left-right scale, precisely because they are more focused on EU opposition and 
so do not have other policy positions. 
 
Looking at the proximate factors in group formation revealed further support for the 
hypotheses.  A large majority of groups can be associated with specific developments at the 
European level or in national policy towards Europe.  Moreover, those groups that have 
formed because of non-European events can also all (with the exception of the Conservative 
Party) have the development of their opposition to the EU linked to European events.  All of 
this is consistent with the first hypothesis on group formation.  The only partial exception is 
the matter of group evolution, which is due to internal processes and pressures within 
groups, rather than European events per se.  Such evolution can take various forms, be it 
group form, objectives or focus, and is contingent upon case-specific factors. 
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One of these factors is the role of individuals.  A limited number of individuals play a 
disproportionately large role in each country’s anti-EU movement.  They do this by moving 
from group to group with their financial and organisational resources.  In many cases, groups 
form around such individuals and are essentially a function of those individuals’ interests.  
As a result, it is important to recognise that the motives for these people are just as often 
based on political calculations of increasing their influence as they are on opposing 
European integration. 
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Having looked at the factors in group formation, it is now necessary to consider what the 
groups do once they have been formed.  This primarily concerns what strategies groups 
employ in order to achieve their objectives, but it also includes some calculation of how the 
volume and profile of opposition to the European Union has changed over time.  This 
second point is obviously related to the third key hypothesis, which states that volume and 
profile have increased over time, because of increasing scope for action and depth of 
penetration into formal institutional spaces.  Logically, that requires an understanding of 
what actions groups take in the first place and how that has changed.  More importantly, as 
far as the hypotheses are concerned, exploring group strategies helps to understand the 
extent to which institutional spaces have been a constraining factor: do those groups 
working, or aiming to work, inside formal institutional spaces pursue different strategies 
from those outside?  This chapter will address such questions. 
 
The first step in the exploration of group strategies is to establish a single framework of 
analysis.  It is necessary to find some common way of describing the various actions of 
opposition groups.  The reason for this is simple: by extracting the underlying motivation of 
groups’ actions, they can better be compared and contrasted. 
 
In essence, groups’ action can be reduced to one simple motivation: the desire to secure that 
group’s objectives.  Regardless of group form, ideology or focus, in an ideal world (from the 
group’s perspective), a group would be able to fulfil all of its policy goals and objectives.  
However, in practice there are other groups also trying to achieve their objectives, which 
may go against the group’s own objectives, so it has to try to improve its position of 
influence relative to those other groups.  In short, groups need influence in order to secure 
their objectives. 
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The objectives of opposition groups have been discussed in the previous chapter.  They 
range from policy reforms, through major structural reform, to withdrawal from the 
European Union.  What links all of these is their subject matter: public policy.  In their 
different ways, all the groups under consideration are concerned with changing public 
policy.  Where they differ is in the locations and means by which they attempt this. 
 
When talking about locations, there are two distinct elements.  Firstly, there is the choice of 
institutional space where a group can operate.  This can either be formal institutions, such as 
parliaments or assemblies, or informal spaces, which also can be described as civil society.  
The second element is related to the first and concerns the choice of target audiences, i.e. the 
set of individuals that a group is trying to influence. 
 
The only group that can change public policy is elected politicians at the national and 
European levels, so at the end of the day it is they who have to be influenced.  However, it is 
also apparent that anti-EU groups do not devote all of their efforts to influencing elected 
politicians.  Indeed, in some cases they appear to have very little interest in such an effort.  
This is not to say that there is no attempt to exert indirect pressure on politicians, but it is not 
the primary effort of such groups.  Hence, the potential for different primary target audiences 
must be borne in mind. 
 
Likewise, the means that anti-EU groups have at their disposal to gain influence are 
numerous.  They can be categorised into four main elements, each of which interacts and 
overlaps with the others.  Firstly, there is the seeking of election to formal institutional 
spaces, be they at the sub-national, national or supranational level.  Secondly and most 
heterogeneously, there is campaigning, in the sense of specific actions designed either to 
raise a group’s profile with a particular target audience or to raise awareness of particular 
issues more widely.  This includes activities such as public meetings, lobbying politicians, 
marches, and single-issue campaigns.  Thirdly, there are media-related actions, usually 
forming part of wider strategies that relate to the first two elements.  The fourth heading is 
somewhat different, in that it concerns information dissemination.  This differs from 
campaigning in that it is a constant process and that it is as much directed to other members 
of the anti-EU community as it is to other audiences. 
 
In order to analyse the variety of strategies a suitable categorisation must be developed.  
Three alternatives present themselves: looking at different strategies, different target 
audiences or different group types.  However, in order to address the hypotheses, it would be 
most productive to look at the impact of group types on strategies.  The hypotheses state that 
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institutional structures will shape group development, including group actions.  This will be 
reinforced if it is shown that each type of group adopts strategies consistent with their 
position in the national institutional system (e.g. parties only work inside formal institutions 
and non-party groups only work outside them).  It will also allow for observations on how 
the structure of a group is related to its actions. 
 
This raises the question of what aspect of group morphology is most pertinent.  In the 
previous chapter several means of classifying groups were identified: the extent of their 
focus on EU opposition, the type of opposition to the EU that they have, the form or ‘party-
ness’ of the group and the ideological basis of their opposition.  Of these four dimensions, it 
is most logical to consider the form of the groups as a means of analysing their actions.  
Group form is the dimension that is most closely related to the matter of institutional spaces: 
parties are a priori much more likely to operate within formal institutional spaces than they 
are outside them, since that is part of how parties are defined.  Likewise, non-party groups 
will have a tendency to operate outside of such formal spaces, even if their goal is to 
influence them.  The existence of intra-party groups also provides an opportunity to see 
where the locus of their actions lies, either closely linked to their parties or operating 
relatively autonomously. 
 
As for the other dimensions, as has been noted previously, group focus is largely driven by 
group form, parties being much more likely to make opposition only a secondary objective.  
As far as the type of opposition - be it sectoral, reforming or withdrawal – is concerned, the 
impact that will have on strategies is likely to be much less than the group form, especially 
when looking at the case of France, where there is relatively little variation between groups 
in their opposition objectives.  Finally, ideological backgrounds do not provide a very useful 
dimension, since there will not be any particular difference between groups of the left and of 
the right, given their similar forms. 
 
While group strategies are divided on the basis of group form, when turning to the question 
of changing group volumes later on in this chapter, all the groups will be looked at together.  
This is because the main interest is in the global changes in anti-EU opposition, rather than 
in changes within particular types of groups.  At the same time, it is necessary to look at life-
cycle changes (birth, growth, maturity and, in some cases, decline and death) within 
individual groups that may be hidden within those global figures. 
 
Three methods of measuring group volume will be employed and, as before, there is some 
overlap and correlation between them.  Firstly, the number of members that a group has will 
 157 
 4: Group Strategies, Volume & Profile 
 
be measured.  Secondly, and where relevant, the number of votes cast in any election that a 
group has stood in will be gauged.  Thirdly, some measures of references within the print 
media of various groups will be taken, which can be used as a proxy for gauging their profile 
in public debates.  Together these three measures cover the two key elements of volume, 
namely internal size and external leverage.  A group does not have to be large, in terms of 
members, in order to gain either many votes or much press coverage.  Likewise, groups with 
many members do not necessarily exert much of a presence in the media or in elections. 
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STRATEGIES 
 
In this half of the chapter the focus will be on the three group forms and the types of strategy 
that they employ in their work.  In each case, the four elements of seeking election, 
campaigning, media actions and information dissemination will be considered.  At the end of 
the section, some overall observations will be made. 
 
PARTY GROUPS 
Party groups present the clearest set of strategies of the three types of group form.  This is a 
logical consequence of that form, namely that parties, by definition, fight elections.  Since 
parties seek to gain elected office, the essential thrust of their work is securing public 
support that will turn into votes at elections.  While they also engage in activities other than 
seeking election, such activities should be seen as functions of building popular support. 
 
All but one of the 22 groups identified as parties in the previous chapter contested elections 
within their national political system during the study period.  The exception, Demain la 
France, did not for the simple reason that during its latter incarnation there were no elections 
to contest, having folded into the Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF) before the 1999 
European elections.  Different parties fought different types of election, as shown in Table 9 
below.  All parties contested national elections (i.e. to the Assemblée and the Commons), 
except Demain la France and the RPF, again both for the reason that there were no national 
elections that they could contest during the period.  However, the pattern is more varied with 
regard to sub-national and European elections. 
 
In Chapter One, on institutional spaces, a sub-hypothesis was elaborated, which stated that 
anti-EU interests are more likely to be represented in supranational and national institutions 
than they are in sub-national ones.  This was related to the relative pertinence of the 
European issue in these different institutions: the lower pertinence of the issue in sub-
national elections, where more local issues prevail, would make it less likely that a party that 
sold itself on its European position would be elected.  This leads to a logical corollary, 
namely that anti-EU parties, particularly primary-focus ones, will not contest sub-national 
elections in the first place.   This is for the very reasons that they will be unlikely to get 
elected and, even if they were, they would have little scope to express their opposition to the 
EU, since sub-national assemblies spend relatively little time on European matters. 
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Table 9: Types of Election Fought by Party Groups in France and the UK, 1985-1999 
 British Groups  
 Group Sub-national 
(Local/Regional) 
National European  
 Anti-Federalist League  X   
 British National Party X X X  
 Conservative Party X X X  
 Communist Party of Britain X X   
 Democratic Party  X   
 Green Party X X X  
 National Democrats X X   
 National Front X X   
 Referendum Party  X   
 UK Independence Party  X X  
French Groups 
 Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions X X X  
 Demain la France (late)     
 Front National X X X  
 L’Autre Europe   X  
 Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire X X X  
 Lutte Ouvrier X X X  
 Mouvement des Citoyens X X X  
 Mouvement National Républicain X X X  
 Mouvement pour la France X X X  
 Parti Communiste Française X X X  
 Rassemblement pour la France   X  
 Source: Année politique économique et sociale en France, annual, 
Paris, Moniteur; D. Butler & G. Butler, 2000, Twentieth-Century 
British political facts 1900-2000, 8th ed., Basingstoke, Macmillan 
 
 
When looking at primary-focus parties, it can be seen that none of them contested sub-
national elections during the period, which confirms that the corollary of the sub-hypothesis, 
and hence the sub-hypothesis itself holds true.272  This is further bolstered by the fact that 
while there are several parties that contest sub-national and national elections, particularly in 
                                                     
272 This group consists of the Anti-Federalist League, the Referendum Party, UK Independence Party, Demain la 
France (late) and L’Autre Europe.  However, it must be noted that from 2000 onwards UKIP did contest 
local elections. 
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the UK, there are no secondary-focus parties that contest only national and European 
elections.273 
 
There is a further distinction between France and the UK.  In the former, all parties contested 
all three levels of elections, opportunity permitting.  Even L’Autre Europe turned into the 
Mouvement Pour la France (MPF) after the 1994 elections and contested sub-national and 
national elections.  In the UK, however, there are some parties that have not contested 
European elections.  In all three cases, they are small extremist parties: the Communist Party 
of Britain on the left, the National Front and National Democrats on the right.  This can be 
attributed both to the lack of interest in European elections as a forum for these groups’ 
interests and, more importantly, to a lack of resources.274 
 
Seeking election needs to be seen as a strategy with a double goal.  There is the obvious 
intention of winning enough votes to secure a position in the relevant institution.  However, 
there is also the goal of raising the party’s profile with the public in the longer-term.  This is 
particularly true in the UK, where the height of the electoral hurdle makes election relatively 
unlikely for a party outside of the big three.  Certainly, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
pursued this strategy with respect to by-elections, in an attempt to maintain momentum for 
the party between general elections and to give dissents from other parties a convenient 
destination.275  L’Autre Europe also falls into this category, representing an opportunistic 
manoeuvre by Philippe de Villiers to benefit from his position as an important member of 
the No campaign during the Maastricht ratification to make an electoral breakthrough, and 
then to use that breakthrough as the basis for his new party, the MPF, with its wider scope of 
policy positions. 
 
Mention should be made here of UKIP’s electoral strategy, which has not been consistent.  
Under Alan Sked, the party had a clear policy of not accepting any seats that it might win in 
the European Parliament, as a mark of its lack of constitutionality.276  Money normally paid 
to MEPs would be returned to the taxpayer.  However, this strategy was criticised by 
elements within the party who were to rise to prominence after Sked’s departure.  From 1997 
                                                     
273 The Democratic Party has only contested one by-election since its foundation, making definitive statements 
about its electoral strategy difficult.  However, it appears to have a clear focus on national elections in its 
standing manifesto (http://www.democraticparty.org.uk/).  The RPF only contested the 1999 European 
elections in the study period, but has since taken part in both sub-national and national elections. 
274 Note that the larger British National Party has contested European elections. 
275 Interview Sked. 
276 Sked wrote that if all 87 seats in the Parliament were empty ‘then Europe would know that the British people 
has repudiated Maastricht and that the road to secession was open’, leaving the government the options of 
either renegotiating membership or ‘fac[ing] annihilation’ in a general election (Sunday Telegraph 
24/04/1994, ‘Sunday Comment: Dear Tory, don't vote Tory on Europe’) 
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onwards, party policy changed so as to accept seats in the Parliament, in order to gain a 
platform, expose fraud and mismanagement and report on the EU’s activities: MEPs would 
only take minimum expenses and give the rest to help fund anti-EU activities.   This shift 
in policy is related to the differing views within the party leadership, and a good example of 
the role of individuals within parties that was discussed in the previous chapter. 
277
 
Apart from seeking election directly, parties also use other methods to support this basic 
goal.  In terms of campaigning, opposition to the EU occurs at two points.  The first of these 
is closely linked to seeking election, as parties express their position during electoral 
campaigns, in order to gain public support.  As such, it is little more than a function of 
seeking election.  The second, however, is separate from the electoral cycle and concerns 
parties’ campaigns against specific European issues.  This can occur both inside and outside 
of formal institutional spaces. 
 
                                                     
Those parties that have gained representation inside institutions can then use their position to 
influence decisions.  This essentially consists of voting against positions they dislike and 
voting for, or even proposing, positions that they do like.  Examples here would include 
opposition to ratification of the Maastricht treaty by the Parti Communiste Française (PCF) 
and the incipient Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) in France, or of the Amsterdam treaty by 
the Conservatives in the UK.  Such actions are part of the cut and thrust of party politics and 
are not the primary concern in this thesis. 
 
Of more interest are actions taken outside of formal institutions.  The best example of this is 
the Conservatives’ “Keep the Pound” campaign, which it launched in the run-up to the 1999 
European elections and which ran until the 2001 general election.278  This campaign 
consisted of a rolling set of public meetings, pamphlets, opinion polls, a website and regular 
efforts on the part of senior party members to push the issue to media outlets.279  While this 
represents the most extreme form of such campaigning, effectively being partitioned off 
from the rest of party business, it provides a template against which to compare other such 
activities by parties. 
 
277 As one UKIP member put it, “we will take the devil’s money and put it to god’s work” (quoted in 
Birmingham Post 10/12/1998, ‘Sovereignty comes above all’) 
278 Daily Telegraph 01/06/1999, ‘Tories step up fight to keep pound’. 
279 The website (http://www.keepthepound.org.uk) is not longer functioning, redirecting instead to the 
Conservative Party homepage (http://www.conservatives.com/).  Lord Bell was given responsibility for 
running the campaign. 
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While those parties that have representation within formal institutions have the option of 
voting against policy developments, such as treaty ratifications, those that do not (i.e. the 
majority) have been forced to express their opposition to these treaties in other ways.  
Beyond simply releasing press statements with the party’s opposition, this has usually taken 
the form of involvement in events organised by non-party groups.  In France, the PCF and 
the MDC associated themselves with the appeal of the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité 
de Maastricht of May 1997, which condemned the impending Amsterdam treaty.  Likewise, 
a demonstration in January 1999, on the occasion of the Amsterdam treaty ratification and 
organised by the Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France, was attended by various 
members of the MPF and Demain la France.280  Likewise, in the UK several parties have 
chosen to join existing umbrella groups, rather than pursuing their own campaigning.  This 
has been the case for small parties, such as the Democratic Party, and even UKIP, both of 
whom have been involved with the Congress for Democracy from an early date, in order to 
coordinate plans for any future referendum on membership of the Euro.281  The Congress for 
Democracy even appeared to have the seal of approval of the Conservative Party, when then 
leader William Hague addressed the second congress in July 1999, ironically as part of its 
Keep the Pound Campaign.282 
 
If these actions were the result of optimising resources and avoiding unnecessary and 
potentially counter-productive duplication, then the actions of the British National Party 
(BNP) have been more controversial.  In 1998 it launched the “Save Our Sterling” 
campaign, which ostensibly had the same basic aims and elements as the Conservative’s 
campaign discussed above, albeit on a rather smaller scale.283  However, most observers saw 
the campaign as part of the effort by the party to move itself into the realms of public 
acceptability.  The strategy was essentially one of using populist themes to engage with the 
general public, which would in turn generate acceptance of more contentious policies, such 
as repatriation of immigrants.284  The “Save Our Sterling” campaign was part of an on-going 
effort on the part of the BNP to infiltrate UKIP, dating back to 1997.  Then a researcher had 
been expelled for his BNP links by Alan Sked, which seemed to stop the process 
                                                     
280 Le Monde 20/01/1999, ‘Le Congrès a adopté sans passion la révision constitutionnelle’. 
281 European Movement, 2000, p.14-5. 
282 European Movement, 2000, p.15; Daily Telegraph 09/06/1999, ‘Hague to set out positive defence of the 
pound’.  On a more parochial issue, UKIP has been a key supporter of the “Metric Martyrs”, traders who 
have been prosecuted for using imperial measurements, since the issue first came to prominence in March 
2000.  Full details are available at the Martyrs’ website (http://www.metricmartyrs.com/).  However, this 
falls outside of the study period, suffice to say here that the party saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate 
concrete action towards British withdrawal from the EU and raise its profile. 
283 European Movement, 2000, p.3-4. 
284 There are more detailed accounts of the BNP and its strategy, upon which this section is based, in both 
Guardian 13/10/1999, ‘The right revs up’ and Searchlight 07/1997, ‘Nick Griffin…The sting, part 2’, at 
http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/stories/nickgriffin1.htm.  
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temporarily.  However, after Sked’s departure, the leadership was accused of continuing 
links with BNP members, as well as removing the anti-racist clause from the party’s 
constitution.  Although neither side has publicly discussed this strategy, and nor there has 
been any apparent shift in UKIP policy in relevant areas, there is still some concern that the 
BNP (and the National Front) continues to probe this strategy.285 
 
In the area of media relations, parties enjoy a pre-eminent position among anti-EU groups.  
As will be seen in the second half of this chapter, parties take the vast majority of media 
coverage, especially in France.  As the established (and establishment) actors within a 
national political system, it is not surprising that the media has an interest in the views of 
parties on various issues, nor that all the anti-EU parties have press officers, trying to push 
out information to media outlets.  Thus media coverage is both a cause and an effect of 
parties’ public profiles.  The need to gain a public profile, and to turn that profile into votes, 
makes parties keen to exploit the resources that the media has to offer, since the latter has a 
large potential leverage, especially if it communicates a party’s message in a positive 
manner.  As was discussed in the introductory chapter, the media is not only a passive 
conveyor of information, but also an actor with its own preferences and interests.  As a 
result, it is just as often that the media contacts a party as it is the other way around.286 
 
In the final category, information dissemination, parties occupy a particular position.  While 
parties do produce relatively large amounts of information, it is very largely in the context of 
electoral materials and explanations of policy positions, rather than trying to disseminate 
material with which to attack the European integration process.287  The reason for this is 
clear: as a consequence of their chosen form, parties have to be elected in order to effect 
policy change, so they have to inform voters of their policy positions, to convince voters to 
vote for them.  As a result, materials have the aim of building identification with the party, 
rather than informing through factual information.288  Even in a primary-focus party such as 
UKIP, information on its website is almost exclusively directed towards building support for 
the party, with the small exception of some briefing reports on developments in the EU.289 
 
                                                     
285 Spectator 10/02/2001, ‘Sceptics who betray Britain’ (written by Alan Sked); Times 08/06/1999, ‘'I would 
advise people voting on Thursday to help the Tory revival. It may be the one useful thing to emerge from 
this useless election'’. 
286 Interview Cesari. 
287 See the MPF’s website, for example (http://www.mpf-villiers.org/).  
288 The RPF send out a daily email to supporters and media organisations, outlining the party’s position on the 
day’s news (Interview Cesari) 
289 http://www.independence.org.uk/html/resource.html - this section of UKIP’s website dates from 1999, when 
the MEPs were able to fund a research officer within the framework of their EDN group in the European 
Parliament. 
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Taken overall, there is a clear primacy of seeking election on the part of party groups.  While 
parties pursue activities in the other areas of campaigning, media actions and information 
dissemination, this is all directed towards supporting the key goal of gaining representation 
in institutional spaces.  This primacy is clearly the result of the group form, since election is 
considered as the first step to gaining influence.  Even where parties have had little chance 
of election, as in the early days of the Anti-Federalist League and UKIP in the UK, this has 
not dissuaded them from pursuing their strategy, instead using each election as an 
opportunity to build on a base that will eventually allow for the securing of seats. 
 
INTRA-PARTY GROUPS 
Given that intra-party groups exist within parties (hence their name), it might be expected 
that their strategies would be parallel in some way to those of their parties.  However, this is 
not the case.  Unlike their parent organisations, intra-party groups focus primarily on media 
activity and information dissemination. 
 
None of the intra-party groups in the study engaged in electioneering.  This should not 
suggest that individuals within these groups did not later seek office, but this they did with 
other groups.290  However, during their time in intra-party groups, these individuals confined 
their electoral activities to their respective parties.  The closest to seeking election that any of 
them got was during the ratification of Maastricht.  In France, Combat pour les Valeurs and 
the Rassemblement pour le Non were key groups on the ‘no’ side.  However, this was in the 
context of the Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) and the Rassemblement Pour la 
République (RPR) respectively not stopping the two groups from pursuing their position, 
partly through party divisions, partly through a lack of sufficiently strong party structures 
and partly through a desire to unseat the Socialist Mitterrand through a ‘no’ victory.291  In 
the UK, the Fresh Start Group engaged in a concerted programme of voting against the 
government, only being reined in by the latter calling for a vote of confidence over the 
inclusion of the Social Protocol.292  Despite this, the group quickly dissipated itself once the 
ratification process was complete.293 
 
                                                     
290 See the section on individuals and the group in the previous chapter. 
291 Portelli discusses the French referendum campaign in more depth: H. Portelli, 1992, ‘Le referendum sur 
l’Union européenne’, in Regards sur l’Actualité, Sept-Oct 1992, pp.3-12 
292 Forster, 2002, p.87, records that the group proposed 500 amendments, 100 new clauses, as well as voting 985 
times against the government, with a further 1,515 abstentions. 
293 The group quickly went from talking about setting itself up on a permanent basis (Times 07/06/1993, ‘Right-
wingers pose new threat to battered Major’) to being deeply divided over the question of the Social Protocol 
vote (Times 07/07/1993, ‘Social Chapter vote splits sceptics’). 
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While it is understandable that the status of a group that classifies itself as existing within a 
party would be under threat were it to seek election, intra-party groups do not engage in 
generalised campaigning.  With the aforementioned exception of the French referendum, 
intra-party groups have only engaged in very limited campaigning activities.  Both 
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe (CAFE) and Conservative Way Forward 
encouraged their members to select anti-EU candidates in their constituencies for the 1999 
European election.294  Both groups, along with the three other British groups (the Anti 
Common Market League, the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign (LESC) and the People’s 
Europe Campaign), have also been active at their respective annual party conferences, 
organising debates and meetings.  The Conservative European Reform Group operated 
principally within Parliament, but also occasionally released papers and pamphlets on topical 
issues.295  In a similar vein, Debout la République has tried to promote its anti-Amsterdam 
position within the RPR through colloquia of party members.296 
 
While such actions appear to be limited within the broad scope of activities discussed in this 
chapter, there is a coherent logic behind it.  Just as parties are driven by the primary goal of 
gaining representation inside institutions, so intra-party groups being driven by the primary 
goal of gaining influence within their respective parties.  All parties contain differing 
opinions on various policy positions, even if there is still enough overlap to ensure a certain 
level of party coherence.  However, the existence of differing opinions creates the potential 
for different elements within the party to compete for control of the party’s organisational 
structure.  All of the intra-party groups under study have anti-EU policy positions and all are 
trying to embed that policy into their parties’ structures. 
 
The result is an analogous strategy between parties and intra-party groups.  Parties seek 
representation in institutions, while intra-party groups seek representation within parties.  In 
both cases, there are access mechanisms (e.g. elections) that have to be utilised in order for 
the group to set about achieving its aims.  Seen in this light, intra-party groups are merely 
adding one more step to the strategy used by parties.  They seek to gain control of their 
party, and then to get that party elected, so that it can effect policy change.  Consequently, 
                                                     
294 European Movement, 2000, p.16-20.  People’s Europe Campaign used a variation on this approach, trying to 
get local Labour constituencies to pressure MPs on the single currency. 
295 A typical example would be the pamphlet suggesting joining the lower tier of a 2-tier Europe, so as to avoid 
joining EMU, released during the early phase of the negotiations leading up to Maastricht (Guardian 
05/11/1990, ‘Brittan offers new European option’).  It is worth noting here that the group ended up as the 
moderate opposition faction during Maastricht ratification, not following the hard line approach of the 
Fresh Start Group. 
296 See http://deboutlarepublique.ifrance.com/deboutlarepublique/ for minutes of more recent meetings. 
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the important objective for an intra-party group is to gain influence and position within the 
party, hence its efforts are directed to that task. 
 
This primary goal not only explains intra-party groups’ activities with reference to 
campaigning, but also to media actions.  While none of these groups has pushed for a high 
level of coverage by the media (with none of them having full-time press officers), what 
coverage there has been, has tended to reflect efforts by the group to achieve a more 
dominant position.  Generally speaking, this has meant either articles in newspapers with an 
anti-EU position, and which are widely read by party members, giving space to group 
members to express their position, or by more pro-EU newspapers describing the rise of 
extreme factions within the particular party.297 
 
Taking into account the elements above, one would expect there to be little in the way of 
information dissemination outside of party members, and indeed this is what is found.  In the 
same way as parties, intra-party groups are less concerned with research and informing a 
wider public of developments in the EU per se than they are with promoting policy positions 
that will gain they support in their chosen constituencies (i.e. the party membership).  As 
will be seen in the following section, this contrasts with non-party groups and even with 
those groups that, while de facto intra-party, hesitate to have any formal links with a party.298  
This is evidenced by the relatively sparse nature of these groups’ websites, which contain 
little more than a statement of aims, the occasional article, a list of group organisers and 
contact details.299 
 
Overall, the strategies adopted by intra-party groups, with the partial exceptions of Combat 
pour les Valeurs and the Rassemblement pour le Non, are consistent with the goal of gaining 
influence in, and control over, their respective parties.  Work is focused upon raising the 
group’s profile within the party, rather than more widely, since to do the latter would be an 
inefficient use of resources.  The exceptions mentioned above were the result of particular 
circumstances, namely the French referendum on Maastricht, where the aim was precisely to 
influence the general public.  However, both organisations were short-lived, a consequence 
                                                     
297 For example, Daily Telegraph 05/08/1999, ‘Tories make up a Cafe society of Euro-sceptics’ and The 
Observer 05/10/1997,  ‘Conference Manoeuvres: Hague needs to restore tribal ties that bind’, both on 
CAFE, or Figaro 16/03/1999, ‘La petite vague des gaullo-ronchons’ and Le Monde 17/03/1999, ‘Les 
républicains nationaux du RPR s'organisent en courant’, both on Debout la République. 
298 Such as the European Foundation. 
299 This is true for the Anti Common Market League (http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/cibacml.htm - part of the 
Campaign for an Independent Britain site), Conservative Way Forward (http://www.conwayfor.org/), the 
Labour Euro Safeguard Campaign (http://www.lesc.org.uk/), and Debout la République 
(http://deboutlarepublique.ifrance.com/deboutlarepublique/).  CAFE does not even have this, its website 
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of their restricted goals.  Where intra-party groups have persisted, they have followed the 
strategy outlined above. 
 
NON-PARTY GROUPS 
The third and final category of groups, non-party groups, presents a fundamentally different 
set of strategies to the two previous ones.  Whereas both parties and intra-party groups 
exhibit very similar strategies within their categories, both driven by a clear and overarching 
objective, non-party groups are much more diverse, in both strategies and objectives. 
 
The reason for this stems from the lack of a single goal.  Parties need to gain election to 
effect policy changes, so their efforts are directed towards election; likewise, intra-party 
groups need to gain control of their party to effect policy changes, so their efforts are 
directed towards gaining control.  Non-party groups do not have such an objective, for the 
reason that they operate outside of formal institutional spaces, enabling them to adopt a 
variety of strategies, designed to achieve influence at different points within the national 
institutional system.300 
 
Where non-party groups are consistent is in their non-pursuit of elected office.  None of the 
non-party groups under study has contested elections at any level, either during the study 
period or after it.  This is to be expected, given that in the previous definition of non-party 
groups, there is no intention of pursuing elected office as a strategy.  Instead of trying to gain 
direct control of decision-making institutions within a national system, non-party groups aim 
to achieve indirect influence.  As can be seen in Figure 20 below, there are various ways in 
which this can be achieved, combining elements of campaigning and media activity. 
 
Figure 20 highlights four main routes for gaining influence within institutional spaces.  The 
first, and most obvious, is the direct lobbying of elected members of those institutions, to 
shift the balance of opinions within parties (and hence institutions).  Secondly, groups can 
lobby sectoral interests, which may or may not already have active European policies, in 
order to broaden the range of groups lobbying politicians and institutions on the subject.  
Thirdly, there is use of the media as a direct conduit of influence within institutions, through 
the reproduction of non-party group opinions and policy positions.  Finally, the media can 
also be used indirectly, as a means to influence public opinion, which can then influence 
                                                                                                                                                      
(http://www.cafe.org.uk/) having been closed down since 2001 and the election of Iain Duncan Smith as 
leader of the Conservative Party. 
300 And on the international level as well: non-party groups are proportionately more likely to be involved in 
transnational groups such as TEAM. 
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institutions in a variety of ways, both formally (i.e. elections) and informally (e.g. opinion 
polls and focus groups).  These campaigning strategies, as listed above, are increasingly 
indirect, in terms of the number of steps and actors between the group and the institution that 
is to be targeted.301  Using these various possibilities in combination, sub-sets of non-party 
groups can be identified, classified on the basis of their chosen strategies.  These sub-sets are 
listed in Table 10 below, along with the passive strategy of building inter-group contacts, 
which will be discussed later. 
 
 
 
The first two sub-sets to be considered are primarily concerned with the utilisation of more 
direct forms of gaining influence.  Think tanks generate materials and policy positions 
within their own structures, in contrast to clearing house groups, who instead merely 
provide a structure through which individuals can project their own ideas.  In both cases, 
such groups aim to influence politicians, either directly or via media coverage of their work. 
 
                                                     
301 This is reflected in the original version of this figure (which did not include sectoral lobbying): there the 
Bruges Group had labelled the lobbying of politicians as a ‘primary influence mechanism’, and the press-
based strategies as ‘secondary’.  Bruges Group, undated, ‘Current Communication Strategies’, in-house 
document, and interview Oulds. 
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Table 10: Non-Party Groups Classified by Strategies 
   
 Active Strategies Passive 
Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Sub-Sets (constituent 
groups) 
Lobbying 
Politicians 
Lobbying 
Sectoral 
Interests 
Media 
Activity 
Influencing 
Public 
Opinion 
Building 
Inter-
Group 
Contacts 
 
 Think-Tanks (Demain 
la France (early), 
European 
Foundation, Global 
Britain, The 
Freedom 
Association) 
X  X    
 Clearing Houses 
(Bruges Group, Etats 
Généraux de la 
Souveraineté 
Nationale, European 
Research Group) 
X  X    
 Sectoral (BWMA, 
Business for 
Sterling, Federation 
of Small Businesses, 
New Europe, No, 
Save Britain’s Fish) 
X X X X   
 Hyper-Sectoral 
(Campaign Against 
Euro-Federalism, 
Trade Unions 
Against the Single 
Currency) 
 X     
 Grassroots (Action 
Française, Britain 
Out of Europe 
Campaign, CIB, 
Democracy 
Movement) 
  X X   
 Youth (Youth Against 
the European Union, 
Youth For a Free 
Europe) 
   X   
 Umbrella (Alliance 
pour la Souveraineté 
Française, Anti-
Maastricht Alliance, 
Comité pour 
l’Abrogation du 
Traité de Maastricht, 
Congress for 
Democracy, New 
Alliance) 
    X  
 Source: Group materials and media coverage  
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In their most developed forms, both think-tanks and clearing houses produce substantial 
amounts of material.  The European Foundation publishes a regular journal, the European 
Journal, which is still one of the major non-web-based channels of communication in the 
British anti-EU community, with contributions from both in-house members and invited 
individuals.302  Similarly, during its heyday, the Bruges Group published Occasional Papers, 
pamphlets, books, a journal and newsletters.303  Even at the other end of the scale, groups 
such as the European Research Group and Global Britain have all produced at least one 
significant piece of work, either as a policy position or as a research project.304 
 
Where the two sub-sets diverge is in their editorial line.  While think-tanks generally claim 
their work as a collective effort, clearing houses are much more cautious about attribution.  
The reason for this revolves around the question of group cohesion, a subject already 
touched upon on several occasions.  In two of the three cases, clearing houses do not have a 
sufficiently strong centre to allow for the imposition of a group line: the Etats Généraux de 
la Souveraineté Nationale limits its communal activities to round-table discussions, summer 
schools and a newsletter expounding the group’s overall position on the benefits of 
sovereignty.305  In the case of the Bruges Group, the lack of group cohesion did not result 
from a weak centre per se, but from the internal friction between neo-liberal economists 
(such as Lord Harris and Kenneth Minogue) and nationalists (such as Patrick Robertson), 
and from the external friction between the Conservative Party and the Group, which became 
increasingly aligned after several attacks on government policy in the early 1990s.306  As a 
result, the only publication that had the support of the whole group was a 1991 Occasional 
Paper, ironically authored by Alan Sked, who was later to be ejected from the group.307 
 
Despite this difference in methods, the two sub-sets both have similar aims in their 
strategies, namely the direct influencing of politicians.  This occurs in a variety of manners.  
                                                     
302 Recent issues are also available on-line at: http://www.e-f.org.uk/pubs/ej/index.html  
303 The Group, while still producing the majority of these, was much more intermittent after its clashes with the 
Conservative Party in the early 1990s (see, for example, Times 16/05/1992, ‘Bruges bruises’).  More 
recently, and particularly after the 1997 general election, the Bruges Group developed and expanded once 
more, as evidenced by the breadth of activities presented on its website 
(http://www.eurocritic.demon.co.uk/).  
304 This said, the European Research Group’s manifesto, “A Europe of Nations”, did not make any impression on 
the media, and now appears to exist as little more than a reference on a anti-EU website 
(http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks40/antieu.html).  Global Britain has produced several items on the effects 
on the British economy of withdrawal and on pro-European bias in the BBC 
(http://www.globalbritain.org/).  
305 See http://www.souverainete.org/ for copies of this newsletter, and details of the other activities.  The group 
does support the publication of books, but only under the authorship of an individual. 
306 The Bruges Group’s most prominent attack was on the Major Government’s handling of Kurds refugees 
during and after the Gulf War (see Times 13/04/1991, ‘Bruges secretary offers to resign’). 
307 A. Sked, 1991, A proposal for European Union, Bruges Group Occasional Paper No.9, London, Bruges 
Group. 
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In the most straightforward case, groups have direct and personal links with individual 
politicians built up through common interests and repeated contact.  The latter is facilitated 
by the general proximity of many of these groups to particular political parties (the 
Conservative Party for the Bruges Group, European Foundation and European Research 
Group, and the RPR for the early Demain la France): party conferences offer many 
opportunities for such groups to organise fringe events and meetings.  Through such 
contacts, as well as mailing lists, groups can directly target politicians with their materials, in 
order to try and influence them. 
 
At the same time, groups use the media to generate further interest in their work and to gain 
further leverage with politicians.  The research that these groups perform is transmitted to 
the media, via direct contacts and press releases (a feature shared by all these groups, bar the 
European Research Group), who then report it, thus raising its profile with politicians.308  
This obviously also generates a profile with the wider public, but none of the groups appears 
to make any particular attempt to utilise this profile, either in seeking mass membership or in 
directing campaigning towards the public.  Of course, generating favourable attitudes at a 
popular level is also helpful in convincing politicians of the credibility of a group’s 
position.309 
 
If think-tank and clearing house groups have pursued a relatively focused strategy, then 
sectoral groups have been much more diverse in their activities.  To some extent, this is a 
reflection of the heterogeneity of the groups involved (certainly at the level of objectives), 
but that should not obscure the similarities between them.  Whether dealing with the 
Common Fisheries Policy or the Euro, sectoral groups have utilised the widest possible 
range of campaigning strategies. 
 
Direct lobbying of politicians by sectoral groups is both a result of the limited goals that 
such groups are pursuing (which can be largely achieved without systemic change to the EU, 
as discussed in the previous chapter) and of the presence of political figures within the 
groups’ structures.  With the exception of the Federation of Small Businesses, which is also 
the only secondary-focus sectoral group, all sectoral groups have current or former 
politicians at the head, or close to it, of their organisations.310  This provides groups with 
                                                     
308 The director of the Bruges Group, Robert Oulds, describes this as a structural counterpart to direct links with 
politicians (Interview Oulds). 
309 Interview Oulds. 
310 Business for Sterling and New Europe (and as a result, No) are headed up by Lords Marsh and Owen 
respectively; Save Britain’s Fish was co-founded by Austin Mitchell MP, who remains its Parliamentary 
contact; British Weights and Measures Association was founded and is directed by Vivian Linacre, UKIP 
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convenient and consistent access to other politicians, as well as the opportunity to have 
group concerns raised inside formal institutional spaces.  Even the Federation of Small 
Businesses has developed links with UKIP at the individual level.311 
 
At the same time, sectoral groups also lobby sectoral interests directly.  Generally speaking, 
this involves campaigning in those sectors most closely affected by the EU policy in 
question.  For Business for Sterling and the Federation of Small Businesses this means the 
commercial sector, via involvement with the groups’ regional sections.312  Save Britain’s 
Fish has close links with various fishermen associations, who also provide much of the 
group’s funding.313  Likewise, the British Weights and Measurements Association (BWMA) 
has actively worked with traders unwilling to use metric measurements, setting up an 
‘Imperial Traders’ Register’ in late 1999, a move which was later to segue into the “Metric 
Martyrs” legal case.314  With a more academic- and politically-inclined target audience, New 
Europe has been more active in the area of producing research publications and organising 
speeches, seminars and meetings.315 
 
If these activities are essentially confined to specific target groups, related to the policy in 
question, then sectoral groups have also made efforts to reach the general public, both via 
the media and more directly.  This is particularly true of the anti-Euro groups, Business for 
Sterling and New Europe.  They have maintained high media profiles since their formation 
in 1998-9 (see next section), with dedicated media directors and teams ensuring not only 
active relationships with the media, but also a platform for their position on the single 
currency, especially after their creation of No, which is generally treated by the media as the 
de facto umbrella organisation in any forthcoming referendum on membership of the single 
                                                                                                                                                      
member.  It should be noted that Business for Sterling has maintained a consistent line of not involving 
politicians in its campaigning  (Times 11/06/1998, ‘Businesses line up against the Euro’), although this has 
not precluded informal links existing with various figures inside Parliament, nor with UKIP (Interview 
Eels). 
311 Britain in Europe notes the involvement of FSB members in UKIP meetings and links with the Campaign for 
an Independent Britain (http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=84). 
312 Business for Sterling currently operates regional committees across the UK, with a national council made up 
of 300 prominent businessmen (http://www.no-euro.com/whoweare/bfs.asp): the Federation of Small 
Businesses has 220 branches, organised into 30 regional committees (European Movement, 2000, p.25-6) 
313 Initial support by the Scottish White Fish Producer’s Association was replaced in 1995 by that of the 
Fisherman’s Association: The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations has also been involved 
with the group since 1994 (http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/hisfsh.htm).  
314 European Movement, 2000, p.4-5.  The Metric Martyrs were street traders prosecuted for selling produce 
under imperial measures after the 1st January 2000 deadline for shifting to metric measurements: full details 
of the case and its background can be found at http://www.metricmartyrs.com/; the BWMA’s involvement 
is discussed at http://www.bwmaonline.com/. 
315 http://www.new-europe.co.uk/contents.html has full details of these activities.  New Europe is also one of the 
very few groups in the UK to have a youth section, Students for New Europe, launched in October 1999 
and based around university groups (see http://www.new-europe.co.uk/student/index.html).  No has 
essentially mixed together New Europe and Business for Sterling’s work. 
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currency.316  While the other groups have a smaller media profile, they do still engage in 
popular actions, usually structured around specific events: Save Britain’s Fish most 
famously organised a fleet of fishing vessels to sail up the Thames to London to protest over 
changes to the Common Fisheries Policy in 1996.317 
 
The reasoning behind the breadth of strategies pursued by sectoral groups is related precisely 
to the limited nature of their objectives.  All of these groups, with the exception of the 
Federation of Small Businesses, have very limited policy goals, all of which are achievable 
within the current system of the European Union, i.e. they do not hold positions of 
generalised opposition.  Since this reduces the amount of change required to bring the new 
policy into effect (because the current system does not have to be built up again from 
scratch), so it is potentially easier for it to be achieved.  The corresponding response to this 
on the part of the groups is to push at every available point of pressure around formal 
institutional spaces in order to achieve their goals: Business for Sterling’s information 
manager described the programme of his group as being to react to government and EU 
events and to secure a ‘no’ vote in a referendum, broad goals with room for much flexibility 
of approach.318  This is aided by the simplicity of the message to be communicated: no to 
membership of the Euro, withdrawal from the Common Fisheries Policy or use of imperial 
measurements all need much less elaboration than objectives of major reformation of the 
EU.  Put differently, sectoral groups do not pretend to have policy positions on subjects 
outside of their immediate interests, hence there is a greater potential for disseminating the 
group’s aims to a very wide audience, while other groups have to adjust their message to 
different audiences. 
 
This said, there are a couple of groups that exhibit features that merit being referred to as 
hyper-sectoral.  Both the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism and Trade Unions Against 
the Single Currency have adopted very focused approaches in their campaign strategies that 
set them apart from other sectoral groups, albeit in differing ways. 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism was founded in 
1991 to organise opposition within the Labour party and the trade union movement against 
                                                     
316 See European Movement, 2000, p.35 and http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=98 for the 
opinions of pro-European groups on this point.  No is included here, rather than under umbrella groups, 
since both Business for Sterling and New Europe have suspended the majority of activities under their own 
names, so as to give No a clear field. 
317 The Herald (Glasgow) 19/04/1996, ‘Fishermen sail in with protest aimed at sinking Euro-policy’.  Save 
Britain’s Fish also encourages the public to join its organisation and to engage in lobbying of MPs and other 
bodies (http://www.savebritfish.org.uk/whafsh.htm). British Weights and Measures Association supports 
similar action (http://www.bwmaonline.com/Join%20the%20Action.htm).  
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membership of the EU.  As a consequence, its activities have been very focused upon 
mobilising support for its position within these bodies.  It has very close links with the intra-
party LESC and co-organised a campaign against Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
with the left-wing newspapers Tribune and Morning Star.319  Trade Unions Against the 
Single Currency has been even more focused in its activities, limiting itself just to trade 
unions and to the issue of the Euro.  While its campaigning was minimal during the study 
period, even after its relaunch in September 2000, it has limited itself to building up support 
within individual unions and branches, as well as at events such as the Trades Union 
Congress.320 
 
In both cases, the groups have eschewed the approaches taken by others, as a consequence of 
their highly focused nature.  Neither has made any attempt to develop a profile in the media 
generally or with the general public, instead limiting activity to a very precise audience.  In 
this, they most closely resemble intra-party groups, since their aim is to affect the policy of a 
political party (albeit through the indirect route of trade unions) so as to change public 
policy.  The difference lies in a clearer separation between these groups and their targets 
than is the case for intra-party groups. 
 
All of the non-party groups discussed so far have exhibited a common interest in lobbying 
elite-level actors, be they politicians or other decision-makers.  However, there are non-party 
groups that do not structure their work along these lines.  The more important of these fall 
under the grassroots category in Table 10.  Despite their very different backgrounds, Action 
Française, Britain Out of Europe Campaign, Campaign for an Independent Britain (CIB) and 
the Democracy Movement engage exclusively in activities aimed at the general public.  Such 
action not only includes street demonstrations, rallies and marches, but also public debates 
and meetings, as well as the distribution of EU-related materials.321   
 
The development of an anti-EU position was an integral part in the renewal of Action 
Française in the early 1990s, giving it a new focus for its traditional strategy of mass action, 
most notably at the January 1999 rally in Versailles on the occasion of the ratification by the 
                                                                                                                                                      
318 Interview Eels. 
319 The group’s chairmen have all been members of either the Labour party or a trade union (European 
Movement, 2000, p.12). 
320 See the group’s website (http://www.tuasc.org.uk/) and Daily Mail 12/09/2000, ‘Broadside by Morris shatters 
Euro truce’. 
321 The groups’ websites contain more details of their work (http://action.francaise.free.fr/, 
http://www.bullen.demon.co.uk/index.htm,  and http://www.democracy-movement.org.uk/): also see ‘These 
Tides, 2001 Vol.3.2, p.10, ’Action française’ a royalist sovereignist movement’. 
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Congrès of the Amsterdam treaty.322  CIB has run public meetings throughout the study 
period, although it has only been since the late 1990s that they have attracted any substantial 
audiences.  It also produces pamphlets and information packs for schools and libraries, 
organises speakers for meetings, as well as arranging the 1992 ‘counter-summit’ in 
Edinburgh, which saw the birth of the Anti-Maastricht Alliance and The European Alliance 
of EU-critical Movements.323  Britain Out of Europe Campaign has organised 
demonstrations and a march, as well as lobbying farmers to leave the National Union of 
Farmers and create an anti-EU union.324  The Democracy Movement adopted a very 
decentralised structure after its emergence from the Referendum Party, developing a strategy 
that combined constant activity at the grassroots level with regular high profile events, such 
as ‘Democracy Days’ and rallies.325 
 
As noted before, these groups have adopted the position that the best way to influence public 
policy is to create sufficient movement in public opinion to make decision-makers in 
institutions change their positions.  If Action Française and Britain Out of Europe Campaign 
aim to do this through vocal protests, and CIB through targeting popular sources of 
information, then the Democracy Movement has taken a more low-profile approach, 
counting on the sheer volume of its members to have an effect.326  However, in all four cases 
there is also an intention and an effect of generating media interest, even if this does still 
remain relatively small in comparison to other non-party groups. 
 
This contrasts with the two youth groups, Youth Against the European Union and its 
successor, Youth For a Free Europe.  These groups developed out of the perceived need for a 
youth-oriented anti-EU organisation, such as are found in Scandinavia.327  In practice, these 
groups have not instigated much activity on their own, instead joining in with other groups – 
such as the Democracy Movement – to express their views.  This has meant participation in 
rallies and meetings, as well as working on door-to-door campaigns, both in the UK and 
                                                     
322 http://action.francaise.free.fr/Europe1/180199.htm.  
323 Interview Lord Stoddart. 
324 http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=64. 
325 Financial Times 25/09/1998, ‘Campaign against monetary union to be launched' and Independent 25/09/1998, 
‘Goldsmiths fund Sykes' anti-euros’.  Democracy Days included speeches, rallies and pamphleting around 
the country. 
326 Some 200,000 in 1999, essentially inherited from the Referendum Party, as the previous chapter noted. 
327 In Sweden the Unga mot EU is attached to Nej til EU (http://www.nejtilleu.se/ungamoteu/index.htm), while in 
Denmark the JuniBevægelsen has a large youth section 
(http://www.junibevaegelsen.dk/index.php?page_id=18&data_id=49).  In both cases, the youth sections 
have substantial autonomy of action. 
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abroad.328  Rather than using the media to convey their message, these groups have adopted 
word-of-mouth tactics, consistent with their grassroots approach. 
 
While the difference between the grassroots and the youth sub-sets is partly one of size and 
of the latter’s relative lack of organisation, it is also a reflection of the specialised nature of 
youth groups.  These are aimed at mobilising young people, who are often more sceptical of 
political activity.  As a result, youth groups have been relatively informal, stressing as much 
the social function of joining the group as the political intent.329 
 
The final sub-set of non-party groups presents a very particular situation.  Umbrella groups 
exist in both France and the UK, but their strategies cannot be classified within the active 
categorisation in Table 10.  This not to suggest that these groups have not engaged in any of 
the activities outlined above, but that it is not their primary purpose.  Instead of working to 
influence public policy makers, the primary strategy of umbrella groups is the promotion of 
contacts between various groups, with a view to optimising their efforts to influence 
decision-makers.  This stems from the nature of umbrella groups as collections of, or fora 
for, other groups. 
 
In most of these cases, this is very clearly the situation.  The work of the Anti-Maastricht 
Alliance, the Comité pour l’Abrogation du Traité de Maastricht, Congress for Democracy 
and New Alliance has been limited to the organisation of meetings for their various 
constituent parts, in order to build links, coordinate work and prepare for future activities.330  
The individual reasons for the formation of these groups have been discussed in the previous 
chapter, and do not require repetition.  However, as an illustration of the type of work that 
umbrella groups have engaged in, the example of Congress for Democracy can be used.  
Lacking any substantial group organisation, it essentially exists only as a bi-annual meeting 
for all groups interested in coordinating work on a future referendum on British membership 
of the Euro.  Motions are passed by the plenary session, and any work that is required is 
                                                     
328 Youth Against the European Union helped in the Danish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 
(http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html).  
329 This was certainly the case for Youth Against the European Union 
(http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3729/history.html): while more serious, Youth For a Free Europe 
still has the feel of a group of friends (see http://www.free-europe.org.uk/).  
330 This was also the case, at least initially, for the various European groups, such as The European Alliance of 
EU-critical Movements (TEAM, which was set up at the same time as the Anti-Maastricht Alliance) and 
SOS Democracy (an inter-group of MEPs). 
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fielded out to individuals.331  The Congress does not even appear to want to turn itself into 
the lead organisation in the event of a referendum.332 
 
In the remaining case there has been some effort to influence public policy directly.  The 
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France has followed the same path as the other umbrella 
groups to a great extent, organising meetings for French anti-EU campaigners at regular 
intervals in order to coordinate their work around some basic objectives concerning the 
preservation of French sovereignty.333  At the same time, it has also engaged in occasional 
activities under its own name, asking the French government to press for a protocol of the 
respect of national constitutions at the Vienna European Council in December 1998, and co-
organising the January 1999 Versailles demonstration.334  In this respect, it could be that the 
Alliance is moving in the same direction as CIB, a group that has gradually overcome its 
initial fractiousness to pursue a coherent strategy.  However, at this point in time, its actions 
still represent the exception, rather than the rule, with member groups still holding the power 
of decision. 
 
To complete this review of non-party groups’ strategies it is necessary to discuss briefly the 
importance of information dissemination.  While parties and intra-party groups have not 
treated this as a priority, given their objectives, non-party groups have devoted considerable 
resources to this work, regardless of their individual strategies.  The production of analyses 
and critiques of European integration, and its subsequent dissemination to as many groups 
and individuals as possible, is seen as an integral part of these groups’ work.335  As a result, 
it should come as no surprise that non-party groups and individuals manage all of the major 
resources for anti-EU activity, both on-line and off.336 
 
                                                     
331 Agendas are set by a Steering Committee, compromising politicians and non-party figures from various 
groups (http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/the%20committee.html).   
332 At the Seventh Congress, in March 2002, a resolution was passed that merely proposed that individual groups 
should work together (http://www.congressfordemocracy.org.uk/seventh.html).  
333 As their website notes: “Chaque association adhérente, chaque membre, s'exprime et agit librement en dehors 
de l'Alliance, dans tous les domaines.  Tous s'engagent cependant à respecter, dans leurs prises de position, 
les principes politiques communs inscrits dans la Charte pour la souveraineté de la France.” [Each 
participating association and member may express themselves freely outside the Alliance, in all areas.  
However, each one also undertakes to respect, in the taking of positions, the common political principles 
contained in the Charter for the Sovereignty of France], http://www.souverainete-france.org/html/pages/qui-
sommes-nous.htm.  
334 http://www.souverainete-france.org/html/code/asf-choix-communiques.php.  
335 Lord Stoddart notes that the on-going nature of European integration, and hence of campaigning against it, 
implies a requisite need for full information on events. Interview Lord Stoddart. 
336 On the internet, mailing lists such as EuroFAQ are non-party, as are websites providing links to materials and 
other sites, such as the Critical European Group (http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks40/ceghome.html), Facts, 
Figures and Phantasies (http://www.eufactsfigures.com/), Euro-sceptic.org (http://www.euro-sceptic.org/) 
and Souverainisme.org (http://www.souverainisme.org/).  Off-line, the work of CIB in the UK has already 
been mentioned. 
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Unlike parties and intra-party groups, non-party groups are not competitive.  Parties compete 
with other parties to secure election; intra-party groups try to promote their agendas within 
parties over those of other factions.  By contrast, non-party groups can be cooperative, since 
they are all working towards changing the status quo of European integration: hence their 
relative willingness to get involved in transnational groupings.337  As discussed before, this 
does not mean that there is much agreement on either the problems or the solutions, but that 
all groups are motivated by the same desire to change the system in some way.  Moreover, 
success by one group does not necessarily mean failure for the others: the prevalence of 
primary-focus groups among non-party groups means that it is much more likely that gains 
secured by one group’s actions will benefit all of the others.  The dissemination of 
information is a result of this non-competitive approach – different groups can use the 
information in different ways to support their strategies. 
 
This is not only true for information dissemination, but for non-party group strategies in 
general.  The non-competitive nature of the situation in which non-party groups work means 
that they can adopt very different strategies from one another in a stable manner.  Whereas 
parties and intra-party groups constantly have to optimise their strategies to match their 
opponents’, non-party groups can engage in strategic specialisation, without concerns that 
this will result in their marginalisation.  Indeed, one of the strengths of the non-party groups’ 
strategies is precisely that they are diversified, which results in a more complete coverage of 
all pressure points around formal institutional spaces. 
 
This is not necessarily the intention of non-party strategies.  The role of individuals within 
groups and the impact of divergent individual interests on group cohesion has been previous 
discussed.  At least some of the diversification is thus attributable to the desire of individuals 
to pursue their own personal projects in whatever way they see fit.  At the same time, there is 
also a structural factor that plays a role.  As shown in Figure 20, there are several ways in 
which non-party groups can exercise influence.  This sets them apart from parties (who only 
have the route of being elected) and intra-party groups (who have to secure control of their 
party).  Non-party groups are thus the only ones not bound by the structure of the 
institutional system to follow a single course.  This is shown in Figure 21 below.  Note how 
both parties and intra-parties only have one course of action with which to secure their goals. 
 
                                                     
337 See Annex 1. 
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Figure 21 thus represents a summary of groups’ strategies.  It shows the interrelationship 
between parties and intra-party groups, which was not immediately apparent in the 
taxonomy proposed in the previous chapter, as well as the differences between types of 
groups.  Underlining this there is still the idea of institutional constraints, which variously 
serve to limit or enable different activities by different groups.  Parties and intra-party 
groups are forced into particular strategies and activities by their initial choice concerning 
the best way to influence public opinion.  On the other hand, non-party groups can exploit 
more diverse strategies by dint of their choice not to pursue direct representation within 
formal institutional spaces. 
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VOLUME AND PROFILE 
 
Having looked at group strategies, the question of volume and profile needs to be discussed.  
This is directly linked to the third hypothesis that there will be an increasing volume and 
profile of anti-EU groups over time, due to an increased ability over time to penetrate 
institutional spaces, a question that will be fully addressed later on.  However, the first step 
in testing this hypothesis is to see whether group volumes and profile have increased at all, 
regardless of the reasons for this.  This will be done through consideration of how many 
individuals are members of such groups and what level of support they have more widely, 
both in terms of votes and of media coverage. 
 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
A first useful indicator of group volume is the changing level of group memberships.  
Clearly, this has two components, namely changes over time within groups and changes over 
time in the number of groups.  Therefore it is necessary to provide not only global figures, 
but also figures for each group. 
 
The first point to note is that information on this subject is very hard to obtain, and even 
harder to confirm.  The reasons for this are twofold.  The first is political: groups often claim 
to have more members than is actually the case, so as to strengthen their claims to ‘speak for 
the people’, a matter that was discussed in the previous chapter.  Conversely, groups with 
low memberships, or falling memberships, will not be eager to report this.  The second 
reason is administrative: paradoxically, this seems to affect larger groups more than it does 
smaller ones.  While small groups can keep relatively accurate records of membership, 
larger groups often do not keep up-to-date and centralised membership databases, resulting 
in miscounting of members.338 
 
An associated problem is that of multiple memberships by individuals.  This is best 
illustrated by looking at the membership of one of the main email discussion lists in the UK.  
EuroFAQ was set up in September 1998 to disseminate anti-EU information: it currently has 
                                                     
338 The Secretary General of the RPF highlighted this as a particular problem for French parties, which can only 
receive funding from members or from the state, the latter being calculated on first round votes for the 
Assemblée and the number of elected posts.  Given the RPF’s electoral performance, which will be 
discussed later on, this means the state does not give the party any funds.  However, despite the resulting 
importance of having accurate membership lists, M. Cesari was still not totally sure how many members his 
party had, due to “a rather complicated accounting system”.  Interview Cesari.  However, the suggested 
figure of 100,000 members in the RPF’s first phase of existence is certainly a substantial overestimate, 
given that such a figure would have made it the same size as the RPR! 
 181 
 4: Group Strategies, Volume & Profile 
 
some 190 members.339  As part of the enlisting procedure, members are asked to list 
membership of various anti-EU groups.  In general, most members who do claim 
membership of one group will also be members of other groups: for instance, there are 
several members who belong to the Democracy Movement, UKIP and CIB.340  As a result, it 
should be kept in mind that there is likely to be some overlap in memberships, particularly 
amongst non-party groups. 
 
Consequently, a substantial part of the following section is based on second-hand estimates, 
either by the author or by other observers.  Despite this, the figures do still have a useful 
indicative value, showing the general trends.  The data in Annex 2 covers for groups with a 
primary focus on opposing the European Union (see Table 2 in the previous chapter), as well 
as several other notable anti-EU groups, on a year-by-year basis.  Figures 22 and 23 put this 
information into graphic form.  In addition to the comments made above concerning the 
data, some further assumptions must be noted.  Firstly, where only more recent data is 
available for a particular group, then those figures have been extended back to the group’s 
foundation date.  Clearly, this will tend to overstate the size of groups in earlier years, but 
without any clear means of calculating those figures, this remains the most logical way of 
treating the data, since it is in the early phase of a group’s existence that most growth takes 
place.  Secondly, while the British figures only concern groups with a primary focus, the 
French data also include the MDC, MPF and RPF, since a substantial part in their growth 
results from their anti-EU stance.341  Their inclusion can also help in understanding shifts 
between the two sets of groups.  Thirdly, where groups either do not have memberships (as 
in the case of certain umbrella organisations), or lack sufficient structures to make 
membership meaningful (as for the early phase of Demain la France) then the figure is 
replaced with a dash. 
 
                                                     
339 EuroFAQ is hosted by Yahoo! Groups (http://groups.yahoo.com/): the author has been a (passive) member 
since September 1999.  It originates from the EuroFAQ website (http://members.aol.com/eurofaq/).  
340 Due to the restricted nature of the list, it is not possible to release specific instances.  Moreover, it should be 
noted that EuroFAQ members have tended to be amongst the more active anti-EU elements, and so their 
multiple memberships are likely to be less common in other, more passive circles. 
341 The inclusion of the three souverainiste parties and the exclusion of the far right and left, not to mention 
Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions, requires some explanation.  Off all the French parties, only the RPF, MPF 
and MDC made Europe a substantial element of their political platform.  As noted in Table 2, only the MPF 
can be considered as a primary focus group, all the others being secondary focus.  However, within those 
secondary focus groups, the RPF and MDC have shown a much greater interest in European issues than the 
remainder.  Hence only those three have been included, not least so as to not swamp out the other groups: in 
the classification used by Taggart and Szczerbiak, 30% of the electorate voted for parties with some degree 
of anti-EU policy in the late 1990s, equivalent to an estimated 12 million voters (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 
2001). 
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Looking at the figures, in both countries there has been an upward trend over time.  Even if 
the big jumps in numbers in 1997 in the UK and 1999 in France can be attributed to single 
groups and are subject to a degree of overestimation (the Referendum Party and the uniting 
of the MPF and Demain la France into the RPF respectively), then that should not hide a 
wider process, whereby there are an increasing number of groups in both countries, each of 
which draws in new members.  It has to be mentioned that in the case of France, global 
figures fell quite sharply in 2001, when the RPF split: membership of the resultant MPF and 
RPF totally roughly 30,000 instead of the 100,000 it had in the aftermath of the 1999 
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European elections.342  By contrast, the Democracy Movement was able to retain the vast 
majority of the Referendum Party’s support base after the latter collapsed in 1997. 
 
The second observation to be made concerns the relative importance of new groups bringing 
in new members over existing groups increasing their membership.  There is only one 
demonstrable case of a group substantially increasing its membership over time, the UK 
Independence Party.  Even in this case, it is necessary to be careful with the figures.  The 
party’s internal newsletter talks about a rise in membership from a few hundreds to “some 
thousands” between its foundation out of the Anti-Federalist League and mid-1995.343  
During the next couple of years, various newspaper reports placed membership at between 
10,000 and 16,000.344  However, in his farewell piece, Alan Sked put figures at only 3,000 
members, with a ‘hard-core’ of 200-300, i.e. no real increase since 1995.345  This practical 
example of groups inflating their membership is instructive, not least because it appears that 
a similar process took place after Sked’s departure.  His figure was repeated two years later, 
in the wake of the 1999 European elections, when it was claimed that UKIP’s new 
leadership had increased membership to 8,000.346   
 
The relative importance of new groups driving increasing global totals, rather than existing 
groups expanding, highlights the diversification of strategies over time, as discussed in the 
first half of this chapter.  Generally speaking, there has been a move from small, elite groups 
to larger, popular groups, both in the form of grassroots campaigns such as the Democracy 
Movement and of fully-fledged political parties such as the RPF and UKIP.  However, 
caution must be exercised over any assumptions concerning future trends.  It is still unclear 
how many more, if any, such large-scale groups each national system could hold.  At the 
same time, it does appear that in overall terms the anti-EU movement has been successful in 
retaining its membership over time: during the study period, even taking into account 
overlapping memberships and the various shortcomings of the data, it remains apparent that 
global totals have tended upwards and that when one group stops, another one will more 
than replace its membership. 
 
                                                     
342 Interview de la Perriere. 
343 UKIP, 1995, UK Independence News, No.9, June 1995. 
344 Times 27/06/1996 ‘Rival party threatens Goldsmith’; Financial Times 03/02/1998 ‘Visions of a 'monster' 
rouse the Independence party’. 
345 UKIP, 1997, UK Independence News, No.21, August 1997. 
346 Daily Telegraph 15/06/1999 ‘EU Spanish junket drove retired tycoon into politics’.  Even in face-to-face 
interviews, UKIP Council members refused to give precise figures: a general figure of “more than 10,000” 
was given to the author (Interview Sinclaire) with the comment that the party did not wish to be more 
precise for ‘strategic reasons’. 
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This then is the internal aspect of group volume: its membership.  But how does that relate 
to the external dimension of profile?  It is necessary to consider groups’ wider resonance in 
society, first in terms of electoral power and then in terms of media representation. 
 
ELECTORAL RESULTS 
As was discussed in the first half of this chapter, elections are one key strategy that anti-EU 
groups have pursued in their attempts to improve their position of influence.  Thus it is a 
useful benchmark to look at how well those groups that stand for election do, since this will 
reflect on their profile in the general public. 
 
As before, Annex 3 lists election performances by groups with a primary anti-EU focus (plus 
the same French parties looked at in the previous section) in various national elections 
during the study period, while Figures 24 and 25 give global totals in graphic form.  Figures 
show the percentage of the total vote in each election.  Particularly in the early British 
elections where anti-EU candidates stood, this results in relatively low figures, for the simple 
reason that not many candidates were fielded: the Anti-Federalist League only had 17 
candidates in the 1992 general election, averaging 0.5% in those constituencies.  Regional 
and local election results have been excluded, since none of the groups contested these 
during the study period.347  However, the results of by-elections to the British Parliament 
have also been excluded from the Table: instead they have been included in Annex 4, with 
Figure 26 below showing their development.  As can be seen, these are exclusively the 
preserve of UKIP.  In the Assemblée Nationale, deputées are generally replaced by alternates 
without election.348 
 
In contrast to the evolution over time of group memberships, when looking at election 
results there is a rather mixed picture.  The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, while British 
results appear to have followed a consistent trend upwards, this is clearly not supported by 
the development of UKIP’s by-election performances since 1993.  Moreover, looking at 
UKIP’s results from the 2001 general election, despite the general upward trend there is a 
slump back to 1.5% of the total vote.349  Similarly, in France there appears to be a mismatch 
between European election results in 1994 and 1999 and national elections in between.  To 
                                                     
347 As already mentioned, UKIP has stood in local elections since 2000. 
348 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/qui/modifications.asp contains a full list of such changes to the 
composition of the Assemblée. 
349 See House of Commons, 2001, ‘General election results, 7 June 2001’, House of Commons Research Paper, 
No. 01/54.  Even using a figure for the 428 constituencies that UKIP contested, the average is still only 
2.1%. 
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some extent that is due to electoral alliances on the part of the MDC in 1997, but with an 
estimated 1% of the vote that year, this still does not cover the gap.350 
 
 
 
 
More importantly, in the French case, there does not seem to have been a progressive 
evolution of anti-EU voting in European elections.  Instead, there appears to have been a 
simple step up between 1989 and 1994.  Whether this is purely a temporary phenomenon 
will only become apparent in 2004. 
                                                     
350 Les Echos 27/05/1997, ‘Petits partis: les Verts recoltent les fruits de leur alliance avec les socialistes’. 
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The case of France does initially seem to be redolent of the situation that has existed in 
Denmark for the past 15 years, namely the existence of a substantially different constellation 
of parties in national and European elections.351  However, this would be to misread the data.  
Certainly, the MDC has only presented a separate list on one occasion, in the 1994 European 
elections, but it did not repeat that in 1999, working instead with the Parti Socialiste.352  But 
none of the three main anti-EU parties – the MDC, MPF or RPF – has pursued a strategy of 
only contesting European elections.  Likewise, UKIP in the UK has fought both national and 
European elections.  If anything, the differences that can be seen between results can be 
ascribed to the relatively higher profile of ‘Europe’ as an issue in European elections, with a 
resultant boost for parties that offer clear alternative visions to mainstream parties.353  Of 
course, this is simply another expression of the ‘second-order’ hypothesis these elections, 
which states that national government parties will do relatively badly and that smaller, more 
extreme parties will do relatively well.354 
 
                                                     
351 A. Michalski, 1996, 'Le Danemark et sa politique européenne', Les Études du CERI No.16, CERI, Paris, 
discusses this.  The People’s Movement (Folkesbevægelsen Mod EU) and the June Movement 
(Junibevægelsen) only participate in European elections, with the former having an electoral pact with the 
Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkepartei), which does not compete in European elections. 
352 Reports at the time put this down to political expediency, namely that Chevènement did not want to jeopardise 
his political standing with the PS and that the MDC was receiving very low scores in opinion polls. Les 
Echos 09/03/1999, ‘Après bien des tergiversations, le Mouvement des citoyens de Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
a décidé de faire liste commune avec le PS pour les prochaines élections européennes’. 
353 For example, note the differences in issue rating between European and national elections shown in Figure 12. 
354 See Rief & Schmitt, 1980, and Marsh, 1998. 
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It is also pertinent to look at the practical consequence of groups’ electoral performances, i.e. 
how much representation they have gained.  Table 11 below lists seats won by anti-EU 
groups during the study period.  In addition to these, there are several more seats that came 
by other means into the hands of these groups.  In France, the MPF has two sénateurs and 
the RPF one, while the latter also has three deputies in the Assemblée, all of whom crossed 
the floor from other parties at the time of their formation.355  Likewise, in the UK, the 
Referendum Party briefly had one MP for two months before the 1997 general election.356 
 
As discussed at length previously, the French electoral systems are more proportionate than 
those in the UK, and so it not at all surprising that the former has seen more successes on the 
part of anti-EU groups than the latter.  However, it is worth noting that in both countries the 
site of the greatest success has been the European Parliament, an institution whose 
legitimacy is questioned to a greater or lesser extent by the various anti-EU groups elected to 
it. 
 
Table 11: Seats won by anti-EU groups in national and European elections 
   
 Election France UK  
 European election, June 1994 13 (L’Autre Europe) -  
 Assemblée Nationale, May-June 1997 1 (MPF) 
7 (MDC) 
-  
 European election, June 1999 13 (RPF) 3 (UKIP)  
 Source: Année politique économique et sociale en France: Butler & Butler, 2000.  
 
In summary, anti-EU groups have been able to convert their growing internal membership 
into an increasing electoral profile in both countries.  This is a relationship that works both 
ways.  In the UK, UKIP claimed to have doubled its membership after gaining its first seats 
in 1999, and certainly improved its performance in subsequent by-elections (Figure 26).357  
In France, the mere announcement of the RPF’s formation before the 1999 elections was 
                                                     
355 It would also be possible to add the 6 MEPs elected in 1999 by CPNT, the party’s first seats outside of 
regional elections.  The 6 now sit with the EDD group in the European Parliament. 
356 George Gardiner, founder of the thatcherite Conservative Way Forward, left the Conservative Party in March 
1997, after he was deselected by his local association for attacking John Major’s European policy (Observer 
09/03/1997, ‘Ditched Gardiner joins Goldsmith’).  Given the continued strain between the Conservative’s 
MEPs and the party proper, the 37 MEPs elected on 36% of the vote in 1999 have not been included, 
despite the presence of several prominent anti-EU individuals amongst their number (see Guardian 
21/06/1999, ‘Tories try to sort out how Euro MPs will be aligned’). 
357 Daily Telegraph 15/06/1999 ‘EU Spanish junket drove retired tycoon into politics’. 
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enough for tens of thousands of individuals to ask for membership, even before the party had 
established any formal structures.358 
 
At the same time, the size of a group that contests elections does not bear a clear linear 
relationship to its success.  This is best seen in the 1999 elections, where UKIP got over half 
the national vote of the RPF, despite only having about 5% of the members.  Similarly in 
1997, the Referendum Party only got three times the mean national vote of UKIP (i.e. 
looking at constituencies where each party stood), despite UKIP having a mere 1.5% of the 
Referendum Party’s members and substantially fewer resources.  In this, the strong showing 
of the smaller party is more interesting than to the weak showing of the larger one.  One 
possible explanation in both the above cases is that the RPF and the Referendum Party were 
only set up shortly before the election, while UKIP had a much more permanent structure in 
place, which allowed it to maximise the leverage of its resources.359  However, it is 
necessary to take into consideration various other factors, such as other parties’ positions, in 
order to fully understand the relationship at any given point. 
 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
The third and final element of this section looks at media coverage of anti-EU groups.  
Unlike the previous element, this is of concern to all groups, regardless of form.  As was 
seen in the first half of this chapter, the large majority of groups seek to gain some kind of 
media profile.  The reason for this is clear: national media outlets provide the most cost-
effective means of reaching the general population.  Larger groups can afford to employ full-
time media or communications officers to ensure a steady feed of material to the media, 
while smaller groups tend to concentrate their efforts on specific campaigns, given their 
more limited resources.  In either case, it would be expected that those efforts would be 
reflected by media coverage and, if the hypothesis is correct, then that coverage should 
increase with time. 
 
In order to measure this, coverage in national newspapers over the study period will be 
measured.  Clearly, this provides an incomplete picture of media coverage, but it represents 
the only practical means of collecting data: television, radio and the internet do not have the 
same searchable archiving systems as newspapers, the latter further suffering from its 
novelty.  Moreover, as noted previously, newspapers do not play the same role in French 
                                                     
358 Interview de la Perriere. 
359 Certainly this was the view of one defector from the Referendum Party to UKIP.  Regional organiser, John 
Bostock, described Goldsmith’s campaign as ‘useless’ and said that there was a ‘lack of organisation and 
[much] disillusionment’ (Guardian 01/01/1997, ‘Goldsmith party ‘an empty shell’’) 
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society as they do in the UK: the French are as likely to read weekly news magazines as they 
are newspapers.360  At the same time, the aim is not to provide a comprehensive and 
systematic account of media coverage, but merely an impression of overall trends.  The use 
of primarily broadsheet newspapers here is likewise based on the desire to make trends more 
visible.  More populist newspapers carry substantial less coverage of political events and so 
of groups, and the Lexis-Nexis database does not have such good coverage, which has 
potential impacts on making comparisons between the two countries.  Despite these caveats, 
newspapers do give a relatively comparable medium upon which to base this work. 
 
Two elements will be considered in this section.  Firstly, references to individual groups will 
be noted, in order to gauge their individual and collective profiles.  Then some key words in 
anti-EU rhetoric will be studied, as a measure of more general media interest in the subject 
of opposition to the EU.  Data are based on newspaper searches on the Lexis-Nexis database 
and are presented in the form of references per newspaper per month.361  The reason for this 
is twofold: different newspapers are available for different periods, so results have to be 
adjusted to take account of this, and monthly units are large enough to give meaningful 
figures, but small enough to highlight relatively short-term fluctuations. 
 
Naturally, in all of this it must be remembered that media coverage is not a passive matter.  
Generally speaking, anti-EU groups have to push their stories to media outlets if they are to 
have a chance of being covered.  Alternatively, certain groups may gain a reputation with the 
media and their opinions on various news items may be sought.362  In both cases, the 
different actors have different agendas, which may or may not complement each other.  As 
discussed previously, media outlets have their own interests, and this might result in over- or 
under-coverage of anti-EU groups and their activities, relative to other outlets.  While this is 
countered to a certain extent by using a variety of sources – both left- and right-wing, and 
pro- and anti-European - for each country, it cannot be guaranteed that such effects will be 
eliminated. 
 
                                                     
360 According to Eurobarometer, only 28% of French interviewees read a newspaper every day, against 50% of 
British. Eurobarometer 51, Spring 1999, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb51/eb51_en.htm.  
361 The newspapers used are as follows (including available dates of data): France – Le Monde (From January 
1990), Agence France Presse (From May 1993, except October 1995 and August 1998), Les Echos (From 
January 1993), Figaro (From January 1997); UK – The Guardian (From January 1985), The Times (From 
July 1985), Daily Telegraph (From September 1988), The Independent (From January 1990). 
362 This is the case for the MPF, who are asked to comment on stories relating to the European Union and to 
corruption, partly because Philippe de Villiers is seen as being ‘media-friendly’ (Interview de la Perriere).  
The RPF, by contrast, complains that the media only seeks its opinion on European affairs, because that was 
its founding characteristic, despite the breadth of policy positions it now holds (Interview Cesari). 
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Figures 27 and 28 show the monthly references per newspaper in each country for groups 
with a primary focus on opposition to the European Union, plus the three French parties 
looked at in this half of the chapter: Annex 5 provides annualised totals for each group.  
Other groups have been excluded on the grounds that it would be too complicated to isolate 
those references that relate to the groups’ EU opposition and that the sheer volume would 
drown out the other groups: consider that under this methodology, the Conservative Party 
would score 100 (i.e. three or four references per day per newspaper) on a very regular basis. 
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The first observation to be made is that, generally speaking, in neither country do anti-EU 
groups have a particularly high profile: at the end of the study period, British groups were 
averaging about three mentions per week per newspaper between 23 groups, while in France 
there were only four months when primary-focus anti-EU groups had more than five 
mentions per month per newspaper.  At the same time, coverage is also very uneven: peaks 
usually only last one month and even at the end of the period there are months with little or 
no coverage.  Despite the caveats above about the French press, there were more references 
to anti-EU groups in France between 1992 and 1995 and after 1998. 
 
At the same time, it must be recognised that newspaper coverage of anti-EU groups has 
generally increased over time.  Taking annualised totals for the two countries it can be seen 
that there is a clear evolution in Figure 29 and Annex 5.  Even when looking at falls in 
coverage year-on-year, the coverage during troughs increases over time, with the exception 
of UK groups in 1992 and French primary-focus groups in 1995. 
 
 
 
While it would be tempting to claim at this point that the media was increasingly covering 
anti-EU groups, this would be to ignore a more accurate description.  Firstly, the unevenness 
of coverage suggests that it is almost completely event-driven, rather than systematic: rather 
than occupying a fixed position within the national polity, anti-EU groups only have a 
profile at certain points.  This is mostly seen when looking at the peaks in coverage.  In the 
UK, the 1991 peak is composed of articles covering the Bruges Group’s criticism of the 
government’s European policy, the bulge in 1996-7 is almost completely made up of 
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references to the Referendum Party, while the 1999 peak is related to the UKIP’s electoral 
success at the European elections.  Likewise in France, the 1992 peak is linked with Demain 
la France and Combat pour les Valeurs’ work in the Maastricht referendum, the 1994 and 
1999 high spots with the European elections, the 1995 peak with Philippe de Villiers’ 
presidential candidature, the 1997 with the MDC’s participation in the government coalition, 
and the 1998 with protests against the EMU convergence criteria.  In short, in all cases, 
coverage is linked to specific events that do not provide for a constant interest by the media.  
Moreover, the majority of these events are not created by the anti-EU groups, in the sense 
that they are events which would happen regardless of what they decided to do: the biggest 
peaks are the result of one or more groups standing for election.  Only exceptionally do 
groups’ own positions come to the forefront (as with the Bruges Group in 1991 and the 
protests in France in 1998). 
 
 
 
A second point to note, and one that was implicit in the previous paragraph, is that coverage 
is not evenly split between groups.  Instead there are a few groups that gain the majority of 
the coverage, with the rest getting occasional mentions now and again.  This is clearest in 
France, where the three anti-EU parties have substantially more coverage than any of the 
primary-focus groups.  It is even possible to go beyond this and note that it has been the 
MDC that has had notably more coverage than either the MPF or the RPF, largely due to 
inclusion in the governing coalition since 1997 and its continued close links with the Parti 
Socialiste.  In the UK, the Referendum Party (between 1996 and 1997), UKIP (especially 
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after the 1999 elections), the Bruges Group (in the pre-1992 period) and Business for 
Sterling (after 1998) accounted for the vast majority of references.363 
 
Moreover, there is a question mark over the relationship between group size and newspaper 
coverage.  In Figure 30, references per year per newspaper are plotted against the 
membership data from Annex 2, to give a basic indication of the relationship between the 
two.  Despite the crudeness of the membership data, it is apparent that larger groups do tend 
to receive more coverage than small groups.364  However, the coverage of very large groups 
is highly variable: while the Referendum Party attracted a very high level of coverage, its 
successor, the Democracy Movement, has not, and the RPF falls somewhere in between.  
Furthermore, many middle-sized groups have not received any substantial coverage: none of 
the groups that pre-date the study period score any higher than 3.25 references per year.365  
The only significant outlier to get proportionately more coverage than its size would suppose 
was the Bruges Group in 1991. 
 
The third and final comment concerns the particular situation in France.  While French 
primary-focus groups have maintained some minimal presence in newspaper coverage after 
their initial peaks in 1992 and 1994, it is as nothing compared to the three parties.  The 
existence of established parties on both left and right with clear anti-EU policies gives the 
press an obvious point of contact when debating European issues.  As mentioned before, 
both the RPF and MPF are regularly approached by the media to give comments on such 
stories.366  This marginalises primary-focus groups, none of which have a comparable 
organisational structure or membership, so creating a vicious circle where the lack of media 
presence hinders attempts to increase size, which in turn discourages media attention. 
 
Having now looked at individual groups, the focus now moves to more general indicators of 
anti-EU discourse.  In order to do this, two terms that are closely linked to that discourse 
have been chosen and the number of references over time plotted in Figures 31 and 32.  The 
terms chosen are “eurosceptic/ism” in British newspapers and “souverainiste/souverainisme” 
in the French ones.  Both terms have sprung out of the public debate on European integration 
and so can be taken as markers of media interest in the subject.  However, while French 
                                                     
363 From a total of 856 references per newspaper over the whole period, the Referendum Party provided 42.84%, 
UKIP 15.39%, the Bruges Group 18.55% and Business for Sterling 7.51%, making 84.29% of the total.  
The next most referenced group was New Europe, with 2.07%.  See Annex 5. 
364 The correlation is significant to 99% at 0.391. 
365 I.e. the Anti-Common Market League, Conservatives Against a Federal Europe, Campaign for an Independent 
Britain (which has no references at all during the study period) and the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign. 
366 Business for Sterling and its umbrella organisation, No, have found themselves in a similar position in the UK 
since 2000 on the matter of membership of EMU. 
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groups are happy to take on the title of being “souverainiste”, British groups have, in recent 
years, tended to reject the “eurosceptic” mantle, often preferring to be thought of as 
“eurorealists” instead.367  Despite this, the media has been slow to adapt to this, preferring to 
use the more widely understood term, even if anti-EU groups do not feel it is entirely 
accurate.  It is also to be noted that “souverainiste” has its modern roots in the Quebecois 
secessionist movement, and that it only latterly became used in France to denote the anti-EU 
movement: only the second usage is shown below in Figure 31. 
 
 
 
                                                     
367 The European Foundation describes itself as “the leading Eurorealist think tank” (http://www.e-f.org.uk/).  
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As can be seen once more, British newspapers have a larger number of references per 
newspaper than the French ones, and they started at an earlier date.  In both countries 
references are highly variable between months, reflecting a lack of a systematic debate, 
although in the latter years of the period there is the development of an increasing baseline 
of references, particularly in the UK.  Monthly spikes can be identified with particular 
events, such as the 1997 British general election and the 1999 European elections, a point 
demonstrated in Figure 33, which shows the relationship between group references and 
discourse references. 
 
 
 
While French primary-focus groups have too small a media profile to make meaningful 
comments, both British primary-focus groups and French anti-EU parties show an overall 
positive correlation.368  This not only shows the periodicity of coverage, but also that trends 
in group coverage have been mirrored in more general coverage. 
 
In summary, it can be said that there has been a general increase in newspaper coverage of 
anti-EU groups and of anti-EU discourse more generally.  However, this increase has been 
uncertain and largely dependent on groups’ involvement in bigger events, notably elections: 
likewise, general coverage has been focused around particular events.  It is only rarely that 
groups have been able to push their own agendas.  While larger groups have more coverage 
                                                     
368 For British primary-focus groups and French anti-EU parties, there is a significance to 99% (0.464 and 0.601 
respectively). 
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than smaller ones, size is not a guarantee of a certain amount of coverage: smaller groups 
often receive no coverage at all, while very large groups have highly variable levels of 
coverage.  As a result, substantial coverage is the exception, rather than the norm. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to describe and analyse the ways in which anti-EU groups 
have pursued their objectives of influencing public policy within their national systems, and 
how that has resulted in an increasing volume and profile of protest over time. 
 
With regard to group strategies, the most pertinent criterion for ascertaining what particular 
choices a group will make is that of group form, more particularly the ‘party-ness’ of the 
group.  Both parties and intra-party groups have chosen highly similar strategies for their 
work, and this has been the result of the structural limits placed upon them by institutions.  
In the case of parties, the pursuit of elected office within a formal institutional space forms 
the overriding concern of the group’s work, since changing public policy is predicated on 
control of decision-making institutions.  Likewise, intra-party groups direct their efforts 
solely towards gaining control and influence within a party, so they can then use the party to 
effect changes in public policy through its elected representatives.  In both cases, these 
groups are working through formal channels to achieve results. 
 
In stark contrast, non-party groups have developed a heterogeneous set of strategies, 
designed to apply pressure, and hence gain influence, at various points around formal 
institutional spaces.  These strategies can be characterised by their level of directness vis-à-
vis formal institutions.  At the most direct end of the scale, there are groups which lobby 
politicians and other actors, while more indirectly, other groups aim to use the media to 
generate interest on the part of politicians and the general public in their positions.  Such a 
diversity of strategies is possible precisely because non-party groups have rejected the option 
of working inside the formal institutional system, which leaves them free to pursue whatever 
alternative strategy they feel works most usefully.  Moreover, the resultant diversity 
increases the potential for a greater impact of the groups taken as a whole.  This is more 
clearly seen in the UK, where non-party groups have reached a more mature stage in their 
development than in France, largely as a consequence of the opportunities presented by the 
differing institutional structures in each country. 
 
This analysis of group strategies is of importance in supporting the hypotheses concerning 
the role of institutional structures in the evolution of anti-EU groups.  From the analysis it is 
clear that institutional structures not only shape the pattern of the initial development of 
groups, but that they also continue to shape those groups’ choices with respect to their 
strategies. 
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A second outcome of looking at group strategies is the need to have some gauge of the 
changing volume and profile of anti-EU groups in both countries.  For parties, this means a 
measurement of electoral support, in addition to considering group membership and media 
coverage for all types of group.  Measuring changing volumes and profile is not only 
important in itself, since it completes the analysis of anti-EU group behaviour, but also in 
providing a starting point for a discussion of such groups’ impact, a subject that will be 
discussed in the conclusions. 
 
There has been a substantial growth of memberships of anti-EU groups in both France and 
the UK over the study period.  Within this, various elements have to be isolated.  Firstly, the 
growth has resulted from the creation of new groups, rather than the enlargement of old 
ones: in general, groups can expect to grow in size for only a couple of years before 
plateauing.  The reason for this is linked to the continuing proliferation of new groups: over 
time, the choices available to an individual become much greater, and so it is less likely that 
they will pick any one group.  Compounding this is the effect of high-profile groups drawing 
in members.  The RPF in France and the Referendum Party in the UK increased global 
membership levels by 80,000 and 180,000 individuals respectively during their brief 
existences, but this did not translate into gains for other groups, even after the Referendum 
Party’s collapse (the members effectively being ring-fenced by the Democracy Movement). 
 
While membership has grown, electoral success for anti-EU parties has been much more 
uneven.  It has only been in European elections that anti-EU groups have gained and 
enlarged their share of the vote over time: national elections have been much more uneven, a 
point underlined by performances in elections in 2001 and 2002, after the study period.  This 
has resulted in representation in the European Parliament, but only limited seats nationally.  
There does seem to be some potential for the development of a Danish-style dual electoral 
constellation between European and national elections, particularly in France, although this 
currently appears to be unlikely, given the events of the 2002 elections.  More incidentally, 
electoral patterns also support one of the sub-hypotheses of the chapter on institutional 
spaces, namely that anti-EU groups focus on European and national elections, rather than on 
sub-national ones. 
 
On the final element of group profile, media coverage, another complicated picture emerges.  
While there is a general increase in coverage over time in both countries, it remains very 
uneven.  Coverage is driven by events, and so is essentially sporadic, rather than systemic 
(i.e. the groups are not an integral part of the polity).  Moreover, coverage is very uneven 
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between groups, with one or two groups dominating coverage at any one time.  While this is 
advantageous to the group in question, it tends to starve other groups of media attention.  It 
has to be noted that there is only a weak link between group size and media coverage: while 
only large groups get very substantial coverage, not all large groups do.  If group coverage 
has been uneven, then the use of anti-EU discourse by the media has grown more 
consistently.  Both French and British newspapers have steadily increased their use of anti-
EU terms over the study period.  Despite this, the development still remains sporadic, rather 
than systemic, and show a general correlation to group coverage. 
 
Bringing the two halves of the chapter together, it can be seen that in the pursuit of their 
chosen strategies, anti-EU groups in both countries have had some success in increasing 
their volume and presence in their respective national systems.  At the same time, that 
success has been qualified by a failure to secure gains in one arena (such as the European 
Parliament) and then transform it into gains in other arenas (such as national parliaments).  
In such a situation, where the success of party-based strategies appears to have reached 
certain limits, the importance of non-party-based strategies increases.  Seen in this way, it 
once again underlines the point made at the start of this thesis, namely that it is only through 
the consideration of all types of groups opposed to European integration that it is possible to 
fully understand the processes at work. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis has been to understand how and why opposition to the European 
Union has developed in France and the UK.  To that end, it has built up a basic taxonomy of 
anti-EU groups, identified ideological and proximate factors in their formation, isolated the 
different strategies they have used to pursue their different goals, and provided some 
measure of their changing volume and profile over time.  All of this has been done in the 
framework of a theoretical approach that gives a key place to institutional structures in each 
country, both as an enabling and a constrictive agent. 
 
In these conclusions, the three main hypotheses laid out in the introduction will be re-
examined in the light of the evidence presented in the thesis.  By so doing, both the strengths 
and the weaknesses of the hypotheses will be highlighted, and their relationship with the 
wider literature in the field will be considered.  Such an evaluation completes a circle that 
started in the introduction: the perceived need to cover an important gap in current research 
was a driving force behind this piece of work, yet its full value can only be realised by its re-
integration into the existing corpus of knowledge.  The corpus has three clear elements that 
have to be dealt with: namely, the study of opposition to the EU, the study of the EU in 
general and the study of opposition in general.  Just as these were the three main sources that 
justified the necessity of this work, so they are the three main areas that this work impacts 
upon. 
 
The conclusions fall into two main sections.  In the first, the validity of the hypotheses in the 
face of the empirical evidence will be examined.  Each of the three hypotheses is clearly 
supported by that evidence, with only a small number of outstanding issues that are not fully 
addressed or resolved.  None of these issues serve to discredit the hypotheses, and a clear 
model for describing the formation and development of anti-EU opposition within a national 
system is laid out.  In the second section, the implications of the thesis’ findings on the three 
areas mentioned above will be discussed.  Despite the somewhat limited utility of the model 
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outside of the specific area of anti-EU opposition, the research does produce some useful 
insights into the development of the EU, both past and present, and the study of opposition.  
However, the thesis adds to the study of opposition to the EU in several ways, each of which 
address major shortcomings in current research. 
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VALIDATING THE HYPOTHESES 
 
In the introduction, three main hypotheses were laid out.  These were as follows: 
 
1. Political events at the European level drive the formation and development 
of groups opposed to the EU within a country, but these events have 
unique interactions with individual countries’ political and social 
structures, producing country-specific effects. 
 
2. This pattern of group formation and development is profoundly affected 
by the country’s institutional structure. 
 
3. Over time these groups will increase in volume and profile, as their scope 
for action and their depth of penetration into formal institutional spaces 
increase. 
 
In a field that is currently under-researched, showing that these hypotheses are correct would 
represent a clear advance.  They deal with the fundamentals of opposition to the European 
Union, i.e. the source, pattern and path of organised opposition groups.  Moreover, these 
three elements are all essential in any discussion of the influence of such opposition, at either 
the national or European levels, a discussion that follows later.  However, all of this is 
dependent upon the validity of the hypotheses being proven. 
 
Rather than simply repeat the summaries at the end of each chapter, it is more productive to 
look at all the supporting evidence together, followed by a discussion of any outstanding 
issues.  This is not only clearer for the reader, but also allows for a consideration of the inter-
linkages between the three hypotheses that are evident from a reading of the evidence.   
 
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE HYPOTHESES 
The empirical evidence in support of the hypotheses is broad and generally unambiguous.  
This can be seen in each of the three elements of source, form and path, each of which is a 
manifestation of the hypotheses laid out respectively above. 
 
In terms of source, Chapter Three provided a clear link between events at the European level 
and the formation of groups at the national level.  This was particularly true in the matter of 
proximate events: in every single case, with one partial exception, it was possible to identify 
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a European-level event as a specific cause of either a group’s formation or its conversion to 
an anti-EU position.369  In the latter case, i.e. conversions, the European event was almost 
always a major, constitutional-type event, such as a treaty.  By contrast, groups formed ex 
nihilo exhibit a more diverse set of proximate sources, although European constitutional 
events still play an important part in both countries.  This is partly accounted for by the 
formation of sectoral opposition groups, which oppose specific elements of the EU’s 
policies, which are unlikely to arise from an event such a treaty.370  In any case, the special 
nature of ex nihilo groups is underlined by the fact that groups that convert to an anti-EU 
position are very unlikely to become primary-focus groups: it is only when individuals are 
mobilised directly by European events that such groups come into being. 
 
As was suggested in Chapter Three, on group formation, the reasons for mobilisation by 
these events could be related to individuals’ political economy, or to the impact on their 
lives, or to the inadequacies of existing opposition groups.  In the light of the evidence, it is 
possible to extend this further.  Use can be made of sectoral opposition groups, since they 
present the most explicit features of linkage.  When studying these groups, it is apparent that 
there is a focus around two specific clusters of sectors.  Firstly, there are policies that have a 
clear economic impact on individuals, such as the Common Fisheries Policy.  Secondly, 
there are policies that have symbolic importance, such as the use of metric measures in the 
UK.  EMU falls somewhere in-between these two, given both its obvious economic impact 
and its psychological dimension.371  This division between economic and symbolic matches 
the variety of explanations put forward for public opinion: as Gabel has shown, utilitarian 
models offer a robust explanation of the latter.372  Over and above this, it should also be 
noted that all of those groups represent examples of the EU presenting a credible and 
consequential policy: there are no groups opposed to a Union foreign policy, and are 
unlikely to be until such a policy develops further. 
                                                     
369 The partial exception is the Conservative Party, and results from the very long-standing unease within the 
party as to its policy position on European integration. 
370 Such groups were only found in the UK, although there is no reason to suppose that this is a country-specific 
phenomenon.  Also note while treaties do lay out guidelines on policy areas, there is usually a long time 
delay before specific legislation passes through the system, by which time it has evolved from its starting 
point: as such, this is more in line with the approach taken by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (W. Sandholtz & 
A. Stone Sweet (eds.), 1998, European integration and supranational governance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press), rather than Moravcsik’s (Moravcsik, 1999), namely that intra-treaty developments are at 
least as consequential as the particular provisions of a treaty. 
371 In a large scale psychological survey of the Euro’s impact across the EU, it was suggested that societies 
defined by cultural achievement were more positive than those defined by economic success: Gesellschaft 
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologische Forschung e.V.,1997, The Psychology of the European 
Monetary Union, Cologne, University of Cologne, at http://ww.wiso.uni-
koeln.de/wisopsy/forschung/euro/english/english.htm. 
372 Gabel, 1998.  Imig makes a similar link between personal welfare and public protest: D. Imig, 2002, 
‘Contestation in the streets: European protest and the emerging Euro-polity’, in Comparative Political 
Studies, vol.35-8, pp.914-933. 
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One additional explanation that might play a role here is the effect of socio-historical factors.  
As was suggested in the Introduction, such factors can offer some useful insights when 
placed within a more structured approach, such as the institutionalist one taken here.  In this 
particular context, the perceived infringement on national traditions might partly explain 
mobilisation.  In France, the right of EU citizens to vote in local and European elections has 
been one focus of attention, to a degree because of the French conception of a unitary state 
with an associated united citizenry.  Likewise in the UK, the challenge to parliamentary 
sovereignty carries particular resonance, as does the affective attachment to Sterling (a point 
that is echoed in the other member state with a strong link to its currency, Germany).  Such 
elements can be taken as additional explanations of the link between events and 
mobilisation, since they fall outside of the institutionalist approach, although they do not run 
counter to it. 
 
In addition to the clear link between proximate European events and group formation, there 
is also a more abstract link between the two, in the form of ideological factors.  Where 
groups exhibit clear ideologies (on both the left and the right), they also have much clearer 
and cohesive critiques of European integration, which in turn provide a basis for 
mobilisation.  On the right, concerns centre around the question of national sovereignty and 
identity, while the left is worried about the effect on the welfare state and the erosion of 
social values.  However, despite the clear differences in critique, the actual objects of such 
groups’ opposition are often the same, i.e. large-scale projects such as EMU or the 
Maastricht treaty.  As far as group formation is concerned, this has meant the larger the 
project is, the more likely it is that both left- and right-wing groups will be mobilised. 
 
While it is apparent that European events are the driving force behind group formation, it is 
also clear that there are substantial differences between the UK and France, in terms of the 
timing of opposition formation.  Despite both countries only seeing the development of mass 
movements in the couple of years leading up to 1999, the UK developed large numbers of 
groups relatively early, while France did not.  These differences could simply be attributed 
to country-specific political and social features.  At the outset of this thesis, a socio-historical 
approach was rejected, for a variety of reasons, and it is not the intention here to return to it, 
especially since it is possible to attribute much of the remaining difference to factors relating 
to institutional structures, as will be discussed below.  An institutionalist approach produces 
a useable, comparable and falsifiable explanation for the majority of inter-country 
differences. 
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The model of institutional spaces, laid out in Chapter One, provides a means of measuring 
the pertinent dimensions of formal institutional spaces within a national system, both 
internally and externally.  Internally, the two key factors are ease of access to an institution 
and its carrying capacity.  In both France and the UK it was evident that those institutions 
with easy access (usually by means of a Proportional Representation (PR) system) and a 
large carrying capacity (usually through their multi-member form) were more likely to be 
the location of anti-EU groups and individuals.  Externally, a smaller overall formal 
institutional space was seen to result in the development of more informal opposition, i.e. 
outside of these institutions.  Additionally, the sub-hypothesis concerning specifically anti-
EU opposition was also supported, with anti-EU groups demonstrating hardly any interest in 
sub-national institutions, and focusing instead on national and supra-national ones. 
 
With regard to the formation of groups, it is possible to attribute differences in timing to 
differences in institutional structure.  As noted in Chapter One, First Past the Post (FPP) 
systems require party cohesion in order to avoid coalition government, even though this 
requires individual members making some compromise on certain issues.  However, when a 
governing party only has a small majority, those individuals gain disproportionate power vis-
à-vis the party, which needs to preserve its parliamentary integrity.  The need to avoid a split 
and to retain some sense of unity thus often leads to the creation of extra-parliamentary 
opposition groups at such times, usually in the form of non-party groups.  PR systems (and 
PR-like systems, as in the French case) do not have the same pressures, given the greater 
number of parties and the consequent possibility of coalition governments.  This provides an 
additional explanation of the concentration of group formation between 1992 and 1997 in 
the UK, over and above that of European events. 
 
If a country’s institutional space is important in group formation processes, then it is 
essential to the understanding of the form of those groups.  It is directly evident in several 
ways: a group’s specific form, its focus, its type of opposition and its strategies.  More 
indirectly, there is also an impact on group ideology.  In Chapter Three, when building the 
taxonomy of groups, it was evident that there were distinct categories of groups.  Moreover, 
these categories resulted primarily from the groups’ positions within national institutional 
structures: that these categories were not arbitrary was evident in the coherent and consistent 
characteristics that were displayed by groups within them. 
 
The institutional space within a national system provides the basic structure for anti-EU 
groups.  The basic cleavage between formal and informal spaces that was outlined in 
Chapter One mirrors the divide between parties and non-party groups (intra-party groups 
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essentially falling in the formal category, by dint of their fundamental relationship with their 
parent parties).  This split between parties and non-parties is not only the most visible means 
of differentiating between the various elements that make up the anti-EU movements in both 
countries, it is also the most fundamental.  On the basis of group form, it is possible to make 
assertions on various other characteristics of a particular group. 
 
This link is most obvious in the matter of group strategies: indeed, the complete match 
between form and strategy can be taken as an additional means of verifying the sources used 
to categorise form in the first place.  Parties, and only parties, engage in the seeking of 
elected office, directing all their activities to that goal of gaining representation within 
formal institutions.  Likewise, intra-party groups direct their efforts to gaining control of 
parties in a direct way that non-party groups do not aspire to: the latter aim to change party 
positions by influencing individuals, not gaining control of the party’s apparatus.  In the 
cases of both parties and intra-party groups, the locus of action is clearly within the national 
formal institutional space.  Non-party groups shun fighting elections, preferring instead to 
lobby elected officials, the media and the general public by a variety of means in order to 
promote their policy positions. 
 
Likewise, there is a high level of consistency between group form and group focus.  Parties 
in both countries almost all have a secondary focus on opposition to the EU: the exceptions 
have mainly been short-lived affairs.373  Non-party groups are much more likely to be 
primary-focus groups, for the simple reason that their choice of arena, outside formal 
institutions, permits the formation of a group that can have aims that are relatively limited.  
Parties, on the other hand, are usually required to develop broader programmes and consider 
other issues because they are seeking office and because European integration, as was seen 
in Chapter Two, does not rank particularly high as an issue in the public arena. 
 
Group form can also be linked to the type of opposition that the group presents.  Parties 
almost wholly express policy positions that place them on the side of intra-system 
opposition: i.e. they wish to work within the existing system to change it, rather than 
wanting to withdraw completely.374  By contrast, non-party groups are much more likely to 
express either withdrawist positions or more limited sectoral opposition.  This difference is 
once again a reflection of the position of parties within formal institutions.  Through their 
                                                     
373 Of those parties with a primary focus on EU opposition (the Anti-Federalist League, L’Autre Europe, the later 
Demain la France, Mouvement pour la France, the Referendum Party and UKIP), only the MPF and UKIP 
have contested more than one election. 
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implicit acceptance of the existing political system (implicit through the fact of their efforts 
to participate in it), parties become bound up in it and so tend to seek reform rather than 
revolution, if only out of a concern for loosing their position in that system.  This is most 
patently demonstrated in the exceptional policy of the Anti-Federalist League not to accept 
any seats in the European Parliament should it have won any: the aim was not to enter the 
institution, but to bring it down through a crisis of legitimacy.  Non-party groups do not seek 
formal representation, and so they are not constrained in the same way to preserve the 
system: hence the expression of withdrawist positions.  At the same time, non-party groups 
are free to seek only limited sectoral reforms: parties are under pressure to produce more 
generalised policy positions in order to garner more votes, especially when European 
integration is not a particularly important issue to most of the electorate. 
 
More indirectly, it is possible to attribute differences in group ideology to group form, at 
least in the sense of whether a group has a clear ideology or not.  As has been noted above, 
parties are usually secondary-focus groups with respect to EU opposition and this, combined 
with the need to fight and win elections (which creates a pressure towards a broader 
programme of policy positions), creates a situation where a political ideology is more likely 
both to exist and to be required.  Secondary-focus groups have, by definition, other interests 
that either generate ideological positions by themselves or require an ideology to bind them 
together.  Likewise, a broad programme of policy positions requires an overarching 
philosophy.  The net result is that parties tend to have ideologies, whereas non-party groups 
do not.  The latter often have no ideology beyond the idea that something is wrong with the 
current state of the European Union. 
 
Putting these elements back together, it is readily apparent that a group’s location within the 
national institutional space has a clear and direct impact upon its specific form and its 
strategy.  In turn, this produces knock-on effects of varying strength on other, secondary 
characteristics of the group. 
 
With regards to the path of opposition groups, two basic elements emerge from the research, 
one concerned with groups’ development to date, the other with future trends.  The former 
element was primarily dealt with in Chapter Four, while the latter springs from the findings 
associated with the previous hypotheses. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
374 The exceptions are the small far-right parties (the BNP, National Democrats and National Front) and the Anti-
Federalist League/UKIP. 
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Over the study period there was a clear growth of anti-EU movements in both countries from 
an almost non-existent baseline, in terms of members, electoral success and media coverage.  
Before 1992, there were at most 10,000 people in the UK who belonged to anti-EU groups, 
and none in France.  By 1999, there were between a quarter and a third of a million such 
people, split roughly 2:1 between the UK and France.  Even with the subsequent splitting of 
the Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF) in 2001, the number of people mobilised into 
joining anti-EU groups still represents a substantial advance. 
 
In the same way, anti-EU parties in both countries had been able to corner sizeable amounts 
of votes in European elections, to the extent of gaining access to the European Parliament: 
the size of the step-change between 1989 and 1994 in France is particularly notable.  French 
parties were also able to gain more limited access to the Assemblée Nationale and, in the 
case of the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), even able to form part of a governing coalition 
between 1997 and 2002.  If explicitly primary-focus parties have been less successful in the 
UK, then that should be placed in context by the increasingly sceptical line taken by the 
Conservative Party after their 1997 electoral defeat: none of the French anti-EU parties had a 
policy position comparable to the Conservatives’ outright opposition to membership of 
Stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the 1997-2002 parliament. 
 
Even if media coverage has exhibited less in the way of entry by anti-EU groups into the 
national polity, then this must be balanced by the still substantial progress that these groups 
have made in gaining a media profile.  In both countries, groups have not only gained a 
media profile for themselves, but have also contributed to the growth of anti-EU discourse 
more generally: in the case of the UK, where anti-EU discourse has had a much longer 
development, there is a parallel increase in popular interest in the EU as an important 
issue.375  Each year has seen the further development of a solid base of media coverage that 
lies under the peaks and troughs of the majority of the event-driven coverage that occurs.  
Even the concentration on one or two groups at a time has proved to be a fillip, at least for 
those groups, who enjoy a brief period, or periods, of substantial media interest. 
 
Obviously, the existence of past trends cannot be unquestioningly extended into the future 
and it is reasonable to suppose that the study period forms a first part in a much longer life 
cycle of opposition to the EU.  However, the findings from the other parts of the research do 
point towards further growth in the anti-EU movement.  As has been shown above, it is the 
on-going development of the European Union that is key to group mobilisation and 
                                                     
375 See Figure 12 in Chapter Two and Figure 32 in Chapter Four. 
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formation and it is clearly evident that this development still has a substantial distance left to 
run.  In particular, the impending enlargement to 12 new member states in central and 
eastern Europe has already necessitated reforms to the EU’s structure and policies, a process 
that the current Convention on the Future of the EU will bring to a head when it presents its 
recommendations to an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2004.376 
 
In the event that the Convention and IGC result in more than a simple scaling-up of current 
institutions and structures and produce a qualitatively different EU system, then it is very 
likely that the resultant upsetting of the status quo will generate further mobilisation of 
individuals against that system.377  The reasoning behind this is grounded in the experience 
of previous constitutional European events, which have generated opposition mobilisation.  
In the specific cases of the UK and France, this might revolve around a fall in representation 
in Union institutions, the complete breaking of parity with Germany in those same 
institutions (a particular concern of France, as was seen at Nice), or reform of policy areas 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy (of which France is a major beneficiary) and 
regional spending (from which the UK does relatively well).378 
 
Even if these changes in themselves do not bring more opposition into being, then the simple 
fact of enlargement may well.  In the latest Eurobarometer, conducted in the spring of 2002, 
France is the only member state to have a relative majority of its population opposed to 
enlargement, while the UK has the fourth-largest percentage opposed, just behind Germany 
and Austria.379  In simple terms, neither country has embraced enlargement, even though 
there has long been a British view that an enlarged Union is a less federal one.  Whatever the 
changes to the Union, individual member states necessarily become less powerful, simply 
because there are more of them.  This has an institutional consequence of relatively less 
representation.  More importantly, it also has more diffuse effects of making it harder to 
export policy preferences to the European level and, conversely, of making it more likely 
that policy preferences from outside will be imported into any given country.  This has been 
true of all previous enlargements, but the sheer volume and heterogeneity of the current 
process are certain to heighten these problems. 
 
                                                     
376 See the Commission’s Futurum website for full details of the Convention, as well as numerous submissions: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm. 
377 The draft text produced by the Presidium of the Convention in November 2002 offers several important 
evolutions, including a unified structure under a constitutional text and a delimitation of competences.  Text 
available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm. 
378 Recent developments notwithstanding: Guardian 14/10/2002, ‘UK retreats on farm pledge’. 
379 France: 40% in favour, 47% against. UK: 38% for, 35% against.  In comparison, figures for the EU15 were 
50% for, 30% against: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb57/eb57_en.htm 
 210 
 Conclusions 
 
The result of this double challenge to the existing Union is thus likely to be further 
stimulation of anti-EU elements within France and the UK.  Given the current level of these 
elements’ success in European Parliament elections in both countries, the next set in 2004 
will provide a useful indicator of how far that stimulation has gone towards more active 
mobilisation. 
 
OUTSTANDING ISSUES 
So far, a very uncritical picture of the findings would appear to have been presented.  This is 
due to the very strong evidence that has been found to support the hypotheses.  However, it 
should not be taken to mean that there are no outstanding issues, as shall be seen presently.  
However, none of these issues pose any substantial challenge to the hypotheses. 
 
The most glaring issue relates to the question of the volume of opposition in a country, 
relative to other countries.  While it has been shown that volume has increased, and is likely 
to increase further still, no attempt has been made to explain why the UK has much more 
opposition than France: certainly, this was not a prime concern of the key hypotheses.  We 
have already noted in these conclusions that membership of anti-EU groups in the UK is 
double that in France in absolute terms and of the groups studied, the ratio was 2:1 British to 
French.  Media profiles of both groups and anti-EU discourse were similarly higher in the 
UK throughout the study period.  Indeed, it is only in European elections that French anti-
EU parties gained higher results than their British equivalents.  How can this be best 
understood? 
 
One point with which to begin would be public opinion, since the public are the ultimate 
source of all political activity in a democracy.  As was noted in Chapter Two, British levels 
of support have been consistently lower – and levels of opposition consistently higher – than 
in France.380  Consequently, it can be supposed that there is a greater reservoir of opposition 
available in the UK, both to provide individuals to form groups and to support those groups 
by various means.  This might include voting for anti-EU parties in elections, participating 
in groups’ activities or generating anti-EU discourse.  Taking levels of public support would 
have the methodological advantage of easy comparability and verifiability, as well as a 
strong potential predictive capacity.  However, providing sufficient data to validate this 
approach would require a systematic analysis of many more than the two countries 
considered in this study, both inside and outside the European Union: an analysis that is 
                                                     
380 From the early 1990s onwards this difference are relatively consistent on both measures of support and 
opposition at about 10%.  Prior to that, the UK was much more opposed. 
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clearly not possible within this thesis, and which so must be marked out as a point for further 
research. 
 
Another alternative would be to use socio-historical explanations.  For example, while both 
countries have been characterised as having ‘awkward’ relationships with the European 
Union, it is also apparent that French politicians have adopted a much more positive 
approach to the integration process than their British counterparts: if integration has been a 
policy of last resort for the latter, then for the former it has been a means to the end of 
securing France’s role in the international system.  The resultant hegemony of pro-European 
rhetoric, made easier by the relative goodness-of-fit with other member states’ preferences, 
could be argued to have engendered a more positive outlook on the EU in France than in the 
UK.381  By contrast, the endless debate in British political (and other) circles about the 
country’s role in, and relationship to, ‘Europe’ has created a more critical attitude on the 
public’s part.  Clearly, such an explanation lacks the quality of being quantifiable, but it does 
still suggest that there is something within it that could address the issue of differing national 
volumes of opposition. 
 
The anomaly of higher percentages for anti-EU parties in French elections – when France 
comes behind the UK on every other measure of opposition – can be easily fitted into the 
institutionalist approach.  Institutions are hypothesised to have a strong impact on group 
formation and development, so it is a very small step to extend that impact to people in 
general, in this case voters.  If voters perceive that formal institutions are relatively hard to 
access (as in the case of FPP to the House of Commons and the pre-1999 European 
Parliament), then there is an incentive to vote conservatively, i.e. for a party that has a 
credible chance of winning a seat.  The persistence of higher French votes in the 1999 
European elections, when both countries operated PR systems, can be ascribed to the very 
critical line taken by the Conservative Party, which took votes away from the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP). 
 
The second issue that stands out is the question of whether explicit consideration of 
institutional space factors is present in anti-EU groups or not.  In other words, is there any 
evidence that institutional space is openly and consciously discussed and debated by 
individuals when either forming anti-EU groups or developing their strategies?  Essentially, 
there is no such direct evidence, not least for the reason that this theoretical approach 
                                                     
381 Even if there has been a mixed response in French to the pressures of europeanisation: H. Drake & S. Milner, 
1999, ‘Change and resistance to change: The political management of europeanisation in France’, in 
Modern & Contemporary France, Vol.7-2, pp.165-178 
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currently only exists within this thesis.  However, it is apparent that there is an implicit 
awareness of the limitations and facilitations of the national institutional space in 
individuals’ and groups’ decision-making processes.  Working in a national institutional 
space shapes the mindsets of actors, both subconsciously and consciously.  At the 
subconscious level, exposure to a national system provides a reference point, inasmuch as 
actors see what other actors are doing and have done within that environment: this in turn 
suggests what options are available.  More consciously, actors make assessments about 
where opportunities for action exist and what are the best ways to achieve their objectives: 
assessments that lead either to them joining an existing group or to them forming a new one.  
In the cases of the Mouvement Pour la France (MPF) and RPF in France, the judgement was 
that viable parties could be built around the political personalities of de Villiers and Pasqua 
respectively: in the UK, Alan Sked saw an opening for an anti-EU party in the early 1990s, 
even if he also recognised that electoral success might be hard to achieve.382 
 
This thesis has not tried to investigate these personal decision-making processes further, and 
has instead focused on the aggregate level of group formation and development.  As a result, 
while it has shown how institutional space has moulded the overall division between party 
and non-party, formal and informal opposition, it has not developed the tools to enable an 
observer to explain individual cases.  At best, it is possible to say that as new actors become 
mobilised, so they make an assessment of the situation as it stands – in terms of their goals 
and resources and of existing groups and their successes or failures – and work from there.  
Hence de Villiers’ success in creating an anti-EU party was part of the incentive to Pasqua to 
create one of his own, while the grassroots Democracy Movement was a very pointed shift 
away from party politics after the Referendum Party’s collapse.383  In the final analysis, this 
differentiation between the aggregate level and the individual level does not invalidate the 
findings in any way, but rather suggests that there is clear scope for more research in order to 
build a model of individual decision-making.  At the same time, on the basis of this research 
it would appear to be very difficult to extract specific and conscious elements in any such 
decision-making that were not highly coloured by subsequent experience, both positive and 
negative. 
 
A third point to be considered here deals with the future development of anti-EU 
opposition.  This has been addressed to a certain extent above when discussing future 
                                                     
382 Interviews De la Perriere, Cesari, Sked. 
383 Interview Cesari; The Democracy Movement website lists among the group’s aims, “To work with those who 
share our beliefs, of all parties and of none, whilst not endorsing political parties or individuals at elections” 
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changes in volume and profile, but the matter requires some broader comments to be made.  
Even if European events can be foreseen to generate further opposition in the next few years, 
it is impossible to make any predictions beyond that timeframe.  In part, that is due to the 
unclear future development of the European Union itself (a point that will be returned to 
later), but it is also likely that additional factors will start to play a role as opposition grows. 
 
Most importantly, it is very conceivable that at some future time a saturation point will be 
reached within a country.  This implies a level of opposition where it becomes either 
impossible or very difficult to get any more people to form or join anti-EU groups, vote for 
anti-EU parties or have any more media profile.  It is impossible to say when this point 
might be or estimate how it might change over time: consider the erratic movement of 
European integration as an issue shown in Chapter Two.  However, it is clear that when that 
point is reached, it will change the rules of the game for those involved.  As they enter a 
more mature phase of opposition, they will have to develop new strategies that are as much 
directed towards maintaining their support base (which will thereafter tend most readily 
downwards) as they are towards changing public policy.  This has potential implications on 
policy positions as well as (particularly) on group fragmentation: the factiousness of the anti-
EU movement on both sides of the Channel has never been a selling point and the need for a 
unified front will become more pressing.384 
 
This is linked to the question of how volume relates to influence, a question that will be 
looked at in the following section.  However, it will suffice to say that, to date, that 
relationship appears to be rather tenuous, but that does not preclude matters changing.  
Indeed, in a situation where volume and profile are constantly increasing, then influence 
would be expected to follow at some point. 
 
However, all of this merely serves to show the model’s lack of ability in predicting the long-
term development of opposition.  It does not undermine its power to describe and explain the 
past and present states of opposition.  That it has any predictive power at all is a positive 
feature, given the innate complexity of the European Union and the lack of any clear end-
point at this stage in its development.  What the model does offer in the long run is a set of 
testable hypotheses about how and where opposition will form.  This gives it long-term 
value as a heuristic for understanding the pattern of opposition to the EU. 
                                                                                                                                                      
and “To build a nation-wide grassroots network of supporters able to campaign in support of our 
principles”: http://www.democracy-movement.org.uk/main/aims.html 
384 It is worth noting here that the only anti-EU movement not to have suffered any major split, that of Norway, is 
also the only one that has successfully managed to keep its country out the EU. 
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These three issues of relative levels of opposition, explicit awareness of institutional space 
and long-term development are all elements to be taken into consideration when looking at 
opposition to the EU.  At the same time, this thesis chose not to focus on them directly, 
instead trying to understand the more fundamental questions of what this opposition looks 
like, where it comes from and how it has developed.  It is only after addressing these 
questions that it is possible to see the outlines of further work that goes towards dealing with 
the outstanding issues mentioned here. 
 
None of the issues goes against the research that has been undertaken, but rather shows 
where its limits lie.  For all of these limitations, it must not be forgotten that the institutional 
space model offers a much more rigorous approach to the question of opposition to the EU 
than previously existing models, something that will be discussed in the next section.  Even 
if it does not explain every facet, then it still explains the core issues and offers frameworks 
for further research into those remaining issues.  That has been underlined by the strength of 
evidence given to support the hypotheses: there are few exceptions and those that exist are 
more the result of the difficulty of isolating individual elements than they are of any 
fundamental inexplicability. 
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WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
 
The overall conclusion, with respect to the hypotheses, is that the evidence from the two 
case studies of France and the UK supports them.  But how does this relate to other work in 
the field, both specifically and more generally?  In this second section, the findings are put 
back into context, looking firstly at the study of opposition to the EU, then the EU more 
generally and finally the study of opposition in general.  As has been noted, these three fields 
formed the rationale for the research in the first place and it is to them that the resultant 
findings are most pertinent. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
As has been made clear from the outset, the study of opposition to the EU is still very much 
in its early phases, much like its subject.  No one model dominates the field and empirical 
work remains very much a priority.  Consequently, there is much potential for making a real 
contribution to this field. This is of particular importance in addressing a key complaint of 
Forster that current research has failed to focus sufficiently upon opposition itself, rather 
than simply as a part of a larger topic.385 
 
The first contribution clearly stems from the mere fact of a comprehensive overview of anti-
EU bodies in both countries.  Certainly, as far as the author is aware, this is the first such 
cataloguing piece in the academic literature.386  This has made subsequent work all the more 
easy: the approach that currently predominates, focusing solely on political parties, both 
does an injustice to those non-party groups and makes a complete assessment of opposition 
within a national system all the more difficult.387  Indeed, it has only been through this 
comprehensive approach that it has been possible to construct and verify the institutional 
space model used in this thesis. 
 
The value of simple cataloguing has been further enhanced by the production of the basic 
taxonomy and model used in Chapters Three and Four.  These provide not only a clear 
means of differentiating groups on a variety of dimensions, but also lend themselves to 
application in other case studies.  The criteria for classification are laid out and the 
categories are non-country specific, making them applicable to a large number of potential 
case studies.  This transferability is matched by the transferability of the hypotheses: the 
                                                     
385 Forster, 2002, p.5. 
386 In the UK, the efforts by the European Movement (European Movement, 2000) and the Bruges Group (Tame, 
1997) do not extend much beyond a simple listing of groups and members and no effort is given to any kind 
of analysis.  Both also suffer from partisan perspectives. 
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exclusion of socio-historical modes of explanation means that the framework used in this 
thesis can be applied to any member state of the Union, as well as to applicant states and 
non-members. 
 
This is possible for two main reasons.  Firstly, the model is based on features that are found 
in all democratic societies, namely formal political institutions and civil society.  Even in the 
newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe they are to be found, even if they are not 
fully mature.  Secondly, the model is focused at an aggregate level of analysis: it explains 
the patterns of opposition formation and development very well, rather than the individual 
cases of each group.  As was seen when looking at the outstanding issues surrounding the 
model, even if there is not a conscious and explicit consideration of a country’s institutional 
space, then groups still display aggregate patterns that closely mirror the opportunities and 
constraints of that space. 
 
Moreover, the model and hypotheses are quantifiable and falsifiable.  Collection and 
measurement of the data necessary to prove the hypotheses can be applied in comparable 
ways in different national systems.  Once collected and analysed, that data can also produce 
results that go against the hypotheses: groups can be driven by national events, rather than 
European ones, and the distribution of groups can go against the hypothesised opportunities 
available in the institutional space.  The value of these characteristics lies not only in the 
further strengthening of the transferability of the model, but also in the enhancement of the 
model’s value.  The escape from the methodological limits of the socio-historical approaches 
makes this institutionalist model all the more valuable. 
 
As an institutionalist model, this research also goes beyond other attempts to apply 
institutionalist theory to the study of opposition to the EU.  Most clearly, it builds upon the 
basis of Aspinwall’s ideas on the impact of the FPP system on opportunities for opposition 
in the House of Commons, by extending those ideas to other institutions and by introducing 
the concept of institutional space.388  The research also builds in elements of party political 
behaviour and the role of individuals in the development of opposition, all within the 
institutionalist framework.  As a result, it offers a much more comprehensive appraisal of the 
impact of institutions on both the formation and development of opposition to the EU. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
387 Taggart and Szczerbiak’s, 2001, key piece on opposition is a good example of this problem. 
388 Aspinwall, 2000. 
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The model also raises issues with other work on opposition to the EU.  In the best-known 
piece on the subject, Taggart describes it as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ on the part of 
peripheral parties, who use it as a means of developing a distinctive profile in order to gain 
access to government.389  In this, there is the implicit understanding that oppositional 
positions are adopted on the basis of developments on the national level (i.e. the state of the 
party system), rather than through any particular development at the European level.  This is 
obviously at odds with the findings of this thesis, which understands group formation 
primarily as a function of the evolution of the European Union.  At the same time, the 
existence of opportunistic individuals in both countries has been noted, individuals who 
oppose the EU for reasons of personal political gain rather than of any heartfelt opinion.  
How can all of these elements be squared?  At the heart of the problem lies Taggart’s focus 
on political parties: there is no consideration of the substantial amount of activity found in 
informal spaces, not just in France and the UK, but in all countries.390  The research here has 
seen that parties, as groups generally pre-dating the integration process, are more likely to 
shift to positions of opposition.  Viewed in that narrow context, it would make sense to see 
such shifts as a means to improve the party’s standing in a national party system.  However, 
placed together with non-party and intra-party groups, it becomes apparent that it has been 
European events that have been proximate drivers of opposition mobilisation, formation and 
(in the case of parties) shifts.  This does not preclude opportunists from exploiting the 
situation, but the persistence and increasing volume of EU opposition suggests that they 
form only part of the picture. 
 
The persistence of opposition leads into a comment on the one of the key findings of another 
well-known observer, Benoit.391  In his 1997 book, Benoit portrayed French opposition to 
the EU as a complete life cycle of growth-maturity-death during the period 1992-5.  The 
failure of anti-EU candidates in the presidential election of 1995 was seen to draw a curtain 
on a brief period of widespread activity, united by a common ideology of ‘socio-
nationalism’.  While the relative proximity of left- and right-wing critiques of integration has 
already been discussed in Chapter Three, the idea of a life cycle has been thoroughly 
undermined by the continued strength and growth of the anti-EU movement in France.  This 
is understandable inasmuch as the key events that revitalised French opposition – the 
Amsterdam treaty and the 1999 European elections –post-dated the publication of the book.  
However, it also betrays a lack of consideration of the trend towards a popularisation of 
                                                     
389 Taggart, 1998. 
390 See http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm for a comprehensive set of links to groups across 
Europe. 
391 Benoit, 1997. 
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opposition that was seen in both countries during the 1990s.  This popularisation makes it all 
the more necessary to look beyond the classic preoccupation with party politics and build in 
an awareness of developments in informal spaces. 
 
A final point to be dealt with here concerns the complaint that institutionalist approaches do 
not have sufficient explanatory power to deal with the question of the influence of anti-EU 
groups, or more precisely their lack of influence.392  Certainly, this question has not been at 
the forefront of this piece of research, and indeed was specifically left until the conclusions 
for a discussion.  The reason for this is clear: without a basic description, analysis and 
understanding of opposition, it is pointless to ask the question of what influence it has.  
Consequently, this piece of work forms a necessary basis upon which the matter of influence 
can be built. 
 
At one level, the rising profile of opposition has not been matched by a concurrent rise in 
influence.  In the two countries, attempts to block the ratification of treaties – especially 
Maastricht – were nearly successful, but ultimately failed to prevent their full 
implementation.  Nor have anti-EU forces been able to gain decisive control of any national 
institution and force major changes in European policy.  Seen in this light, there has been no 
direct or substantive influence on the part of opposition movements.  However, at the same 
time, this has not meant that these groups have had no influence or impact at all. 
 
As has been argued, the FPP system in the UK makes governments particularly susceptible 
to influence when they have small parliamentary majorities.  This was certainly borne out by 
the experience of the Conservative party between 1992 and 1997.  As Wallace has 
documented, there were several occasions where anti-EU elements forced direct concessions 
on the part of the Major government vis-à-vis European policy, such as the vetoing of Jean-
Luc Dehaene for Commission President.393  Designed primarily as a means of placating anti-
EU elements within the party, these measures still offer the first example of influence over 
public policy in both countries.  To them can also be added the (unintentional) success of the 
Referendum Party in getting both the Conservative and Labour parties to agree to a 
referendum on membership of Stage 3 of EMU.394  The current popular majority against 
membership and the relative success of opposition groups in preparing for the referendum 
                                                     
392 Forster, 2002, p.5. 
393 Wallace, 1997. 
394 Unintentional in the sense that the Referendum Party had aimed to gain a majority in the House of Commons 
in 1997, hold its referendum on membership of the EU and then disband itself.  Major offered the 
referendum on the Euro in an attempt to minimise the threat to Tory marginal seats in the general election. 
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make it much more of a hurdle than securing parliamentary approval, given the size of the 
current Labour majority. 
 
In both countries, anti-EU parties have gained access to the European Parliament and 
ensured both an institutionalised voice for their concerns and an important source of 
information on current and future developments.  In this, French parties have been more 
successful than the British, both by virtue of their numbers and the cumulative experience of 
their presence: prior to 1999 there were very few actively anti-EU MEPs from the UK.  
While still not numerous enough to hold significant positions in European Parliament’s 
structures, the evolution of the UEN and EDN/EDD groups has marked the stabilisation of 
an anti-EU presence in the Parliament.395 
 
Moreover, in both countries it is clear that opposition groups have been successful in 
popularising the previously elite-centred debate over European policy.  This has manifested 
itself in various ways.  Firstly, there has been a shift from small, elite-based opposition 
groups to larger and more popular ones. This is a shift that is both a cause and an effect of 
the popularisation process: it is hard to believe that there would have been sufficient interest 
in mass bodies such as the Democracy Movement or the RPF in the early 1990s.  Secondly, 
there has been the growth in anti-EU discourse in the media, which plays an important role 
in the linking of elite and public domains.  Linked to this has been the large investment in 
modern technologies (especially the Internet) to contact individuals directly, without the 
interface of the media, an investment that is all the more powerful given the very weak 
presence of pro-EU groups. Thirdly, British and French groups have been active in the 
support of similar groups in other countries, the former primarily through non-party 
umbrella groups such as TEAM and the latter primarily through their presence in the 
European Parliament.  Fourthly, in the UK the semi-permanent discussion about Euro 
membership since 1997 has further raised the issue’s profile and importance amongst the 
general public. 
 
The consequence of this popularisation has been an increasing level of interest on the part of 
citizens and an increasing desire to actively placate those citizens on the part of the elites.  
Certainly, the difficulties of the Maastricht ratification opened the eyes of many to the 
disjuncture between the two levels: not for nothing was one article on this subject entitled 
                                                     
395 See G. Benedetto, 2002, ‘Party competition and office distribution in the European Parliament, 1994-2002’, 
Paper presented at the 32nd annual UACES conference, Belfast, 2-4 September, 2002 and Benedetto, 2001, 
for more on the anti-EU presence in the European Parliament. 
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‘Uncorking the Bottle’.396  In the post-Maastricht European Union, the growth of public 
interest, driven in no small part by anti-EU groups with their diverse strategies, has arguably 
resulted in the current elevation of popular concerns in the form of the Convention on the 
Future of the EU.  This precursor to the IGC in 2004 was explicitly designed to bridge the 
gap that is perceived to have developed: the first challenge laid out in the Laeken 
Declaration is “…how to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European 
design and the European institutions”.397  Even with the vast array of policy objectives that 
opposition groups hold, the full and meaningful involvement of the EU’s citizens in its 
future development is a positive step, both in ensuring that the full variety of public opinions 
is heard and in opening up another, more direct route by which anti-EU elements can 
influence the EU.  Neunreither characterised the EU as ‘governance without opposition’, but 
the Convention model offers a clear means for EU opposition to be re-introduced into the 
Union’s governance system.398  Already, those anti-EU members of the Convention have 
organised themselves into a coherent group, the Democracy Forum, and are making every 
effort to make their voice heard.399 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In terms of the study of the European Union more generally, the thesis adds to the 
knowledge and understanding of an increasingly important issue, albeit one of still uncertain 
influence.  As has just been discussed, the Convention on the Future of the EU represents at 
least an indirect recognition of the need to reincorporate popular concerns and unrest back 
into the system.  However, the research also had broader implications, all revolving around 
the central idea of europeanisation. 
 
Europeanisation is concerned with the impact of European developments and events on 
national structures, and vice versa.400  In this, the thesis adds to the understanding of how the 
EU affects individuals and national party systems, as well as the interaction of the European 
and national levels. 
 
                                                     
396 Franklin, Marsh & McLaren, 1994. 
397 Full text available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm. 
398 Neunreither, 1998. 
399 Jens-Peter Bonde’s website has full documentation on this 
(http://www.bonde.com/index.phtml?selected_topic=35), as does William Abitbol’s site 
(http://www.convention-france.com/0a_convention.htm).  
400 The normal starting point is R. Ladrech, 1994, ‘Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case 
of France’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.32-1, pp.69-88.  Also see S. Bulmer & M. Burch, 
2001, ‘The ‘europeanisation’ of central government: The UK and Germany in historical institutionalist 
perspective’, in M. Aspinwall & G. Schneider (eds.), The Rules of Integration, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, pp.73-96 and Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999. 
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As has been discussed in the first half of the conclusions, it has clearly been shown that 
European events are always proximate to individuals’ mobilisation and formation into 
groups.  Thus a direct link is posited between the level of the EU and the level of the citizen.  
Even if it is apparent that some individuals have ‘used’ the European issue opportunistically, 
it is still evident that this EU-citizen link does explain a large amount of anti-EU opposition 
development.  As a result, it would appear to run counter to the ideas laid out by several 
authors on the ‘second-order’ nature of the EU.401  If the EU has been demonstrated to be 
secondary to national political issues in events such as European elections, referenda and 
even – in Taggart’s view – opposition itself, how can that be squared with the first-order 
nature of opposition proposed in this thesis? 
 
A critique of Taggart has already been made in the previous section and does not require 
repetition here.  Nor it is suggested that other authors have made a mistake.  Instead, the 
proposition here is that opposition to the EU falls into a different category from other 
second-order events.  European elections and referenda are linked by the involvement of an 
entire national polity, whereas EU opposition, by definition, is limited to those individuals 
and groups that are specifically interested (for negative reasons) in the EU.  This means that 
it is not only to be expected that opposition to the EU is first-order, but that it is indeed a 
fundamental characteristic.  The lack of opposition sites within the EU itself, as Neunreither 
suggests, results in a reflux back into national systems.  This reflux is strengthened by the 
focus of most anti-EU groups on the relationship between their country and the EU, rather 
than any wholesale reform of the Union.  The upshot of this is that a situation exists where a 
first-order European phenomenon is located within national systems.  The irony of anti-EU 
elements marking the first demonstrable expression of a first-order event amongst the EU’s 
citizens is apparently lost on them, even with the growth of explicitly trans-national anti-EU 
movements. 
 
This does not necessarily mean that the anti-EU movement is a forerunner of other events 
becoming first-order.  Clearly, it presents very particular characteristics, namely its explicit 
focus on the EU’s development and its limited membership.  In the period since the 
Maastricht treaty, there has been no evidence to suggest that European elections or referenda 
have become any less national.  However, if the anti-EU movement continues to help 
politicise the integration project at the popular level, then it is conceivable that in time the 
EU could become a first-order issue.  Of course, this is a long-term development, but one 
that could be of considerable consequence to the Union’s future development. 
                                                     
401 See footnote 18 for titles. 
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With regard to parties, it has been shown how different parties and party systems have 
responded to the European issue.  In both France and the UK, the European issue has 
produced significant effects.  In the former, it has resulted in three splinter parties (the MPF, 
RPF and MDC), as well as the turning of parties such as the Front National to an anti-EU 
position and the creation of one new party, Chasse-Pêche-Nature-Traditions.  In the UK, it 
has produced major shifts in the positions of the Conservatives and the Labour party, also 
manifesting itself in the creation of numerous intra-party groups.  While there has not been a 
major realignment in either country around the European issue, it has certainly coloured 
party political debate in both cases.402  The diversification of party positions in the wake of 
Maastricht was partly tactical, but was also a reflection of the need to develop policies that 
went beyond a simple permissiveness.  Maastricht was not only an eye-opener for publics, 
but also for political parties.  What had previously been a policy position held primarily on 
the extremes of party spectra was suddenly viable as a centrist position, typified by the 
Conservatives, but even more by the French splinter parties.  It is not coincidentally that the 
MPF, RPF and MDC only differ from their parent parties on the matter of the EU: anti-EU 
policy positions were seen as being compatible with moderate left- and right-wing politics. 
 
Finally, some light has been shed upon the interaction between the national and European 
levels.  As has been demonstrated, opposition to the EU is driven by European events, but 
manifests itself at the national level.  The primary object of every anti-EU group that has 
been covered in this thesis has been to change national policy on the EU, rather than to 
change the policies of the EU itself.  At one level, it can be argued that the focus on the 
national level could also be seen as a vindication of liberal-intergovernmentalist views of the 
Union.403  Anti-EU groups have identified national governments as the key players in the 
Union’s decision-making process and so have targeted them in the same way as another 
sectoral interest within a national polity. 
 
However, the counter-argument is that this is simply a rational approach for individuals and 
groups that question the decisions, if not indeed the legitimacy, of the Union.  In its most 
extreme form, if a group aims to secure withdrawal from the Union then clearly it will be 
concerned with the national polity, since that is the one that is intended to last.  Only when 
groups seek sectoral objectives is there a reason to act at the European level.  This does not 
                                                     
402 Startin discusses at greater length the possibility of a realignment on the French right over Europe: N. Startin, 
2002, ‘Parties et patries: The troubled evolution of Europe and the French right’, Paper presented at the 32nd 
annual UACES conference, Belfast, 2-4 September, 2002. 
403 Moravcsik, 1999, is the basic text for this. 
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in itself provide proof positive that a Moravcsik type model is correct: just as European 
lobbyists tend to cluster in Brussels, so anti-EU groups cluster at the national level, because 
in both cases that is the optimal point for securing integration of their interests.404  Once 
again, there is a certain irony in all of this, given that anti-EU groups are amongst those most 
strongly convinced of the reality of the centralisation of power at the European level. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF OPPOSITION 
This research has highlighted the need to study opposition, not just within the European 
Union, but also more generally.  As was discussed in the introduction, opposition is an 
integral part of modern democratic life, in all its forms, both reflecting the structure and 
process of polities and possessing important characteristics of its own.  The work presented 
here not only confirms the importance of studying opposition, but also adds to our 
understanding of it. 
 
In some ways, looking at the particular case of the EU presents an easy object of study.  The 
lack of structures at the European level to incorporate and diffuse opposition has resulted in 
somewhat disproportionate effects.  This manifests itself both in a concentration at the 
national level and in a concentration of generalised opposition, i.e. opposition that questions 
the system as a whole.  This double concentration is clearly in line with Neunreither’s 
model, which has been discussed previously.  More pertinently, it exposes the way in which 
opposition was developed in a changing European system.  Traditionally, the study of 
opposition has been confined to national systems, since that has been the clear locus of 
political activity.  The combination of a consensus-based system that was created at the 
European level and the lack of a European public sphere might have led one to believe that 
the development of ‘European opposition’ was a moot point.  Certainly, for the first phase of 
the integration process that was true.  But the burgeoning European system was always 
going to impact on European publics at some point, a point apparently reached at Maastricht.  
Since then, there has been a blossoming of substantial opposition, often in novel forms.  All 
of this serves to underline the way in which opposition develops, even in the most 
unfavourable of conditions. 
 
Opposition is essential to democracy, since it is the necessary counterweight to democratic 
decision-making: it is the alternative position that offers citizens the possibility of a different 
                                                     
404 For more on interest groups, see J. Greenwood & M Aspinwall, 1998, Collective action in the EU: Interests 
and the new politics of associability, London, Routledge and B. Kohler-Koch, 1997, ‘Organized interests in 
the EC and the European Parliament’, in European Integration online Papers, Vol.1-9, at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm. 
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path.  While this thesis has focused on those groups that actively oppose the EU, it must also 
be recognised that there is a broad spectrum of opinion on what path the Union should take 
within the mass of those who support it.  These elements do not necessarily think the EU is 
perfect, but they do all recognise the basic legitimacy of its existence, something that is 
certainly not true of most anti-EU groups (sectoral groups being the obvious exception).  
The reason these groups have rejected the Union in its current form can be linked to the 
fundamentally ad hoc nature of the system.  Despite all the talk of a federal super-state or an 
intergovernmental arena, or possibly because of it, there is no clear overarching principle of 
organisation.  One argument that links anti-EU groups with those who would reform the 
Union is a concern at the lack of clear democratic and accountable structures.  
Unfortunately, the current round of proposals being floated in the Convention on the Future 
of the EU for a constitutional-type document that clarifies competences and decision-making 
is unlikely to placate the main part of the anti-EU movement, even if it does finally create 
sites for opposition within the Union. 
 
Opposition is a marker of the health of a political system.  In a system that succeeds in 
taking account of the full breadth of positions within its associated polity, there is relatively 
little need for opposition, excepting some option for intra-systemic alternation of power.  
However, when a system fails to provide, it opens itself up, firstly to intra-systemic 
opposition and then to systemic opposition, which sees the system itself as the root of the 
problem.  Already the lack of opportunities for intra-system opposition to develop in the EU 
has been discussed, leading to a small, but significant, section of European society that 
rejects the Union as a legitimate political structure. 
 
However, opposition is also a driver of democracy.  The growth of opposition to the EU has 
certainly contributed to an increased awareness on the part of Europe’s elites for the need to 
democratise the system, through increased transparency, inclusion and the building of 
legitimacy.  This has been a concern since Maastricht and one that has grown in importance 
with each new treaty reform until the present day, where a new form of that treaty reform is 
under way.  As has been mentioned already, the results of the 2004 IGC may well not soothe 
many opponents of the EU, but they will improve the democratic credentials and potential of 
the Union. 
 
This thesis strengthens the study of opposition in two ways.  Firstly, it highlights the need to 
have a broad conception of what ‘opposition’ covers.  Secondly, it offers a model that is 
applicable to a wide variety of oppositions. 
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A starting point for the research was a clear gap in the literature on opposition in the EU.  
The traditional foci on party politics and public opinion meant that an important part of the 
anti-EU movement was being overlooked.  Non-party groups form an essential part of those 
movements in both France and the UK, and are vital in having a clear understanding of how 
the EU impacts on national systems.  As has been argued, this oversight has contributed to 
several models of opposition that do not fit the empirical evidence.  In a more general 
context, organised non-party political opposition is an important part of any democratic 
political system.  What has been argued here is that party politics and public opinion are not 
dichotomous, but rather two ends of a spectrum.  In between there lie non-party and intra-
party groups, both of which draw together elements of the two end points.  More 
importantly, these groups interact with themselves and with parties and publics, creating the 
opportunity for influence.  An unwillingness to incorporate them into many analyses raises 
the possibility of the problem just mentioned, of models that do not match the evidence. 
 
The structure used here offers an easily reproducible means of measuring and evaluating 
opposition in a variety of forms.  The model of institutional spaces that was developed in 
order to address the main hypotheses is itself based on a set of sub-hypotheses, with one 
exception, that hold true for any type of opposition.  The ideas of access and carrying 
capacity work in any institutional system and are in no way issue specific.  The exception 
lies in the sub-hypothesis concerning the relative interest of anti-EU elements in national and 
supranational institutions, over sub-national ones.  For other types of opposition and interest 
representation it is easy to use the institutional framework as a base for constructing 
taxonomies similar to those presenting in the body of the thesis.  Indeed, such work would 
serve to strengthen the theoretical base of the model further, since similar patterns of 
development within a national system would be expected.  Of course, different issues have 
different impulses and this would mean no a priori synchronicity could be expected between 
issues.  However, the pattern of distribution would logically be the same across issues, given 
the same set of opportunities for access and presence within formal institutions. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis aimed to understand the pattern of formation and development of opposition to 
the European Union.  It took the two case studies of France and the UK and used an 
institutionalist framework to map and describe groups involved in such opposition.  This 
included political parties and non-party organised opposition, the last having been 
previously overlooked.  In so doing, it fully supported the key hypotheses of the research 
project.  As a result, it is possible to say that European, rather than national, events have 
driven opposition to the EU, that national institutional structures have been vital in the 
pattern of group formation and development, and that over time the volume and profile of 
opposition has increased.  These findings make an important contribution to the 
understanding and explanation of opposition to the EU, providing a clear advance on both 
socio-historical explanations and models that have concentrated on a single level of 
opposition.  They have also contributed to the understanding of the interaction of European 
and national levels within the Union and offered a model of interest representation that is 
applicable over a wide variety of issues. 
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Annex 1: Groups not covered 
 
NO ACTIVE ANTI-EU POLICY 
These groups have multiple members and anti-EU policies, but only as an incidental to their 
other activities.  Unlike secondary-focus groups, which fall within the scope of the thesis 
and which make some active use of their anti-EU position, these groups go no further than a 
simple expression of their opposition to the EU.  There is no elaboration and the position is 
nothing more an extrapolation of their core policy positions.  As such, they fall outside the 
definition provided in the introduction (p.20) of opposition groups. 
 
• Académie du Gaullisme – As is clear from its name, the Académie promotes 
Gaullist thinking on the Fifth Republic.  It wants a confederal Europe of sovereign 
nations, but has not pursued any active strategy to this end.  See 
http://acadgaul.free.fr/Presentation dossier/Presentation/index.html. 
 
• British Housewives’ League – Set up in 1945, the League aims to give a voice to 
housewives.  Part of this includes informing them of the consequences of EU 
membership, to which the League is clearly opposed.  However, since its 
participation in the 1975 referendum campaign, the group has not engaged in any 
active strategy vis-à-vis the EU outside of its membership, which currently stands at 
roughly 1,000.  The League is affiliated to CIB.  See 
http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=65. 
 
• Christian Heritage Party – The ‘political wing’ of the Institute of Christian 
Political Thought, the British section of which was set up in 1995, the CHP makes 
only peripheral mention of the EU on its official website, and even then it does not 
form part of its programme.  Certainly, the party has not been active in any way on 
the issue.  See http://www.kuyper.org/icpt/icpt_idx.html. 
 
• Liberal Party – Formed in the wake of the merger between the Liberals and the 
Social Democratic Party in 1988, the rump Liberal Party holds to ‘true liberal’ 
values.  This has included a generally positive policy towards the European Union.  
However, in November 1998, the party’s Assembly voted in favour of withdrawal 
from the EU, on the grounds that it was incapable of reform.  This vote went against 
the majority of the leadership, and there has been no evidence that the party has 
actually done anything to pursue its new policy.  See 
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http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=90 and Independent 
09/11/1998, ‘Pandora’. 
 
• Libertarian Alliance – Originally set up in 1969, and taking its current name in 
1979, the Alliance is a radical libertarian think-tank, with little central organisation.  
While it has produced various critiques of the EU from the libertarian perspective 
(see http://www.libertarian.co.uk/), the Alliance itself has not been active in any 
meaningful sense on the issue.  One of its leading members, Sean Gabb, is 
responsible for the ‘Candidlist’, which lists MPs’ and prospective MPs’ view on the 
EU (http://www.candidlist.demon.co.uk/). 
 
• Monday Club – Founded in 1961, the Monday Club only came round to an anti-EU 
position in the 1980s.  However, the essential focus of the Club has been its 
positions on law, order and immigration, the last of which resulted in the severing of 
links with the Conservative Party in August 2001.  No active policy has pursued on 
the issue of Europe.  See http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=92 
and http://www.conservativeuk.com/. 
 
• National Association of Referendum Party Supporters Groups – The NARPSG 
emerged from the immediate collapse of the Referendum Party and prefigured the 
formation of the Democracy Movement.  During this brief period, it did not pursue 
any policy objectives, being solely concerned with the preservation of the 
movement.  As such it was essentially a latent group.  See 
http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=113. 
 
• 4Sterling.org – Set up by businessmen in Worcestershire in the late 1990s, 
4Sterling does not have any presence except its website, which acts as a posting 
board for its (small number of) members’ view on EMU.  See http://4sterling.org/. 
 
 
ONE-MAN GROUPS 
These are groups in name only.  Usually this means that they are a single person trying to 
convey the impression of being representative of a larger group.  In all these cases, there is 
no media coverage at all, and the individuals involved tend to speak in their own name. 
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• Campaign for United Kingdom Conservatism – Set up in 1994, the 
Campaign is essentially a vehicle created by Rodney Atkinson (ex-UKIP 
member and brother of comedian Rowan).  As such, the ‘group’ is little more 
than a shell, as evidenced by the activity of Atkinson, who has continued to 
speak in his own name, rather than that of the Campaign.  See 
http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=72. 
 
• Cheaper Food League – As with CUKC, the Cheaper Food League is a vehicle 
for Conservative MP Teddy Taylor, and lacks any evidence of activity, despite 
its affiliation to CIB.  See 
http://www.britainineurope.org/sh_antieu.phtml?fid=126. 
 
• Cybertrucker/Truth about Europe Campaign – Both of these websites are 
run by the same individual (‘Chris’), the former dealing with the introduction of 
speed-limiters into lorries and the latter offering information on the EU.  
However, there is no indication that there is any larger group behind these sites.  
See http://members.tripod.com/~Cybertrucker/index.htm and 
http://members.tripod.com/~eurotruth/index.htm. 
 
• Labour European Forum – The only presence that this ‘group’ exists is its 
website, which confirms that it is little more than a vehicle for Labour MP Ken 
Coates.  Despite various pieces on matters European, there is no evidence of 
substantive activity or of other members.  See 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/elfeuro/. 
 
• Populist Party – The Populist Party counts opposition to the EU as a key policy 
position in its (very) brief programme on its website.  However, there is no 
evidence to suggest the party, which appears to be a one-man band (Russell 
White), has contested any elections.  See 
http://www.iits.dircon.co.uk/populist.htm. 
 
• Progressive Liberal Party – The PLP is pro-withdrawal from the EU, but as 
with the Populist Party there is no evidence of group organisation or of 
contesting any elections.  The assumption is that the ‘party’ is a single person.  
See http://www.raf.cwc.net/. 
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TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS 
Whilst these groups have both active anti-EU policies and multiple memberships, they fall 
outside of the national frameworks that are the focus of this thesis.  Their impact is 
considered primarily as a function of national groups’ stategies. 
 
 Europe des Nations (EDN) – The first explicitly anti-EU grouping in the European 
Parliament, the EDN developed in 1994 after L’Autre Europe’s success allowed it to 
form the nucleus of a group, along with smaller Danish and Dutch parties.  By the 
time of its demise in 1999, it had also been joined by one Ulster Unionist, the result 
of a pay off between the UUP and the Referendum Party in 1997, which ensured no 
campaigning by the latter in Northern Ireland during the general election, in return 
for the UUP joining the EDN, so as to met the minimum numbers requirement for 
group status (Carter et al, 1998, p.476). 
 
 Europe of Democracies and Differences (EDD) – The EDD group in the European 
Parliament was formed in the wake of the 1999 elections, after the departure of the 
RPF’s MEPs from the EDN to the UEN (see below).  Initially consisting of 16 
members from 4 countries, the French CPNT and British UKIP were later joined by 
three dissident RPF MEPs in late 1999, working under the banner of Combats 
Souverainistes.  It should be noted that one of the 3 UKIP MEPs, Michael Holmes, 
left the group in March 2000 when he was removed from his position has party 
leader.  See http://www.europarl.eu.int/edd/. 
 
 SOS Democracy – A European Parliament intergroup since late 1998, SOS 
Democracy brings together members of the EDD, Swedish and Finnish socialists 
and Swedish Greens.  The group holds regular meetings in order to discuss 
parliamentary agendas, as well as coordinating activity within the Convention on the 
Future of the EU.  There is a dedicated website (http://www.eusceptic.org/sos/), as 
well as extensive information on Jens-Peter Bonde’s site (http://www.bonde.com/). 
 
 The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements (TEAM) – Set up at the 1992 
Edinburgh ‘counter-summit’, TEAM (originally the Trans-European Anti-
Maastricht Alliance) only developed a formal structure in 1997 (Agence France 
Presse 03/03/1997, ‘40 anti-EU organisations form body to oppose revised 
Maastricht’).  Full British members include CIB, Campaign Against Euro-
Federalism, UKIP, Youth for a Free Europe and Bruges Group: LESC, the Green 
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party and the Democracy Movement have observer status.  The Etats Généraux de la 
Souveraineté Nationale is the only full French member.  TEAM’s website provides 
full details (http://www.teameurope.info/index.html). 
 
 Union pour l’Europe des Nations (UEN) – Born in 1999 out of the RPF grouping 
and the remains of the European Democratic Alliance, the UEN initially brought 
together 21 MEPs from 4 countries, later joined by the Italian Alleanza Nazionale.  6 
French MEPs left in 2001, after the split between the RPF and MPF, to become non-
attached (Figaro 17/01/2001, ‘Six villieristes quittent le groupe de Pasqua’).  See 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/uen/. 
 
 
FURTHER LINKS 
All groups on this list, as well as all groups included in the body of the thesis, are included in 
a website of anti-EU links across Europe, compiled by the author: 
http://www.susherwood.fsnet.co.uk/weblinks.htm.  It will be noted that various other groups 
not mentioned here are also present on this site.  This was the result of a very broad sweep of 
possible groups for inclusion.  All those sites not mentioned here, but found on the site, fall 
outside because they are simply informational (without an associated group behind them) or 
because they were formed after the study period ended. 
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Annex 2: Memberships of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999 
British Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Anti-Federalist League                300 500
Anti Maastricht Alliance                 - - - - - - - -
Anti Common Market League 500              500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Britain Out of Europe Campaign                - -
British Weights and Measures Association                800 800 800 800 800
Business for Sterling                2000 2000
Bruges Group             1000 1000 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism               600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Conservative European Reform Group 50 50          50 50 50 50 50 80 50 50 15 - - - -
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 4000              4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
Campaign for an Independent Britain 3400              3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 3400 
Congress for Democracy                - - -
Democracy Movement              200000 200000 
European Foundation                - - - - - - - -
European Research Group                - - - - - -
Fresh Start Group               50 50
Global Britain                - -
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign 150              150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
New Alliance                - - -
New Europe                1000
No               - 
People’s Europe Campaign               50 50
Referendum Party               20000 220000
Save Britain’s Fish               200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Trade Unions Against the Single Currency                - - -
UK Independence Party               3000 3000 3000 4000 4000 4000 8000
Youth Against the European Union                100 200 200 200
Youth For a Free Europe                300
TOTAL 8100               8100 8100 8100 9100 9300 10450 10780 13250 13200 14065 35200 2352000 217150 222250
Figures in italics are extrapolated from the following year’s figure 
(continued over) 
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Annex 2: Memberships of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999 (cont’d) 
French Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France              3000 3000 
L’Autre Europe                10000
Combat pour les Valeurs        5000 5000       
Comité pour l’abrogation du traité du Maastricht             - - - 
Debout la République                500
Demain la France                - - - - - - 20000
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté Nationale                200 200
Rassemblement pour le Non                -
TOTAL 0               0 0 0 0 0 0 5000 5000 10000 0 0 0 23200 3700
Other Groups                
       Mouvement des Citoyens         2500 10000   10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 
       Mouvement pour la France           10000    10000 10000 10000 - 
       Rassemblement pour la France               100000 
TOTAL 0          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2500 10000 20000 20000 20000 20000 110000
GRAND TOTAL           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5000 7500 20000 20000 20000 20000 43200 113700
Figures in italics are extrapolated from the following year’s figure 
 (Source: Based on interviews, group materials and newspaper reports) 
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Annex 3: National Election Results of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999, Percentage of Total Vote 
British Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992(1) 1993 1994(2) 1995 1996 1997(1) 1998 1999(2)
Anti-Federalist League                0.013
Anti Maastricht Alliance                 
Anti Common Market League                
Britain Out of Europe Campaign                
British Weights and Measures Association                
Bruges Group                
Business for Sterling                
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism                
Conservative European Reform Group                
Conservatives Against a Federal Europe                
Campaign for an Independent Britain                
Congress for Democracy                
Democracy Movement                
European Foundation                
European Research Group                
Fresh Start Group                
Global Britain                
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign                
New Alliance                
New Europe                
No                
People’s Europe Campaign                
Referendum Party                2.6
Save Britain’s Fish                
Trade Unions Against the Single Currency                
UK Independence Party                1.0 0.3 7.0
Youth Against the European Union                
Youth For a Free Europe                
TOTAL                0.013 1.0 2.9 7.0
(1) – General Election in UK, Assemblée Nationale Election in France; (2) – European Election; (3) – French Presidential Election 
(continued over) 
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Annex 3: National Election Results of Anti-EU Groups by year, 1985-1999, Percentage of Total Vote 
(cont’d) 
French Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994(2) 1995(3) 1996 1997(1) 1998 1999(2)
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France                
L’Autre Europe                12.34
Combat pour les Valeurs                
Comité pour l’abrogation du traité du 
Maastricht 
               
Debout la République                
Demain la France                
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté 
Nationale 
               
Rassemblement pour le Non                
TOTAL                12.34
Other Groups                
       Mouvement des Citoyens          2.54   -  - 
       Mouvement pour la France           4.74  2.8   
       Rassemblement pour la France               13.06 
TOTAL                2.54 4.74 2.8 13.06
GRAND TOTAL                14.88 4.74 2.8 13.06
(1) – General Election in UK, Assemblée Nationale Election in France; (2) – European Election; (3) – French Presidential Election 
 
(Source: Based on Année politique économique et sociale en France; Butler & Butler, 2000) 
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ANNEX 4: By-Election Performances by anti-EU Groups in 
the UK, 1985-1999 
 
 
 
Constituency Date Group % Share of 
Vote 
Newbury 5/93 UKIP 1.0 
Christchurch 7/93 UKIP 1.6 
Barking 6/94 UKIP 2.1 
Eastleigh 6/94 UKIP 1.7 
Newham North East 6/94 UKIP 2.6 
Dagenham 6/94 UKIP 2.1 
Dudley West 12/94 UKIP 1.4 
Islwyn 2/95 UKIP 1.2 
Perth and Kinross 5/95 UKIP 1.2 
Littleborough and Saddleworth 7/95 UKIP 1.3 
Hemsworth 1/96 UKIP 2.1 
South East Staffordshire 4/96 UKIP 2.9 
Barnsley East 12/96 UKIP 2.1 
Wirral South 2/97 UKIP 0.9 
Uxbridge 7/97 UKIP 0.1 
Winchester 11/97 UKIP 1.0 
Leeds Central 6/99 UKIP 2.7 
Hamilton South 9/99 UKIP 0.3 
Wigan 9/99 UKIP 5.2 
Kensington and Chelsea 11/99 UKIP 2.3 
 
Source: House of Commons, 2001, ‘By-election results: 1997-2000’, House of Commons Research Paper, No. 
01/36, and House of Commons, 1997, ‘By-elections since the 1992 general election’, House of Commons 
Research Paper, No. 97/32. 
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Annex 5: Media References to Anti-EU Groups by Year, 1985-1999 
British Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Anti-Federalist League          2 4 7       
Anti Maastricht Alliance                 0.25 1 1.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 2.25 0.75
Anti Common Market League                0.25 0 0.5 0 0 0.25 0.25
Britain Out of Europe Campaign                
British Weights and Measures 
Association 
               0.25 0 0 0 0.75
Business for Sterling                18.5 45.75
Bruges Group                9 27 69 14.25 4 9.5 8.25 6.5 1.75 3.5 6
Campaign Against Euro-Federalism                0.25 0.25
Conservative European Reform Group 3.5 3.5 1 1 2.67 2.75 10 9.5 0.75 1.25 0.5 0.25 0 0 0 
Conservatives Against a Federal 
Europe 
               0.25 0.25 0 0.5 1.25 1 1.75 3.25
Campaign for an Independent Britain                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Congress for Democracy                0.5
Democracy Movement                4.75 7.5
European Foundation                2 4.5 4.75 14 2 4.25 4.75
European Research Group                0.25 2.25 6.75 1.5 4.5 0.75
Fresh Start Group                1 1.75 2.25 6 0 0 0.25
Global Britain                1.75 2.75
Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign                0.5 1 1 1 0.75
New Alliance                
New Europe                0.25 17.5
No                
People’s Europe Campaign                0.5 0.25
Referendum Party               1.25 11 147.25 165.5 17.5 24.25
Save Britain’s Fish                0.5 0 0.5 2.5 3.75 1.25 0.75 0.5
Trade Unions Against the Single 
Currency 
               
UK Independence Party               10.75 9.5 19.25 31.75 5.25 55.5
Youth Against the European Union                
Youth For a Free Europe                
TOTAL 3.5               3.5 1 1 11.67 29.75 81 29.75 17 31.5 46.75 200.75 206.25 66.75 171.75
(continued over) 
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Annex 5: Media References to Anti-EU Groups by Year, 1985-1999 (cont’d) 
French Groups 
NAME                1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Alliance pour la Souveraineté de la France                1.5 1.25
L’Autre Europe                20 1
Combat pour les Valeurs       0.5 24 6.33 14 2.58 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 
Comité pour l’abrogation du traité du 
Maastricht 
             0.5  
Debout la République                2
Demain la France                6.5 4 4 1.66 0.66 4.25 7.25 12.42 7
Etats Généraux de la Souveraineté 
Nationale 
             .25  0
Rassemblement pour le Non                12
TOTAL 0          4. 5  15.17  0 0 0 0 0 7 40 10.33 35.66 4.24 7 7.5 10.5
Other Gr oups                
       Mouvement des Citoyens        10 44.66 54 63.58 48.75 90.75 99.33 110.25 
       Mouvement pour la France          10 33.42 14.75 43 33.33 20.5 
       Rassemblement pour la France               56.5 
TOTAL 0            0 0 0 0 0 0 10 44.66 64 97 63.5 133.75 132.66 187.25
GRAND TOTAL                0 0 0 0 0 0 7 50 55 99.66 101.24 68.25 141.25 147.83 197.75
ear Figures are references per national newspaper per y
(Source: Lexis-Nexis database) 
 
 259
